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I examine the relationship between social structural factors and political behavior 
by applying the concept of social cleavage in American society. Lipset and Rokkan 
(1967) developed the concept of social cleavage to explain the influence of social 
structure on political behavior in the 1960s. They suggest that social cleavage emerged in 
Western Europe in the 1920s and persisted until the 1960s. Some scholars claim that the 
influence of social group membership is not as influential in predicting voting behavior in 
elections as it was in the 1960s, while other scholars argue that social cleavages are still 
important in explaining individuals’ choices in elections. Additionally, many scholars 
believe that issue-based factors reduce the influence of social structure on voting 
behavior. 
I first analyze the voting trend of classes, religious groups, and regions, and their 
magnitude of cleavage since 1980. Second, I examine the influence of economic and 
cultural factors on Presidential voting. Third, I estimate the relative size of the effects of 
economic and cultural factors on Presidential voting. Fourth, I demonstrate the influence 
of economic and economic factors on social cleavages.
 
 






The findings show that social group membership and geographical residence are 
significant factors in Presidential elections between 1980 and 2008. Political cleavage
based on religious group membership is the greatest. Voters also have more distinctive 
political preferences based on micro-regional residence compared to macro-regional 
residence. The binary logistic regression analysis showed that economic and cultural
factors are significantly associated with Presidential elections between 1984 and 2008, 
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The influence of social structure on individual behavior has been a main interest 
in sociology from the beginning stage of classical sociology (Parsons 1967). Although
definitions of social structure vary widely, it can be generally defined as “the more or less 
enduring pattern of social arrangements within a particular society group, or social 
organization” (Jary and Jary 2006). In this research, social structure refers to enduring 
social divisions based on social groups such as class, religion, and region.
Many sociologists argue both at the theoretical and empirical levels that social
structures influence individual behavior (Alexander 1982; Bourdieu 1984; Geertz 1973; 
Giddens 1984). The same logic has been applied to political sociology. Social structure 
influences individual political behavior (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Alexander 1982; 
Himmelstrand 1986). Even though some scholars discuss it at the theoretical level, many 
studies focus on the relationship between social structure and political behavior at the 
empirical level (Dalton 1996; Manza and Brooks 1999; Franklin 2010). To examine the 
relationship between social structure and political behavior, many scholars have used the 
term social cleavage, which is defined as “patterns of political alignment arising out of 
social-structural divisions.” The concept of social cleavage includes social division, 
shared group identity, and political interest (Franklin 2010; Bartolini and Mair 1990; 


















electoral studies, I will use it to examine the relationship between social structure and 
political behavior (e.g., vote choice).  
Social Structure, Social Cleavage, and Voting 
The argument that social structure influences political behavior has been 
challenged by the argument that attitudes toward economic (e.g., previous performance of 
incumbent party, prospective economic policy of candidate) and cultural issues (e.g., 
abortion, gays and lesbians, feminism, and environmentalism) are more influential than 
social structure in voting behaviors (Downs 1957; Inglehart and Flanagan 1987; Inglehart 
and Abramson 1994; Wilcox 1994). However, other scholars claim that social structure 
still influences political behavior (Heath, Jowell, Curtice, Field, and Levine 1985; 
Weakliem 1995; Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1995; Manza and Brooks 1999; Nieuwbeerta 
1996; Evans 2000; Goldthorpe 2001; Raymond 2011). For example, Manza, Hout, and 
Brooks (1995) suggest that the social bases of voting behavior have been one of the main 
topics in political sociology, along with the relationship between states and societies.
Other scholars show that social group membership for class, religious affiliation, and 
ethnicity influences individuals’ voting behaviors of the empirical level even though 
there are variations in the pattern of the relationships (Alford 1963; Lipset and Rokkan 
1967; Hout, Manza, and Brooks 1999; Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989; Layman 2001).
Despite different perspectives on the role of social structural factors in elections, 
few sociologists deny the influence of social structure on individual behaviors because 
the existence and influence of social structure have been evident to sociologists from the 
beginning stage of classical sociology (Durkheim 1951). Alexander (1987:11) explains 













   
 
there are structures separate from the individuals who compose it.” Therefore, the 
existence of social structure is a basic presupposition of sociologists, although there is no 
agreement on how social structure is generated and maintained (Alexander 1987). 
However, observable facts should support the assumption that social structure 
exists outside individuals. As Van Fraassen (1980:12) explains, “Science aims to give us
theories which are empirically adequate.” Furthermore, social theory on social structure 
should be changed if the observable social structure changes over time. For this reason, if
social structure changes in some societies, the relationship between social structural 
factors and individual voting behaviors also may change. Thus, observable facts at the 
empirical level need to support the proposition that a relationship between social 
structural factors and individual voting behaviors at the theoretical level, and the change 
of relationship between social structure and individual behaviors at the empirical level 
should be reflected in social theory.
Based on this argument, studying trends in relationships between social cleavages 
and voting behaviors is important because there is always a possibility that there will be 
changes in the relationship between social cleavage and individual behavior. Although 
the relationship between social cleavage and individuals’ voting patterns was stable until
the 1960s, many scholars claim that this relationship has changed since then (Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967; Inglehart and Abramson 1994; Franklin 2010).
To understand the trend of the relationship, it is necessary to understand how the 
pattern of the relationship between social cleavages and voting behaviors changes. 
Because social cleavages may be related to various short-term factors, it is also necessary
















cultural issues because they may influence the dynamic of social cleavages in elections. 
With regard to attitudes toward economic issues, proponents of the economic theory of 
voting suggest that rational voters tend to vote for the party which deliver better 
economic performance and offer better prospective economic policy for themselves 
regardless of their group membership (Fiorina 1978; Campbell, Dettrey, and Yin 2010).
With regard to attitudes toward cultural issues, some scholars argue that cultural 
movements, such as the Religious Right movement, influence voting behavior by 
emphasizing religious values during campaigns (Wilcox 1994; Williams 2010). Many 
scholars suggest that these issue-based factors make the influence of social structure on 
voting behavior decline (Inglehart and Flanagan 1987; Dalton 1996; Brooks, Dodson, 
Hotchkiss 2010; Franklin 2010). Thus, it is important to demonstrate whether these issue-
based factors really overshadow the influence of social structure on voting behavior.
Class Cleavage and Voting
In this research, I examine the relationship between social structural factors (e.g., 
social cleavage) and political behavior (e.g., Presidential voting) in American society. 
Because of the change of the global economic environment and government policy in the 
1980s, the industrial structure of the United States changed after the 1980s (Jenkins and 
Eckert 2000; Gill 1993; Alvarez, Garrett, and Lange 1991). These changes influenced the 
structure of social cleavage in the United States, especially class cleavage, and its 
relationship with voting behavior. For example, professionals leaned toward the 
Democratic Party, while the working class who moved upwardly supported the 
Republican Party (Manza and Brooks 1999). Thus, I will focus on the trend of class



















Religious Cleavage and Voting
American religious cleavage also changed in the 1980s. In particular, conservative 
Christians participated in politics more actively by establishing the Religious Right 
organizations, such as the Moral Majority, the Christian Voice, and the Religious 
Roundtable Council. Before the late 1970s, many conservative Christians were not
involved in political activities because of their attitude toward separation of church and 
state. 
However, since the late 1970s, some fundamental Christians began to oppose the 
influence of secularism, such as the pro-choice movement toward abortion, while liberal 
Christians showed a more open mind toward the abortion issue (Hoffmann and Johnson 
2005). Accordingly, conservative Christians are more likely to participate in political 
activity by supporting the Republican Party while liberal Christians are less likely to 
support the Republican Party. These cultural polarization processes among religious 
groups, initiated in the late 1970s, deepened in the 1980s (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 
1996; Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Poole and Rosenthal 1984). Thus, I will deal with the 
trend of religious cleavage between 1980 and 2008.  
Regional Cleavage and Voting
To examine the relationship between social cleavages and voting behaviors,
regional or sectional cleavage also need to be considered. Even though Lipset and 
Rokkan (1967) dealt with regional or sectional cleavage, regional cleavage has received 
less attention in electoral research than other social cleavages. Many scholars suggest that 
a regional effect is another important influence on voting behavior. Regional difference is




















many scholars focus on the difference between the South and non-South in voting 
behavior (Key 1949; Petrocik 1987). However, some scholars began to focus on the 
importance of the rise of the Sunbelt because Sunbelt residents are regarded as strong 
Republican supporters. Other scholars study the role of suburbanization. Traditionally, 
suburban residents are assumed to support conservative parties because these residents
have high levels of education and income. The suburban population is growing very fast, 
so the impact of suburban voting is important in national elections. Because of the
strategic importance of suburban areas, political campaigners have paid close attention to 
suburban areas. Suburbanization also accelerated in the 1980s due to the change of 
industrial structure. As urbanization in the 1930s was advantageous for the Democratic 
Party, accelerated suburbanization was helpful for the Republican Party after the 1980s
(Key 1942; Zikmund 1967; McKee and Shaw 2003; Gainsborough 2005). Thus, I will
deal with the trend of regional cleavage between 1980 and 2008.  
Theoretical Background
Even though there are various perspectives about social structure, many 
sociological theories on the topic originate from the perspectives of two theoretical 
traditions: instrumental and normative approaches (Alexander 1986). Alexander 
(1988:20) explains that “the theoretical legacies of Weber and Marx have framed modern
instrumentalist explanations of social structure…the great accomplishment of 
instrumental structuralism is to demonstrate that individual action is strongly affected by 
the material context within which it occurs…” With regard to the normative approach to
social structure, he explains that “for Durkheim, the emotional bonds of social solidarity 














which all others emerged.” (Alexander 1988:25). He continues to explain that “if
instrumental structuralists demonstrate the impact of the material environment on 
individuals, normative thinkers just as forcefully indicate that action is regulated by 
moral structures internalized in the personalities of individuals” (Alexander 1988:29-30). 
Many sociologists, including Max Weber, try to integrate materialist and normative 
approaches to social structure, but two social structural approaches to social structure still 
influence theoretical perspectives on social structure (Weber 1968; Geertz 1973; 
Habermas 1975; Collins 1981; Bourdieu 1984; Hays 1994; Scott 2012; Emirbayer and 
Noble 2013). 
Traditional approaches to social cleavage emphasize an instrumental approach to 
social structure rather than a normative approach, although a cultural element, such as 
shared group identity, is included in the concept of social cleavage. Manza and Brooks 
(1999:32) differentiate social-structural cleavage from ideological cleavage However, 
Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) concept of social cleavage is closer to the Weberian tradition 
than the Marxist tradition because the concept of social cleavage includes not only social-
structural division but also shared group identity and political interest among social group 
members (Franklin 2010; Bartolini and Mair 1990; Manza and Brooks 1999). Because I
use Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) traditional concept of social cleavage, the concept of
social structure in the current research follows an instrumental approach rather than a
normative approach.
In the current research, social cleavages are used to investigate the relationship 
between social structure and voting behavior because social cleavage includes social-















   
electoral studies, so I consider social cleavages as long-term factors. On the other hand, I 
consider voters’ preference and attitudes toward various issues to be short-term factors
(Franklin, Mackie, and Valen 1992; Walczak, van der Brug, and de Vries 2012). Even 
though there are various approaches to culture, I follow the subjective approach to 
culture. Wuthnow (1989a) identifies four approaches to culture: subjective, structural, 
dramaturgic, and institutional. Wuthnow (1989a:11) explains that “the subjective 
approach focuses on beliefs and attitudes, opinions and values,” while “the structural 
approach focuses on patterns and relationships among cultural elements themselves” and 
he also argues that “culture is typically conceptualized in subjective terms in survey 
research studies of public opinion.” In the current research, I take the subjective approach 
to culture to understand the relationship between social structure as social organization 
and culture as voters’ opinions and attitudes.
Traditional and New Social Cleavages
Dalton and Wattenberg (2000) argue that new types of social cleavage, such as 
gender cleavage and race cleavage, are also relevant to the change of Western democratic 
societies. Manza and Brooks (1999) consider these new types of social cleavage, such as 
race and gender, in their analysis. They explain that race and gender cleavages became 
important influences’ on American voters’ behaviors in Presidential elections in the post-
Civil Rights era. However, I will focus on traditional social cleavages. Although many
scholars argue against the claim that social cleavages declined since the 1960s, it seems 
that most scholars agree with the argument that at least one social cleavage, especially 
regional cleavage, declined after World War II. For example, when Manza and Brooks 


















    
 
cleavage was unimportant in Presidential elections after World War II. Many scholars
overlook regional political differences because of the development of mass 
communication, growth of transportation systems, and high levels of education 
(Murauskas, Archer, and Shelley 1988). Although the political influence of central cities
and suburbs was emphasized in the 1930s and 1950s, it seems that voters’ socioeconomic 
characteristics are more important than voters’ location (Manza and Brooks 1999).
However, political geographers continue to argue that voter location has an 
independent relationship with voting behaviors (Ethington and McDaniel 2007; 
Gainsborough 2005; Agnew 1996). For example, Gainsborough (2005:436) explains that 
the emergence of suburban politics during the 1980s is not only based on voter
socioeconomic characteristics, but also on the contextual influence of residence. Political
geographers show that macro- and micro-regional factors are associated with voting 
patterns (McKee and Teigen 2009; Walks 2004; McKee and Shaw 2003). These 
arguments suggest that traditional social cleavages, including regional cleavages, are still 
associated with Presidential voting behaviors. Thus, I will examine whether traditional 
social cleavages really declined between 1980 and 2008. 
Research Questions and Conceptual Map
The current study will show whether social cleavages are still important in
explaining individuals’ choices in elections. Many scholars propose that the formation of
cleavages has changed, so they suggest that new classification systems for social 
cleavage are necessary to explain more diverse relationships between social cleavages 
and voting behavior (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Goldthorpe 1980; Hout, Brooks, and 









   
 
    
   
  
   
new class classification system to reflect the transformation of the class system in 
industrialized societies. Hout, Brooks, and Manza (1993) used Goldthorpe’s new class 
classification system to examine whether class cleavage had declined in Presidential
elections in the United States. Additionally, Brooks and Manza (2004) tried to use the 
most appropriate religious cleavage classification system at the time of their research.
My research questions are: Have social cleavages among voters in Presidential 
elections declined or remained the same since the 1980s? What is the relative importance 
of various economic and cultural issues? Thus, I first examine the voting trends of classes, 
religious groups, and regions, as well as their magnitudes of cleavage since 1980. Second, 
I examine the influence of economic issues on Presidential voting. Third, I examine the 
influence of cultural issues on Presidential voting. Fourth, I analyze the relative strength of
economic and cultural issues in social cleavage voting models. This analysis shows how 
social cleavages have changed since the 1980s and how they are changed when economic















Figure 1.1 Conceptual Framework
To address these questions I will use data from the ANES Time Series 
Cumulative Data File (The American National Election Studies 2010) and use binomial
logistic regression to analyze the association between social cleavages and vote choice 
and the influence of short-term factors on the relationship between social cleavages and 
vote choice. To measure the magnitude of social cleavage, I will use the Kappa Index 
developed by Manza and Brooks (1999). To measure the relative strength of short-term
factors on the social cleavage models, I will use standardized logistic regression 
coefficients. The analysis will show that social cleavages based on class, religion, and
macro- and micro-regions influence individuals’ vote choice and that the influence of 
social cleavage on vote choice will not disappear when short-term forces are controlled in 



















Several theories have been used to explain voting behavior, including sociological
voting theory, psychological voting theory, and economic voting theory. This chapter will
review these theories and explore their various ways of explaining voting behavior. 
Voting Theory
Psychological Voting Theory
The Michigan School, based on the works of Campbell, Converse, Miller, and 
Stokes, has been influential in electoral studies and emphasizes the psychological 
approach to voting behavior (Thomassen, 1994 Lewis-Beck et al. 2009). The Michigan 
School emphasizes psychological factors, arguing that psychological identification with a 
particular party is important for voters’ choices (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 
1960). The School explains that there are two types of influences on voting behavior:
“short-term forces,” which involve issues, candidates, and particular conditions for the 
election, and “long-term forces,” which involve party identification (Abramowitz and 
Saunders 1998). Applying this classification, the Michigan School focuses on long-term
factors, proposing that such factors stabilize trends in voting patterns. Among long-term
factors, this School suggests that voters’ party identification is more important than 






















make their choice while structural variables, such as class, influence the psychological 
preferences of voters at the baseline (Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995). Thus, the 
Michigan School emphasizes the strength and direction of the psychological 
identification of voters in order to predict voting results (Kamieniecki and Eulau 1985).
Economic Voting Theory
The economic theory assumes that voters are rational. It claims that voters 
evaluate the previous performance of candidates or parties and the prospective economic 
policies of candidates and parties. Based on these evaluations, voters choose candidates 
or parties that provide more benefits to them. (Downs 1957). Scholars who support 
economic voting theory suggest that voters’ individual rationality is more important than 
their social group membership in determining voting behavior (Downs 1957). Voters’
higher income and education produced a more rational voting pattern among young-
generation voters (Dalton 1996; Manza and Brooks 1999; Franklin 2010). In economic 
voting theory, individuals’ rationality based on their evaluation of candidates’ policies
and candidates’ attitudes toward specific issues in particular elections is more important 
than their group membership. Thus, economic voting theory argues that short-term
factors overshadow long-term factors in elections. 
Sociological Voting Theory
The origin of the sociological approach to voting behavior research can be found 
in the research of the Columbia School. Paul Lazarsfeld and his associates, known as the 
Columbia School, participated in panel studies based on local areas: Erie County in Ohio 
















Their original intention was to understand the relationship between psychological factors
and voting behavior. They tried to understand how voters’ political preferences change 
during the campaign process and the influence of mass media on individuals’ behavior.
Paul Lazarsfeld was engaged in the study using principles of developmental psychology 
to understand human actions, such as choice in purchase or occupation (Visser 1994;
1996). However, Lazarsfeld and his associates found that few voters changed their 
political preference during the election campaigns (Thomassen 1994). Thus, they 
conclude that primary groups based on friends, family, religion, and coworkers do
influence individuals’ political preference. They also suggest that unions, political 
parties, and the media did not influence voting behavior to the extent to which political 
preference changes (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954). Consequently, the 
conclusions of their study became a benchmark for sociological approaches in electoral 
research (Thomassen 1994). 
Even though the contribution of the Columbia School was influential, their study 
was based on a “micro-sociological approach” because they examined the relationship 
between individuals’ choice and their group membership within the community (Antunes
2010). In contrast, Antunes (2010) argues Lipset and Rokkan (1967) “start from a 
historical and macro-sociological approach that understands the party system in the 
countries of Western Europe.” Lipset and Rokkan (1967) take a macro-level approach to 
voting behavior research using the concept of social cleavage. Social cleavage is a long-
lasting division due to conflict among social groups within the national community 
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Bornschier 2009). The concept of social cleavage began to be 














   
   
behaviors (Stoll 2004). Lipset and Rokkan developed the concept to explain the influence 
of social structure on political behavior in the 1960s (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Although 
the concept of social cleavage was developed to explain party formation in European 
countries, it is now being used to explain the association between social group 
membership and vote choice in the United States (Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1995).
However, as many scholars argue that the influence of traditional social cleavage 
(e.g., class, religion, and region) in the United States has declined, scholars are now 
paying attention to individual characteristics to explain unstable voting patterns (Lipset 
[1960] 1981). European scholars, on the other hand, continue to explain voting behavior 
by means of contextual characteristics despite the influence of psychological and 
economic approaches (Thomassen 1994). Franklin (2010) explains the reason as follows.
US political scientists generally partake of the ‘American dream’ of 
individualistic determinants of political and other success or failure –a dream that
strongly feeds into the rational choice tradition of electoral research – whereas
European scholars appears to have an equally strong commitment to the idea that 
individuals are not masters of their fates but are subject to impersonal forces often 
associated with life chances established at birth – forces that have different effects 
on people born with (or acquiring) different social characteristics. Though most 
scholars on both sides of the Atlantic would pay lip service to the joint importance 
of both individual and contextual characteristics, American scholars largely 
choose to focus on individual determinants of the vote while European scholars 
(at least when they work in this large sub-field) choose to focus on contextual 





    
  
    
   
   
  













These different historical backgrounds continue to influence electoral studies in the 
United State and Europe. Additionally, there was “the behavioral revolution” which pays
attention to political “attitude development, change, and structure which were rooted in
psychological models” in the United States (Hatemi and McDermott 2012:397). Lewis-
Beck et al. (2009:12) also explain that the introduction of individual-level surveys, such as
the National Election Studies, “shifted the focus from the collection of sociological 
variables to the measurement of attitudes.” Thus, individual-level analysis based on 
psychological and economic approaches became more popular than aggregate-level
analysis based on a sociological approach in the United States. So, few studies have used
the concept of social cleavage in electoral studies since the 1980s in the United States. 
Nonetheless, some scholars began to emphasize the sociological approach to 
voting behavior in the 1990s and continued up through the 2000s (Manza, Hout and 
Brooks 1995; Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1995; Manza and Brooks 1997; Brooks and 
Manza 1997a; b; c; Manza and Brooks 1999; Hout, Manza, and Brooks 1999; Brooks and 
Manza 2004; Manza and Brooks 2008). In European countries, many scholars continue to 
focus on the concept of social cleavage in their electoral studies (Ringdal and Hines
1999; Müller 1999; Oesch and Rennwald 2010; Elff and Rossteutscher 2011; Goldberg 
and Sciarini.2014). I will review theories regarding the concept of social cleavage as well
as sociological approaches to voting behavior more specifically in the next section. 
Social Cleavage
Theoretical Background of Social Cleavage Theory
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) explain the concept of social cleavage in terms of the 














   
cleavage concept can be interpreted with reference to the theories of classical 
sociologists, such as Marx and Weber. Thus, I will describe how Lipset and Rokkan 
explain it based on the Parsonian AGIL model in this section and how social cleavage is 
related to the classical social theories in the following section (Franklin 2010; Bartolini 
and Mair 1990). 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) explained the relationship between the origin of social 
cleavage and political party formation in Western Europe by using the Parsonian AGIL 
model. Parsons (1961:30) maintains that social systems are involved in a “processes of 
interchange” with environing systems, such as cultural systems, personality systems, and 
physical environments. Subsystems of social system are also involved in the processes of 
exchange (Parsons 1961). Based on this logic, the AGIL model assumes that “society 
should be understood as a system of interdependent parts” (Holmwood 2005:87). AGIL 
represents the four basic functions of social systems such as adaptation (A), goal 
attainment (G), integration (I), and latency or pattern-maintenance (L) (Alexander 1983). 
AGIL corresponds to the four “functional prerequisites” such as “economy” (adaption), 
“political institutions for regulation and use of power” (goal attainment), “legal 
institutions for regulation of conflicts and control of deviants” (integration), and “a 
culture which creates solidarity, social bonds, and a shared identity” (latency) (Allardt 
1981:259). Because these four functions are involved in the processes of interchange, the 
AGIL model identifies “six lines of interchange between each pair,” such as the A-G, G-
I, I-L, L-A, A-I, and L-G interchanges (Lipset and Rokkan 1967:7). 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967:8) “examine the internal structure of the I quadrant in a

















community in the early phases of consolidation, and what cleavages emerged in the 
subsequent phases of centralization and economic growth?” They also tried to “compare 
sequences of I-G interchanges to trace regularities in the processes of party formation,”
to “study the consequences of these developments for the I-L interchanges,” and “to 
bring all these diverse data to bear on the analysis of the L-G interchanges in the 
operation of elections and the recruitment of representatives (Lipset and Rokkan 1967:8-
9). 
Talcott Parsons used the AGIL model to “create a general social theory which 
could be used at any analytical level from the institutional to the personal” (King 
2004:27). Alexander (1983:48) also points out that “Parsons focused…on elaborating 
general concepts in relation to concrete institutional analysis--for example, on the pattern-
variable schema and its relation to the political, economic, and cultural changes that 
threatened the vested interests of class, sectional, and religious groups” (Alexander 1983: 
48). Tilly (1981:1) asserts that “Stein Rokkan felt the attraction of general 
propositions…he could not resist the temptation to try out the new comparative 
scheme…” Lipset and Rokkan (1967) used the Parsonian AGIL model not because they 
are Parsonians but because functionalism was a dominant theory in the early 1960s 
(Allardt 1981; Lipset and Ladd Jr. 1972). 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) differentiate the types of cleavage based on two 
dimensions of the Parsonian paradigm: territorial and functional dimensions. They 
explain that “the crucial cleavages and their political expressions can be ordered within 
the two-dimensional space generated by the two diagonals of the double dichotomy”




















territorial dimension and religious cleavage based on the functional dimension were 
important during the nation-building process, while class cleavage based on the
functional dimension was important during the industrial revolution. Their explanation is
a “macro-sociological approach” because they analyzed historical changes in the 
relationship of social division and political party at the national level (Antunes 2010).
They suggest that cleavage was created during national and industrial revolutions 
involving nation building and structural economic changes, respectively. These social
transformation processes tend to create conflicts among social groups, and cleavages tend 
to be created by social conflict among social groups during these processes. These 
changes also linked certain social groups to particular political parties. Thus, the concept 
of cleavage is closely related to the formation of a political party system (Bornschier 
2009). In the next section, I will explain the concept of social cleavage in terms of 
classical social theories.  
Concept of Social Cleavage
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) proposed the social cleavage concept by arguing that
the concept of cleavage is related to social structure. The concept of cleavage in electoral 
studies indicates the persistent conflicts among political and social constituencies (Manza 
and Brooks 1999). The concept of cleavage includes both social and political cleavages. 
Social cleavage reflects political conflict related to social structure while political
cleavage reflects persistent political conflict regardless of its social basis (Manza and 
Brooks 1999). Many scholars tend to use the concept of social cleavage to explain the 
relationship between social group arrangements and vote choice because social cleavage 




















Manza and Brooks 1999). Manza and Brooks (1999) explain that the concept of social 
cleavage emerges from the theories of classical social theorists: namely, Karl Marx and 
Max Weber. 
Although the concept of social cleavage includes both classical sociological 
traditions, it is more closely related to the Weberian tradition than to the Marxist 
tradition. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) differentiate social cleavage from political cleavage
and explain the relationship between two cleavages based on the Weberian tradition. For 
example, Franklin (2010) explains that social cleavages are aligned with political 
cleavage under three conditions. The first is distinctive differences in interests between 
social divisions. The second is that group members of each division should recognize the 
importance of the interest and identify themselves as part of a group. The third is that 
there are political means, including political parties, to express and realize their interests 
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Franklin 2010; Manza and Brooks 1999). Other scholars 
suggest that multiple components at different levels should be considered to understand 
the relationship between social cleavage and political cleavage: an “empirical 
component” at the social structural level (e.g., social group division), a “normative 
component” at the cultural level (e.g., social group consciousness), and a “macro-
institutional component” at the institutional level (e.g., political parties) (Manza and 
Brooks 1999:33). When a cleavage exists at all three of these levels, social cleavage is 
aligned with political cleavage, and the political divisions endure effectively (Bartolini 
and Mair 1990; Manza and Brooks 1999). 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) identify four types of cleavage: “center-periphery”
















“land-industry” (aristocrats-bourgeoisie). These divisions are based on the transformation 
of social structure during two revolutions: the national revolution and the industrial 
revolution. The national revolution caused social divisions, such as center-periphery and 
state-church, and the industrial revolution produced social divisions, such as owner-
worker and land-industry (Antunes 2010). These cleavages, based on class, religion, 
region, ethnicity, and culture, gave rise to the European Party systems that emerged in the 
1920s and persisted until the 1960s (Bornschier 2009; Neto and Cox 1997). 
According to Lipset and Rokkan (1967), social structure had a stable relationship 
with vote choice between the 1920s and 1960s. However, diverse perspectives on the
decline of social cleavage began to appear in the 1960s. Some scholars argued that social 
cleavage has had a continuous influence on voting behavior, while other scholars argued 
that social cleavage declined after the 1960s. Most scholars studied class and religion 
cleavages, although class cleavage is a more popular topic than is religion cleavage. 
However, few sociologists focused on regional cleavages after World War II. For this 
reason, the argument about the decline of each cleavage needs to be examined separately. 
Thus, I will review arguments about the decline of class, religion, and regional cleavages 
in the United States.  
Decline of Social Cleavage
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) suggest that social cleavage emerged in Western
Europe in the 1920s and persisted until the 1960s. Based on this continuing influence of 
social cleavage on voting, sociological factors had been regarded as good predictors of


















not change easily during their lifetime, scholars argue that sociological factors are long-
term factors that stabilize voting patterns (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998). 
However, as social structure changes after World War II, many scholars argue 
that short-term factors are more influential than long-term factors on voting. Scholars 
categorize social factors as structural factors or long-term factors (Franklin 2001).
Opinions about the relationship between social structural factors and voting behavior 
diversify because of the different theoretical perspectives of scholars and scholars 
interpret the changed situation differently. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) emphasize social 
structural factors, while the Michigan School and economic theory of voting emphasize 
psychological factors and rational choice of individuals respectively. The Michigan 
School and economic voting theorists argue that the influence of structural factors on
voting decline. 
In addition to these perspectives, other scholars explain the decline of cleavage 
voting based on empirical evidence of social change. Some scholars suggest that social 
conflict between social divisions declines because of the improvement of the 
socioeconomic situation of working-class people. For example, Clark, Lipset, and 
Rempel (1993) argue that the rise of welfare programs, diversified occupations, and 
affluence in Western societies has weakened the force of class cleavage in political 
systems. He also explains that economic inequality and social conflict among voters have 
declined over time because of voters’ higher education and better standards of living.
The improvement of the socioeconomic conditions of young generations also 
effected new types of culture among new generations. Inglehart and Abramson (1994) 















    






issues, such as environmentalism. They maintain that the older generation tends to have 
more interest in material-related issues based on their class membership. However, the 
material issue is not a big issue for younger generations because of their improved 
socioeconomic situations. Thus, post-material cultural issues are influential factors in
voting behavior among young generation voters.
Based on these observed trends, some scholars argue that a stable relationship of 
class and political party changed with regard to predicting voting behavior after the 
1960s. These scholars suggest that the influence of social group membership is not as 
influential in predicting voting behavior in elections as it was in the 1960s (Clark, Lipset, 
and Rempel 1993). However, many scholars argue social structural factors continue to 
influence voting behavior. In the following sections, I will explain the theories of social 
cleavages in terms of class, religion, and region.  
Class and Voting
The relationship between class and voting behavior is one of the main concerns of 
election studies. Although there are two main traditions of class concepts, many electoral
studies follow the Neo-Weberian class classification for class voting studies. Thus I will
review the debate about class classification and discuss how the Neo-Weberian class 
concept is applied to class voting studies. 
Definition of Class Concept: Marx and Weber
The concept of class originated in the work of classical sociologists, such as Karl 
Marx and Max Weber. Marx and Weber have different perspectives on class. Marx





   

















means of production. According to Marx, the capitalist class exploits the labor of the
working class for economic gain (Wright 2002). On the other hand, Weber suggests that
Marx’s explanation is too simplistic. Weber suggests that the concept of class is not 
enough to explain stratification structure because class is based on economic position in 
the market situation determining life chances. He argues that life chances are determined 
not only by the ownership of properties but also by the possession of various skills or
assets (Breen 2005). Thus, Weber argues that the number of classes is greater than what
Marx’s schema indicates. He also suggests that there are other kinds of factors related to 
inequality, such as social status and political power (Weber 1946). Weber (1946)
maintains that membership of social status groups and collective behaviors based on 
political party also need to be considered for defining the concept of social class. 
Marx argues that economic structure is the main structure of societies and that it is 
determined by the mode of production of the society. Mode of production defines class 
structure in societies, and it consists of the capitalist class and the working class in 
capitalist societies (Marx 1972). Wright (2002) explains that a class relationship in
capitalist societies is based on conflict because the main characteristic of a class
relationship is exploitation. Based on differences in economic interests, the working class 
has different political interests than the capitalist class (Lipset 1983). The Marxist class 
concept has been used to explain conflict between social groups and their relationship
with political interests. Weber also deals with the stratification structure of societies, even 
though he disagrees with the Marxist class theory. He argues that class determines the life 
chances in the market situation, and suggests a more complex stratification theory by 

















and Weber disagree with the concept of class, both classical sociologists agree with the 
existence of social structure and its relevance to politics. 
When Marx explains the relationship between class and politics, he differentiates
the concept of “class location” from “class formation” (Wright 2002). Even though Marx 
did not use the terms like “class-in-itself” and “class-for-itself,” many Marxist scholars
suggest that Marx differentiates these terms (Andrew 1983). Class-in-itself indicates a 
common objective condition of a group of people who have the same relationship with 
the means of production without class consciousness and collective behavior, while class-
for-itself indicates a group that is organized for its economic and political interest by 
collective behaviors with class consciousness (Andrew 1983; Wright 2002). Thus, when 
class-in-itself is transformed into class-for-itself, the social structural condition of the
working class is connected to political behavior. 
Weber also suggests that people who shared common economic situations are not 
automatically aligned with a particular political party. In the stratification theory of 
Weber, class indicates market situations of individuals without implying communal 
identity and collective action. Thus, people who are located in the same class situation are 
not defined as a group. Conversely, the people who hold the same status are classified as 
social groups because they share common identities based on communal relationship. 
However, the concept of status does not imply participation in collective action. If 
members of a status group participate in collective action, they become a political party 
(Weber 1946; Wright 2002). Even though Marx and Weber explain the concepts of social 
stratification differently, they agree that people in the same social structural position are








   
 
    
 





   
 
structural situations from sharing group identity and participating in political activity. In 
the next sections, I will review how neo-Marxists and neo-Weberians develop the 
concept of class and how class concepts have been used in electoral studies. 
Development of Class Concept: Neo-Marxist and Neo-Weberian
Both neo-Marxist and neo-Weberian scholars have developed advanced class 
schemas. Erik Olin Wright, a representative neo-Marxist scholar added the petty 
bourgeoisie to the original class scheme of the bourgeoisie and proletariat (Wright 1979). 
Then, he added more classes, such as managers, supervisors, small employers, and semi-
autonomous employees, in terms of contradictory class locations (Róbert 1998). 
Wright, Costello, Hachen, and Sprague (1982) suggest the following multiple 
location concepts to reflect the change in class structure: “basic class location,”
“contradictory locations within a mode of production,” and “contradictory locations 
between modes of production.” The first category refers to traditional classes such as the
capitalist class and working class. The second category refers to managers because they 
are involved in the two class category at the same time. Wright, Costello, Hachen, and
Sprague (1982: 710) explain that “they are thus in a sense simultaneously in two classes: 
they are workers in that they are exploited and dominated by capital; they are capitalists 
in that they dominate workers.” The third category refers to small employers (petty 
bourgeois) and semiautonomous employees (professionals). Their location is not included 
in the basic classification of class because they own both means of production and labor
respectively. Wright, Costello, Hachen, and Sprague (1982) explain that the third 












   
  
 
Thus, Wright, Costello, Hachen, and Sprague (1982) argue that these diverse 
locations should be considered in the class definition. However, he explains that these 
classifications are about “class structure” only. They do not pertain to class concepts like 
class consciousness or to collective aspects of class concept related to class organization.
Wright, Costello, Hachen, and Sprague (1982) also try to use several criteria to 
specify the class classification. He uses the number of employees to differentiate small 
employers from the bourgeoisie. He also uses three categories, such as decision making, 
authority, and formal hierarchical position, to identify managers and supervisors. He 
further uses the degree of autonomy to identify semiautonomous employees. Later, 
Wright (1985) describes twelve classes in terms of types of assets: production asset, skill 
assets, and organizational assets. 
In the neo-Weberian tradition, the schema developed by Erikson, Goldthorpe, and 
Portocarero (1979) is a representative classification scheme. This schema, called EGP, 
also classifies social classes based on their market situation, location in the production 
process, and condition of employment. EGP classifies employers, self-employed workers, 
and employees, and differentiates employees based on the types of labor contract and
service relationship (Róbert 1998). Róbert (1998:3) explains that “the employer provides
greater autonomy and independence in work, flexible work hours, greater work hours, 
greater job security, a system of fringe benefits, the possibility and promise of 
professional advancement and career as well as other promotional advantages,” when 
employer need worker’s “special knowledge and skills.” If employee can only provide 







    








making possibilities, independence, autonomy or flexible work hours to the employees”
(Róbert 1998:3). 
An employee’s position is determined by the type of skills, experience, and 
knowledge. The amount of autonomy in the workplaces is another factor in classifying
social class (Róbert 1998; Breen 2005). In the EGP, classes I and II are based on service 
relationships. Class I indicates higher grade professionals, administrators, and managers, 
and class II indicates lower grade professionals, administrators, and managers. Class III 
represents routine non-manual workers including both higher grade (IIIa) and lower 
grade (IIIb). Class IV indicates small proprietors including three types of classifications: 
few employees (IVa), no employees (IVb), and farmers and small self-employed (IVc). 
Class V indicates lower grade technicians, and class VI indicates skilled manual workers. 
Class VII indicates semi or unskilled workers and agricultural workers (Erikson, 
Goldthorpe, and Portocarero 1979). 
The neo-Marxist and neo-Weberian approaches favor a categorical classification 
based on occupation rather than a continuous classification based on prestige scores 
(Ganzeboom, De Graaf, and Treiman 1992). Even though gradational conceptions of 
class had been dominant schemas in social mobility studies, many electoral studies favor
categorical class schemas over continuous class schemas. Among the categorical
schemas, many electoral studies use the EGP class schemas rather than Wright’s class 
classification because of limited information for operationalization (Manza and Brooks 
















   
 
Application of Class Concepts to Electoral Studies
Manza and Brooks (1999) suggest that electoral studies tend to use one of three 
ways to measure social class. The first way is a binomial classification based on blue-
collar and white-collar workers. The second way is to classify class based on income. The 
third way is to classify class based on occupation. There are two ways to use occupation 
for social class schemas. One is the gradational approach and the other is the relational 
approach. The gradation approach tends to use the prestige score of an occupation to 
locate the occupation on a single continuum, while the relational approach classifies
social class groups based on employment situation and relations of production in the 
labor market. Manza and Brooks (1999) argue that the first approach is not appropriate in 
the advanced industrial societies due to the complexity of the industrial structure. They 
also argue that income is not enough to differentiate social classes because there are
diverse economic or class interests among the same income groups. Regarding the third 
approach, they explain that the gradational approach has not been used in electoral 
studies, while many social mobility studies use it frequently (Manza and Brooks 1999). 
Thus, they use the relational approach which is originated from EGP class classification. 
Social cleavage thesis had been examined based on binomial class classification 
(e.g., manual vs. non-manual workers) until the 1980s. Many studies, using binomial
class classification, such as the Alford Index, shows the decline of class cleavages. Lipset
([1960] 1981) also shows that class voting in the United States declined from 1948 to 
1980 by using an Alford index graph. Other scholars also use the Alford Index to 
demonstrate a decline of class voting. Scholars who suggest the decline of class voting



















   
   
   
 
indicate that previous social class categories are not applicable to post-material society.
However, there are scholars who argue that a class voting pattern still exists. They argue 
that the Alford Index does not reflect the change of society, suggesting that a more
diversified class classification is needed to replace the binary class classification scheme. 
They also argue that relative measurement needs to be used to complement the 
disadvantages of absolute measurement (Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1993; Clark and 
Lipset 2001).  
Scholars who criticize the relevance of binomial class classification suggest 
various alternative class classification schemas. Heath et al. (1985) suggest a five-class 
schema; Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Portocarero (1979) use a seven-class schema; and 
Manza and Brooks (1999) also used a seven-class schema. All three schemas follow 
EGP. Weakliem (1992) uses a six-class-scheme. De Graaf, Nieuwbeerta, and Heath 
(1995) use a six-class schema. Even though Wright’s class classification applies the 
relational approach for class schema, it is not used in electoral studies (Manza and 
Brooks 1999). 
Goldthorpe (1980) developed a new class classification scheme to reflect social 
change. Other scholars also suggest that binomial class classification is not appropriate 
for analyzing the post-material society, so they claim that more sophisticated class
classification tools should be used to reflect social structural changes (Heath et al. 1985; 
Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1995; Weakliem 1995; 1997; Goldthorpe 1999).
Scholars also indicate an absolute class voting index, such as the Alford Index, is
susceptible to the change of the size of parties or classes (Nieuwbeerta 1996). The Alford 




















the leftist party among manual occupations and (2) the percentage of voters who support
the leftist party among non-manual occupations (Alford 1963; Hout, Brooks, and Manza 
1995). The scholars explain that (1) the Alford Index can be influenced by the change of 
associational strength between class and vote, and it may also be affected by the change 
of the size of classes or parties (Evans 2000), and (2) the absolute measurement of the 
Alford Index is sensitive to variation in the total number of votes for the leftist party.
That is to say, the Alford Index is subject to the variation of the general popularity of 
political parties (Heath et al. 1985; Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1995). Thus, it is suggested 
that relative measures, such as odds-ratios, or log-odds-ratios, provide better 
measurement of class cleavage (Heath et al. 1985; Manza and Brooks 1999). 
The literature also indicates that the binomial class classification of manual 
occupations/non-manual occupations is not an appropriate measure of present class 
cleavages even though this class classification has been widely used. Manza and Brooks 
(1999) argue that the two-class classification frame cannot identify divisions within 
classes such as the white-collar or blue-collar classes, so it cannot reflect diverse changes 
in the class structure of the United States. They also criticize class classification based on 
income because there are many life chance variations within the same income group 
(Manza and Brooks 1999). Nieuwbeerta (1996) explains that self-employed and farmers
tend to vote differently within the same-income group.
Manza and Brooks (1999) use a seven category class frame (“professionals,”
“managers and administrators,” “owners, proprietors, and other non-professional self-
employed persons,” “routine white-collar workers,” “skilled workers and foremen in all















participants”) to identify the class structure of the United States. They explain that this
class frame can accurately identify the various life chances and class locations of voters. 
By using relative class measurement and multiple class frames, Manza and 
Brooks (1999:79) conclude that the class voting trend in the United States is
characterized by “trendless fluctuation” rather than “monotonic decline.” However, they 
also suggest that each class group has its own voting trend. The political preference of the 
professional group has changed from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party due to 
the professional group’s higher level of education. This trend may be explained by the 
“New Class” thesis or post-materialism thesis. Other scholars argue that the professional 
group tends to have “pro-state” and “anti-market” attitudes because professionals can 
exert more power than the capitalist class in bureaucratic organizations (Manza and 
Brooks 1999). 
Manza and Brooks (1999) also explain the voting trend of the self-employed. The 
self-employed tend to have a “pro-market” attitude because they are more likely to be 
influenced by the market situation. The self-employed, thus, have a conservative political 
perspective. For example, the self-employed were against the New Deal policy and 
supported the rise of McCarthyism (Domhoff 1990). Manza and Brooks (1999) show that
the self-employed had a centrist position until late 1970s and have leaned toward the 
Republican Party since the 1980s, possibly because of disappointment with the Carter 
Administration and the “ideological appeals” of the Reagan Administration. 
Non-skilled workers also show a conservative voting trend that may be due to the 
deteriorated economic situation during the Carter Administration period. Some scholars 


















the improvement of the economic situation of the working class and “working-class 
authoritarianism,” that is, the intolerance of the working class toward social and cultural 
issues related to race or the Civil Right Movement (Lipset 1959; Goldthorpe, Lockwood, 
Bechhofer, and Platt 1967). In the following sections, I will explain the development of 
class voting theory and debates about related issues. 
Class Voting Theories
Class voting began to be a main issue in these studies when the revolutionary
Marxist movement failed and the reformist movement emerged as an alternative 
approach in Western European countries (Evans 2000; D’Amato 2000). Reformist
European Socialists tried to achieve socialism through the election process, believing that
the working class would vote for social democratic parties (Przeworski and Sprague
1986; Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1995). Even though the working class was enfranchised, 
there were many restrictions on the voting rights of working class before World War I. 
However, in the 1920s, the working class could participate in the electoral process 
without restriction because of suffrage reform. For example, in England, the working 
class could participate in the election process without restriction because of franchise 
reform in 1918 (Wald 1978). Freeman and Snidal (1982) suggest that eight European 
countries among the nine European countries they studied experienced significant 
political franchise reform between 1918 and 1920. Under universal enfranchisement, 
most Western European countries showed similar class voting patterns: manual workers’
support for the left party and non-manual workers’ support for the right party (Weakliem
and Heath 1999). Lipset and Rokkan (1967) explain that class voting patterns showed 

















voting studies focused on the relationship between two-class and two-party systems 
(Evans 2000; Manza, Hout and Brooks 1995). 
In the United States, many electoral studies find class to be an important factor as 
well. However, class politics in the United States tend to be characterized as “American 
exceptionalism” (Manza and Brooks 1999; Kim 2003). In contrast to the European 
countries, there has not been a powerful labor party or socialist party in the United States, 
so class division has not been politicized as much as in European countries (Manza and 
Brooks 1999). Regional division between the South and the North discouraged class
politics in the South (Manza and Brooks 1999). Labor movements in the United States 
had failed because of the successful suppression of powerful employers, along with the 
support of courts and government in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Manza and
Brooks 1999). 
Class politics in the United States began to emerge in the 1930s. Because of the 
Great Depression, the institutional hindrance of labor movements decreased, and the 
number of working class people increased. These groups supported the Democratic Party, 
resulting in the New Deal coalition. The power of labor unions increased because of the 
passage of the National Labor Relations Act. For these reasons, most scholars suggest 
that the level of class polarization increased dramatically (Manza and Brooks 1999).
In electoral studies, class has been regarded as one of the main factors, so most of 
these studies provide explanations of how class influences voting behavior. There are 
four main explanations of how class influences voting behavior: economic interest, 
psychological attachment, social networks, and social cleavage (Manza and Brooks 2008; 












   
  
 








and social structural. The economic theory of voting and the psychological theory of 
voting are based on an individual level analysis. The original economic theory of voting 
behavior assumes that rational voters have all the information they need to know. 
However, some critics argue that most voters do not have enough information about the 
previous achievements and prospective policies of parties or candidates, so Downs (1957) 
argues that voters tend to depend on parties’ ideology about policy. This theory explains
why voters tend to vote according to their class background. Downs (1957) explains that
class voting corresponds with the economic interest of voters Thus, even though there are
some variations, many class voting theorists assume that voters choose specific parties or
candidates according to their class or economic interest. 
The Michigan School suggests that the voters who are more aware of their class 
location tend to vote according to their class interests. Even though class is not the most 
important factor in voting behavior, the Michigan School emphasizes the role of class in
partisanship formation as a long-term factor Therefore, class location is still an important 
factor in the party identification of voters (Manza and Brooks 1999).
The Columbia School advances an institutional-level sociological explanation of
the relationship between class and voting behavior. The research of this School examines
how voters’ psychological preference changes during the campaign process. However,
this research found that voters’ partisanship was not changed and showed stable patterns 
during the campaign process. The Columbia School argues that sociological factors, such 
as class, do influence voting behavior. However, the School examines sociological 
factors with an institutional perspective rather than a structural perspective, explaining



















networks (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995; Kim
2003). 
The fourth perspective on the relationship between class and voting behavior is 
the social structural perspective. Alford (1963) suggests that structural factors such as 
urbanization, social mobility, income inequality, and class are important influences on
voting according to the National Election Survey (NES). Lipset ([1960] 1981) also 
suggests that political parties represent different class interests. He explains that the 
working class is more likely to support leftist parties because leftist parties seek to move
toward social equality, while the middle class or upper class supports conservative parties 
because conservative parties protect present privileges (Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995; 
Brooks and Manza 1997c; Kim 2003). Moreover, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) explain the 
relationship between social structural change and party formation in European countries 
in the early 20th century by using the concept of “cleavage.” While they identify multiple 
types of cleavage, such as class, religion, region, ethnicity, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) 
emphasize that class cleavage became a basic cleavage in the advanced industrial society 
during the industrial revolution. However, as social structure changed into postmaterial 
society, some scholars argue that the relevance of class to voting behavior declined. Thus, 
I will review explanations about decline of class voting thesis. 
Decline of Class Voting
The decline of class voting has been a central topic of electoral studies. Some 
scholars argue that class influenced voting behavior until the early 1970s, while other 
scholars have argued that class voting has declined since the 1950s (Abramowitz and 













    





[1960] 1981). Some scholars maintain that class voting continuously influences voting 
behavior (Manza and Brooks 1999). Thus, I will first review the argument supporting the 
decline of class thesis and then review the argument supporting the continuance of class 
cleavage. 
First of all, scholars who propose the decline of class voting thesis have taken 
approaches based on post-materialism, racial cleavages, economics, social mobility, and 
institutions (Inglehart and Flanagan 1987; Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989; Manza and 
Brooks 1999; Kim 2003). The post-material interest approach is a representative
approach to the decline of the class argument. It focuses on the difference in the values of
the older generation and the younger generation, arguing that the values of the older 
generation are based on material values of industrial societies, while values of the 
younger generation are based on post-material values of post-industrial societies
(Inglehart and Flanagan 1987). Clark and Lipset (1991) explain that the younger
generation is more likely to be middle class due to a higher level of education and is more
likely to support policies that advance post-material issues like lifestyle and natural 
environment. Inglehart and Abramson (1994) also argue that younger generations are 
more likely than others to experience income-security, so they have a stronger
commitment to post-material values. 
Some scholars argue that racial cleavage has been more important than class 
cleavage since the 1960s (Carmines and Stimson 1984; Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989). 
Huckfeldt and Kohfeld (1989) explain that southern whites and working class whites 
departed from the Democratic Party when the Party tried to recruit black voters. Southern 
















Additionally, the white working class wanted to be separate from the black working class
and did not want to be affiliated with the same party as the black working class. For these 
reasons, southern whites and working class whites began to support the Republican Party 
after the Civil Right movement. 
The economic approach suggests that affluence can alter the political preferences
of the working class. This approach argues that though the working class previously 
supported the leftist party, it now supports the conservative party because of its improved 
economic situation (Lipset [1960] 1981). Thus, an improved economic situation resulting 
from social mobility can cause a decline of class voting. Cognitive mobilization may also 
reduce the class voting trend. While traditional voting behavior theory argues that voters 
depend on class identification because of a lack of information, cognitive mobilization
theory suggests that the degree of dependence on class has decreased because of higher 
education and greater availability of information (Manza and Brooks 1999). 
Institutional theories suggest that change in institutions, such as government, 
political parties, and labor unions, can transform voters’ political preferences (Manza and 
Brooks 1999; Tolbert 2003; Kim 2003; Peters 2012). For example, Clark, Lipset, and 
Rempel (1993) explain that welfare states make the working class less radical, because 
welfare systems provide occupational stability and economic security for the working 
class. Manza and Brooks (1999) further explain that when welfare states provide voters 
with economic security, working class members begin to be less dependent on leftist 
parties. The weakening of labor unions also influences the decline of class voting. 
Because of the change in industrial structure, the number of labor union members has

















    
 
  
decline of union membership made the Democratic Party look for alternatives, so they 
began to attract middle class voters. Lastly, Przeworski and Sprague (1986) explain that 
the change of leftist parties causes a decline of class voting. After the collapse of 
Communism in Eastern Europe, leftist parties decided to change their leftist policy to 
attract centrist voters because the support of the working class was insufficient to win in 
elections. The moderation of ideology in the leftist parties results in the decrease of the
support of the working class. 
As I explain above, many scholars challenge Lipset and Rokkan’s “freezing 
hypotheses,” which argues that the relationship between social cleavage and vote choice
remained stable until the 1960s (Inglehart and Abramson 1994; Franklin, Mackie, and
Valen 1992; Franklin 2010). Although many scholars have found no evidence that the
relationship has dealigned since the 1960s, some continue to disagree (Franklin, Mackie,
and Valen 1992; Franklin 2010). Although many studies focus on elections until the 
1990s, expanding the study period may provide new evidence about which argument 
better explains the relationship between social cleavage and vote choice. In the next 
section, I will review religious voting theories. 
Religion and Voting 
Religious cleavage is one of main cleavages in the argument of Lipset and 
Rokkan (1967). However, many comparative studies pay more attention to class cleavage 
than to religious cleavage even though religious factors still influence voting behavior in 
European countries (Cebolla, Cordero, Montero, and Segatti 2011). In the United States, 
religious factors have been regarded as more important than in European countries















   
  
   
  
conservative coalition and the secular-left coalition in European countries, in the United 
States, religious conflict was based on ethnoreligious cleavage during the late 19th and
early 20th centuries (Manza and Brooks 1997). In the United States, political divisions 
were determined by both ethnic and denominational differences in the 19th century. For 
example, immigrant groups which arrived at earlier time supported the Republican Party, 
while immigrant groups which arrived at later time supported the Democratic Party in the 
later 19th century. Thus, I will first discuss how religion has influenced politics in the 
United States since the 19th century. 
History of Religious Cleavage in the United States
Historians have studied the main determinants of the political affiliations of voters
in American history in the 1800s. While the Progressive historians argue that social class 
is an important factor in political partisanship, the Ethnocultural School of political 
historians suggests that ethnic or religious affiliation is an important factor in political 
behavior (Benson 1961; Hays 1965; Kleppner 1970; McCormick 1974; Wilentz 1982). 
The ethnocultural historians argue that religious division correlates with political conflict
after economic variables are controlled (Wright 1973). 
Ethnocultural historians use various terms to express religious cleavage in the 19th 
century, such as “puritan-nonpuritan,” “pietists-ritualists,” “pietists-liturgicals,” and
“evangelical-nonevangelical” (Benson 1961; Kleppner 1970; Jensen 1971; Formisano 
1971; McCormick 1974; Feller 1992). Even though there are many terms to represent 
conservative Protestants, the term “evangelicals” is used by many scholars. Evangelicals 
“is also the best word available to describe a fairly discrete network of Protestant 
















colonies” (Noll, Bebbington, and Rawlyk 1994:6). Evangelicals are “the heirs of 
numerous spiritual traditions including Puritan theology, German Pietism, the Great
Awakenings of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and a long tradition of periodic 
revivals” (Lee 2008:515). Hunter (1983) emphasizes behavioral aspect of evangelical 
movement in addition to doctrinal aspect. He said that “behaviorally, evangelicals are 
typically characterized by an individuated and experiential orientation toward spiritual 
salvation and religiosity in general and by the conviction of the necessity of actively 
attempting to proselytize all nonbelievers to the tenets of the Evangelical belief system”
(Hunter 1983:7). 
Ethnocultural model of voting theory explains that pietistic or evangelical voters
supported the Whigs or the Republican parties, while nonevangelical or ritualistic voters 
supported the Democratic Party (McCormick 1974). Howe (1991:1222) explains “the 
evangelical movement in the antebellum United States was in many respects the 
functional equivalent of an established church.” The evangelical Christians thought that 
they should fight against worldly sin in American society, so they agreed that government 
should intervene in personal behavior. Thus, they supported the temperance movement, 
the abolition movement, and Sabbatarian legislation. 
The debate about Sabbath-keeping started when Congress passed the Postal Act 
of 1810. It required every post office to be open on Sunday. Evangelicals opposed to this 
act and launched the General Union for Promoting Observance of the Christian Sabbath 
in 1828. They submitted petitions to protest the “Sunday mail law” in 1929 (Formisano 
1971: 122). The topics of Sabbath-keeping debates covered opening of post office, 








    












of Whigs supports the Sabbath bill, while half House Democrats support the bill
(Formisano 1971). 
However, nonevangelical or ritualistic Christians did not agree with these 
movements. The Whigs or the Republican parties supported moral reform movements, 
while the Democratic Party opposed governmental intervention in personal behavior.  
Benson (1961) argues that puritans support the Whig party, while nonpuritans 
supported the Democratic Party. Kleppner (1970) defines the ritualistic Christians as 
those who emphasize formal doctrine based on traditional confession. He explains that 
ritualistic practices are not synonymous with liturgical practices. Ritualistic religious 
groups agree that the world is sinful, but they do not try to change the sinful world. 
Ritualistic Christians do not support religious emotionalism. They emphasize right belief 
rather than right behavior. On the other hand, pietistic Christians stress personal 
conversion and emotional commitment to a transcendental God. They think that they 
should change the sinful world, so they emphasize active participation in moral 
movements for right behavior. However, Kleppner (1970) explains that these religious 
perspectives do not align with the denominational classification. Formisano (1971)
suggests that evangelicals emphasize “devotionalism,” while non-evangelicals stress
“doctrinal orthodoxy.” Even though these classifications do not align with
denominationalism, Presbyterians, Congregationalists, and Baptists are classified as 
evangelicals. 
Even though these classifications are not aligned with denominationalism, 
denomination is an important religious category. Denominationalism became a general





















preserved their own religious traditions and formed denominations. Until the late 19th 
century, most Protestant denominations embraced conservative or evangelical beliefs, 
even though there had been theological debates within Protestant groups and 
ethnocultural conflicts among Protestants, Catholics, and Jews (Liebman, Sutton, and 
Wuthnow 1988; Noll 1992). Even though most denominations shared evangelical beliefs
in the 19th century, scholars differentiate denominations based on their socioeconomic 
differences (Niebuhr 1929; Davidson, Pyle, and Reyes 1995). These scholars argue that 
Episcopalians, Congregationalists, and Presbyterians ranked higher in status with regard
to income and educational level, while Methodists, Lutherans, and Baptists showed lower
socioeconomic status in the early 20th century. Jews are classified as a higher status 
group, while Catholics are classified as a lower status group in the early 20th century 
(Pyle 2006). Davidson, Pyle, and Reyes (1995) show that the dominant position of the 
Protestant Establishment persisted until the 1990s, while both Jews and Catholics 
advanced in status by this time. They argue that the social stratification of religious 
denominations has been the main factor influencing religious cleavage in the United 
States (Pyle and Koch 2001; Pyle 2006). 
Even though there has been agreement on the importance of denominational
classifications in the early 20th century, some scholars believe that internal division 
within denominations is more important than denominational classification (Wuthnow
1989b). While Glock and Stark (1965) found that denominational differences in 
socioeconomic status decreased after World War II, many scholars suggest that 
theological divisions within main denominations in the early 20th century became a main 




















Liebman et al. 1988). In the next section, I will explain the religious group cleavage 
based on religious liberalism in the 20th century.  
Theological Debates and Religious Cleavage
A major theological debate in American society started after evolutionism and the 
higher criticism of the Bible transferred from European countries. German scholars 
studied philology and compared “the usage of words and texts with other writings in its 
historical context” (Lee 2008: 513; Brown 1960). Higher criticism “examined literary 
forms, styles, and models” while “lower criticism was devoted to the study of original 
texts and versions” (Lee 2008: 520). Even though the basic idea of Higher criticism was 
used by Erasmus in the 16th century and by Benedict Spinoza and Thomas Hobbes in the 
17th century, it was German scholars, such as J. S. Semler, J. A. Ernesti, J. D. Michaelis, 
and J. G. Eichhorn, who began the “naturalist-historicist interpretations of the Bible” in 
the 18th century. They “did not abandon the doctrine of divine inspiration, but they did 
historicize the texts by reading them comparatively, with other biblical texts and with 
extra-biblical secular literature” (Carhart 2007:165). The Tübingen School, such as 
Ferdinand Christian Baur and David Strauss, developed higher criticism in the 19th 
century based on “the German innovators of the historicist biblical criticism” in the 18th 
century (Lee 2008:513). Higher criticism and became popular in Germany in the 1830s 
and began to be introduced to the U.S. in the early 19th century (Lee 2008).  
Even though some scholars, such as Andrew Norton and Moses Stuart introduced 
higher criticism before the Civil War, it had not been a great issue not until the 
publication of Darwin’s The Origin of Species in 1959. Higher criticism became a great















   
 
  
    
(Brown 1960; Lee 2008). The influence of “European learning,” irreligious culture of 
European immigrants in cities, and the reformulation of higher education system made 
conservative feel anxious and began movements for defense against higher criticism and 
evolutionism after the Civil War (Noll 1985:232-233). Thus, conservative Protestants felt
the necessity for revival movement and Prohibition campaign (Noll 1985). 
Before evolutionism and German higher criticism imported to the U.S., majority 
of Christians believed that the Bible was inspired by God, and that the Bible includes no 
error until the early 19th century (Lee 2008). The debate on traditional belief about 
Biblical inerrancy deepened when Scopes Trial happened in the 1920s. In the 1920s, 
conservative Protestants made efforts to forbid teaching evolutionism in public high 
schools and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), founded in 1920, looked for a
way to increase their fame for their movement to support antiwar protesters and recruit a
volunteer to challenge the antievolution Law in Tennessee (Stark 2003; Matzke 2010).
Even though it seemed conservative Protestants won the trial because Scopes was found 
guilty at the trial, scholars explain that fundamentalists were defeated because they were 
ridiculed by the press and the court’s decision was overturned later on procedural 
grounds (Stark 2003; Matzke 2010; Larson 2008; Webb 2011). Since that time, religious 
cleavage reconstructed based on the debate between fundamentalism and liberalism. 
Smith (1990) explains that the Fundamentalist movement emerged in the early 20th 
century in reaction to the secularization of many mainstream Protestant groups. This 
movement is based on: 1) Biblical inerrancy, 2) born-again experience for personal 
salvation, 3) “premillennialism,” which “believed that Christ would return prior to the 



















also explains “it was commonly believed that it would be triggered by a worsening of the 
world situation, as well as the growing successes of the Antichrist in the world,” 4) an 
evangelical movement for conversion of nonbelievers, and 5) traditional Protestant 
teaching, such as the Trinity and the Virgin birth. Liberal Protestants, on the other hand, 
emphasized: 1) social reform, 2) acceptance of secular scientific knowledge, 3) resistance 
against literal interpretation of the Bible about miracles, and 4) the progress of this world 
rather than the second-coming of God. Smith (1990) proposes that the fundamentalist-
liberalist continuum is the basis for differentiating the Protestant denominations. 
Even though there are some divisions, conservative Protestants are regarded as a 
single group because the conservative/liberal division is a larger division in present
religious situation. While some people do not differentiate evangelical Protestants from
fundamentalist Protestants, there are salient differences between Fundamentalism and 
Evangelicalism (Smith 2002). Historically, Fundamentalism arose to resist against the 
teaching of Evolution in the 1920s (Marsden 1991; 2006). In general, Fundamentalism
resists the influence of modernism and seeks to create a separate life from modern culture
(Ammerman 1987). Wilcox (1992:2) explains “fundamentalism developed out of 
evangelicalism early in the twentieth century.” On the other hand, some conservative 
Protestants, such as Billy Graham, Carl Henry, and Harold Ockenga, were dissatisfied 
with separatism of Fundamentalism and began new evangelical movement to “have a
broader influence in shaping American society” in the late 1940s (Bendroth 1999; 
Marsden 1991; 2006; Evans 2009:251). Even though Ockenga invented the term “neo-
evangelicals” to emphasize their new identity, “evangelicals” became a common term to 















institutions such as Fuller Theological Seminary, Christianity Today, the National 
Association of Evangelicals, and other organizations” (Evans 2009:248) The debate 
between Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism has been a major issue in the conservative
Protestant churches, so scholars tend to classify conservative Protestants as either
fundamentalists or evangelicals. Often, this classification replaces denominational 
classification because of decline of denominationalism even though denominational
affiliation tends to be used to decide religious preferences. Hunter (1981:364) explains “it 
is fallacious to presume that because the Southern Baptist (or any other) denominational
tradition falls within the religious heritage of American Evangelicalism, therefore all 
Southern Baptists (or Nazarenes, etc.) are Evangelicals.”
The participation of liberal denominations in the Ecumenical movement of the 
1960s also contributed to the decline of denominationalism (Stark and Glock 1968). The 
decline of interdenominational tensions (Protestants/Catholics, Protestants/Jewish), the 
increase of “denominational switching” or “religious mobility,” and the increase of 
religious intermarriage have further accelerated the decline of denominationalism in the 
U.S. (Wuthnow 1989b; Greeley 1972; Hout, Manza, and Brooks 1999). Accordingly, 
many scholars suggest that political differences based on denominationalism have been 
replaced by political divisions based on religious ideology (conservatism/liberalism).
However, Woodberry and Smith (1998) use “evangelical Protestant” to describe 
theologically conservative groups because “conservative Protestant” refers to religious 
conservatism as well as to social, political, and economic conservatism. These religious 














section, I will discuss how religious voting theories explain the relationship between 
religious affiliation and voting behavior. 
Religious Voting Theories
There are several issues involved in the study of the relationship between 
religious belief and voting behavior. One issue concerns “secularization” and the “decline 
of denominationalism” (Manza and Brooks 1999:91). In Western Europe, secularization 
theory explains the voting pattern of religious voters. Religious voting decreased as 
church attendance decreased (Stark and Iannaccone 1994; Broughton and Napel 2000). 
On the other hand, in American society, the number of church attendants has not 
decreased to the extent that it has in Europe (Finke and Stark 2005; Stark and Iannaccone 
1994). 
Some scholars have become interested in the role of the Christian Right
movement, believing that this movement contributed to the success of the Republican 
Party in the Presidential elections and Senate elections in the 1980s (Manza and Brooks 
1999; Brooks and Manza 2004; Claassen and Povtak 2010). Yet, other scholars, such as 
Wilcox (1994), find that the impact of the Christian Right movement was modest in the 
1980s. None the less, the influence of the Christian Right movement changed after the 
1980s because the main Christian Right movement organization in the 1990s was the 
Christian Coalition, and its foundation and strategy were also different from those of the 
Moral Majority. The main denominational base of the Christian Coalition was the 
Pentecostal church. The Christian Coalition focused on state and local level elections 















Christian Coalition was successful, the impact of the Christian Right movement in the 
1990s was bigger than it was in the 1980s (Williams 2010; Wilcox 1994). 
The Catholic dealignment thesis is the idea that Catholics have changed their
political preference from the Democratic Party to a more centrist posture (Manza and 
Brooks 1999). According to thesis, Catholics’ socioeconomic status has increased and 
was similar to that of the majority by the 1980s (Greeley 1989). The thesis also argues
that Catholics also began to live in the suburbs by this time and were no longer
residentially different from non-Catholics (Davidson 1994; 2013). Based on these 
arguments, scholars suggest that Catholics’ political preference departed from the 
Democratic Party (Gallup and Castelli 1987). However, Manza and Brooks (1999) 
conclude that the dealignment thesis of Catholics is overstated because Catholics seem to 
have supported the Democratic Party since 1952 without much variation. 
The dealignment of liberal or mainline Protestants is also an important issue. 
Mainline Protestant denominations, such as Episcopalians, Congregationalists, and 
Presbyterians, tend to have above average socioeconomic status in the U.S. (Mills 1956; 
Baltzell 1964). Furthermore, mainline Protestants have been supporters of the Republican 
Party (Manza and Brooks 1999). However, although there are debates about whether 
mainline Protestants have changed their political preference toward the Democratic Party 
(Lopatto 1985), Manza and Brooks (1999) conclude that liberal Protestants moved 
toward the Democratic Party and away from the Republican Party. Conservative
Protestants consistently have supported the Republican Party with some exceptions 






   
    
  
   
   
 
    
   
    
  










As I explain above, ethnoreligious cleavage was an important influence on the 
political affiliations of American voters until early 20th century. Theological differences 
between religious conservatives and liberals were important influences on political
preferences after World War II. Although the secularization process influenced religious 
denominations, religious conservative continued to support the Republican Party and the
Christian Right movement and seemed to strengthen this trend. Some religious groups
seemed to change their political support in Presidential elections. As Manza and Brooks
(1999) argue, the degree of religious cleavage has been relatively consistent with the 
exception of liberal Protestants until the 1990s. However, it was not measured in the 2000s 
and few studies analyze the relationship between the influence of the Christian Right 
movement and the magnitude of religious cleavage or the influence of economic attitudes
of religious groups on vote choice since the 1980s. Thus, I will analyze whether religious
cleavage declined between 1980 and 2008 and influenced voters’ attitudes toward cultural 
and economic issues pertaining to religious cleavage. In the following section, I will review
the relationship between region and voting. 
Region and Voting 
Sectional Cleavage in the United States
Sectional cleavage is one of the main topics in the structural cleavage literature
even though this topic receives less attention than class cleavage and religious cleavage 
in electoral research. Layman (2001) argues that sectional cleavage was associated with a
major transformation of party politics in the United States in the 19th century. He explains 
that the transformation of party politics, such as (1) the Republican Party’s replacement 


















   
   
 
 
    
party of farmers and laborers in the Southern and Western areas, and the Republican 
Party’s establishment as a majority party representing industrialists in the Northeastern
and Midwestern areas in the 1890s, (3) the Democratic Party became a majority party
based on “lower-status whites and racial, ethnic, and religious minorities, leaving the 
Republicans with a coalition of upper-status, non-southern white Protestants” (p. 27), and 
(4) African Americans began to support the Democratic Party and white southerners
began to move their political preference toward the Republican Party in the 1960s. 
Layman (2001) argues that the first transformation is related mostly to sectional cleavage, 
while the second transformation is related to sectional cleavage and class cleavage. He 
explains that the third and fourth transformations occurred in the 20th century and are 
related not to sectional cleavages but to class cleavage and racial cleavage (Layman 
2001). Lipset and Rokkan (1967) also include an urban/rural cleavage in the four main 
social cleavages. 
Turner (1932) studied the sectional difference of voting patterns in the U.S. in the 
early 20th century. His argument of political sectionalism has influenced studies of the 
geographical distinctiveness of the West in political preferences since the early 20th 
century (Archer 1988). Key (1942) also analyzed the geography of political preferences
in the U.S., observing that sectional cleavage began during the westward movement of
the early 19th century. It contrasted to European countries that had long-established 
sectional cleavages. Key (1942) explains that the economic interests of western residents 
were different from those of eastern residents because, in many cases, land in western 
areas was owned by easterners in the early 19thcentury. Additionally, the interests of 
















the eastern areas. Because of the difference in economic interests, westerners supported 
Jefferson and Jackson in Presidential elections because these candidates supported the 
sectional interest of western areas (Key 1942). 
The pattern of sectional cleavage changed during the abolitionist movement. Even 
though the West still had distinctive interests, sectional conflict occurred based on the
economic dispute between northern and southern areas in the mid-19th century. 
Furthermore, after the development of transportation networks, such as railroads, the 
distance between the West and the East was shortened, and the sectional conflict between 
the West and the East was replaced by the conflict between the South and the North (Key 
1942).
The main economic conflict was between northeastern manufacturers and 
southern cotton producers. Even though there were also divergent sectional interests 
based on the economic specializations of particular sections, such as the cornbelt region, 
the pasture region, and the corn-and-winter-wheat belt region, the main sectional 
cleavage was between manufacturing industry of the North and cotton farming in the 
South (Key 1942). The slavery system made the sectional cleavage more intense between 
the North and South (Key 1942). Because of the weather and soil conditions, cotton could 
be produced only in the South, and the huge demand for labor in cotton production made 
the southerners adhere to the ideology of white supremacy and the slavery system. Thus, 
economic interests based on cotton production and racial prejudice were primary reasons 
























Key (1942) explains that a common economic interest within the same region is 
important to maintain sectionalism because diversified economic interests tend to reduce
sectionalism. When there is division within the same section or differences in economic 
interests between sections, sectional cleavage tends to decrease. In the early 20th century, 
due to the industrialization of the South, the economic interests of southern voters
diversified along the lines of manufacturing industry in the Carolinas, petroleum industry 
in Texas, and citrus fruits and sugar production in Florida and Louisiana. With the 
introduction of new industry in the southern states, the number of Republicans also
increased. Additionally, the issues of religion and prohibition helped the spread of 
Republicanism in the South. However, the industrialization of the South progressed 
gradually and most manufacturing jobs remained in the northeast. The percentage of 
manufacturing jobs in the northeast decreased from 86 percent to 82 percent between 
1899 and 1935. However, even though manufacturing industry in the South grew 
gradually, it diluted the political unity of the region (Key 1942).  
Recently, some scholars focus on different aspects of regional cleavage. Some 
researchers examine a more detailed regional classification, such as the South, 
Mountain/Plains, Midwest, Pacific Coast, and Northeast. They found that voters in the 
Mountain/Plains region are more likely to support the Republican Party than voters in 
other areas (McKee and Teigen 2009). Some researchers focus on newly developed 
regions, such as the Sunbelt, because voters in the Sunbelt seem to have political and 
religious preferences that differ from those of voters in other regions (Kellstedt and Guth 























With the process of industrialization, more areas were urbanized, and urbanization 
transformed sectional cleavages. The percentage of the population living in urban places, 
where the population was 2500 or more, increased from 39.7 percent to 56.5 percent 
between 1900 and 1940. By 1940, 48 percent of the U.S. population lived in the nation’s 
140 metropolitan areas in the United States (Key 1942).
Key (1942) argues that urbanization decreases sectional cleavage because it
creates divisions within the same region. For example, the interests of big cities differ
from those of rural areas. Political cleavage in big cities is based on class cleavage rather 
than sectional cleavage. Thus, Key (1942) suggests that urbanization increases the
importance of class cleavage as a factor in elections in big cities, giving the Democratic 
Party an advantage in Presidential elections. Residents in metropolitan cities in the North 
and West areas were especially likely to support the Democratic Party and contributed to 
the re-election of the president Roosevelt in 1944. On the other hand, urbanization did not 
affect the South as much as did the northeast. In the South, rural residents showed 
stronger support for the Democratic Party than did urban residents (Brunn and Ingalls
1972; Ingalls and Brunn 1979). Brunn and Ingalls (1972) maintain that the South was a 
“one-party region” before 1948, and remained solidly Democratic from 1948 to 1968 
until it was politically fragmented by the challenges of the Republicans after the 1950s.
Gregory (2005) explains that southerners had supported the Democratic Party since the 
early 19th century, and the party was related to the Confederacy in the Civil War period. 
Southerners continued to support the Democratic Party until the New Deal alignment was 













Even though the patterns of urbanization were different in the North and South, 
the influence of urbanization on voting patterns increased. Some scholars argue that 
urbanism became a more important factor than sectionalism in American politics. For 
example, Mendelson (1977:318) explains “the election of 1932 was the last in which 
sectionalism played the dominant role.” Holcombe (as cited in Eldersveld, 1949:1206) 
explains “a leading feature of contemporary American politics is the shift in the balance 
of power from the country to the cities.” Eldersveld (1949:1189) deals with a contention 
“that sectionalism, if still valid, is being modified, or supplemented, by an urban-rural 
party alignment which bodes major change for the future.” After he examined the 
electoral data of twelve major cities in Presidential elections between 1920 and 1948, he 
concludes “the metropolitan vote may well have become the balance-wheel in our 
political system” (Eldersveld 1949:1206). Agnew (1988:138) argues “sectionalism is 
initially and finally about common regional interests and ideology. It is not about similar 
voting behavior by region per se. From this point of view a sectional interpretation of 
American politics no longer makes much sense whatever the electoral pattern.” However, 
other scholars disagree with the issue. For example, Wright (as cited in Archer, 
1988:123) “sectionalism will remain as a dominant factor in the national life.” Archer
(1988) also deals with the contention that macrogeographical cleavage, such as sectional 
cleavage, had been replaced by microgeographical cleavage among central cities, 
suburbs, and rural areas. He explains that sectional cleavages among northeastern, 
southern, western are defined as macrogeographical cleavages and cleavages among 
urban, suburban, and rural are classified as microgeographical cleavages. Archer (1988) 











   
  
 
   
cleavages by using county-level Presidential election result between 1940 and 1984. 
Archer (1988) concludes that macrogeographical cleavage is still a more important factor
than microgeographical cleavage in voting behavior. However, there is not enough 
evidence to decide which is more important between sectionalism and urbanism in 
American politics. 
The influence of urbanism on American politics gradually became an important 
issue based on urbanization and suburbanization in the Unites States. The growth of 
urban population strengthened the Democratic coalition and it continued until 
suburbanization offset the political influence of city residents. After suburbanization 
accelerated in the 1950s, the suburban population surpassed the urban population. 
Conversion theory argues that new residents in the suburbs became Republicans to adapt 
to the new environment, while transplantation theory suggests that suburban residents
became Republican because of their upward mobility (Archer 1988). 
Political differences among urban, suburban, and rural areas are important topics
in studies of the relationship between region and voting (Zikmund 1967; McKee and 
Teigen 2009). The political preferences of urban dwellers were assumed to be different 
from those of rural residents for a long time before the suburbs were developed (Zikmund 
1967; Oliver and Ha 2007). The political difference between city and rural areas persisted 
before migration from rural areas to cities. Sauerzopf and Swanstrom (1999) explain that
many rural residents migrated to urban areas in the early 20th century and became 
Democratic Party supporters as they adjusted to urban culture. Theorists call this 
movement “residential conversion.” As the population of city residents increases, the 



















   
 
political party preference after they migrated to cities. Thus, the Democratic Party built 
the “New Deal coalition” that dominated national elections during the 1930s and 1960s. 
However, the political geography has changed with suburbanization.
Suburbanization accelerated in the 1950s, and began to be a topic for academic 
research in the 1960s (Walks 2004). Some scholars argue that suburban residents had a 
conservative political preference based on their higher income and their achievement and
social mobility (Campbell et al. 1960; Walks 2004). Walks (2004) explains the
relationship between conservative ideology and suburbanization by using the concept of 
“residential conversion,” “transplantation,” and “consumption process.”
Walks (2004) explains that place of residence affects political preference 
independently of race and class. He suggests that suburban residents tend to choose their
locations actively based on their lifestyle preferences regarding consumption patterns, 
desire for privacy, and value of self-reliance over public responsibility. These specific
lifestyle preferences of suburbanites result in distinctive political preferences among 
suburban voters regardless of race and class. Walks (2004) also explains that 
homeownership tends to make suburban voters more politically conservative than central 
city voters. Homeowners tend to have a conservative political preference because of their
material interests in terms of property value and property taxes. Lastly, Walks (2004)
explains that suburbanites’ commuting pattern with automobiles and the low density of 
suburban areas make suburbanites more self-reliant and competition-oriented by reducing 
the interaction of suburbanites with people of different classes. On the other hand, city




   
 










   




   
 
  
urbanites to different classes and ethnicities, causing them to have a more liberal ideology 
(Walks 2004). 
Gainsborough (2001; 2005) also found that suburban location influences party 
identification and voting behavior by analyzing U.S. national election data between the
1950s and 1990s. She argues that suburban residents are more likely to vote for the 
Republican Party than are city residents even when religion, race, gender, age, and 
income variables are controlled. Additionally, she argues that the rise of the New Right
movement is also related to suburbanization. She explains that the political influence of 
suburbs began to be stronger in the 1980s because of the increase of the suburban 
population, and because of the independence of suburbs from cities. Since then, suburbs
began to have more interest in benefits for suburbanites than city dwellers and supported
separation from cities, both politically and legally. 
Immigration and ethnic diversity also affect the political geography of cities and 
suburbs. African-Americans and Hispanic immigrants are more likely to live in central 
cities, while white middle class, native-born Americans are more likely to live in suburbs.
Thus, the political patterns of metropolitan areas are influenced by the concentration of 
ethnic minority populations in cities (McKee and Shaw 2003). 
The urban/suburban voting pattern began to change again after Democratic Party 
supporters who had lived in central cities began to move toward suburbs in the 1990s, so 
that the political preference of suburban areas was more complex in the 1990s (McKee
and Shaw 2003). McKee and Shaw (2003) found that suburban voters’ political 
preferences shifted from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party in the 1990s due 













    
  
 
    
 
Lang, Sanchez, and Berube (2008) also discovered that suburbs are not politically
homogenous. Some suburban areas are urbanized, while other suburban areas are rural in 
character because of recent suburbanization. Thus, the voting pattern of a suburban area
is influenced by its degree of urbanization. Lang et al. (2008) classify metropolitan areas
based on commuting patterns, land use, and population growth into the following: 
“Core,” “Inner Suburb,” “Mature Suburb,” “Emerging Suburb,” and “Exurb.” Based on 
this classification of counties, they analyzed the voting pattern of areas in 2000 and 2004
and found a negative relationship between distance from the urban center and Democratic 
Party voting and between population density and Democratic Party voting. The residents 
of urban and inner suburbs, which are densely populated, are more likely to vote for the 
Democratic Party, while the residents of exurbs, which are less densely populated, are 
more likely to vote for the Republican Party. Consequently, the Core, Inner Suburb, and 
Mature Suburb residents are more likely to support the Democratic Party, while the 
Exurb residents are more likely to support the Republican Party. In the Emerging 
Suburbs, the Republican Party shows strength, while the Democratic Party shows 
competitiveness (Lang et al. 2008). In the United States, class conflict became an 
important issue in American politics during the New Deal era (Manza and Brooks 1999).
According to Rae (1992: 630-631), “American politics in the period prior to the New 
Deal and for most of the nineteenth century was preoccupied with conflicts over regional 
and cultural issues.” In the 1930s, the growth of the working class and labor unions
strengthened the power of the working class in the New Deal coalition (Manza and 




















The improved political influence of working class was associated with 
urbanization because the working class increased dramatically due to development of 
manufacturing industry in urban areas. In particular, “the Manufacturing Belt” in 
Northeast and Midwest regions was the economic core of the United States in the early 
20th century (Fan and Casetti 1994:179). Furthermore, “The agglomeration of
manufacturing attracted capital, and large cities with ample employment opportunities 
became magnets for labor migration especially from the South” (Fan and Casetti 
1994:179). In the following sections, I will explain how region is related to economic 
interests and religious affiliations in forming voting behavior.
Region, Economic Interests, and Voting
Geography has been associated with economic interests and religious affiliations
since the 19th century. For example, Key (1942:153) observed that the economic interests
of the “thinly populated agricultural West were different from those of the “more densely 
populated financial industrial East” in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
The sectional cleavage between the West and the East changed into a sectional cleavage 
between the North and the South in the early nineteenth century (Key 1942). The South
and the North had different economic interests in slavery (Sundquist 1973). Sundquist
(1973:75-76) suggests that the economic interests of “liberal capitalist” were related to 
the antislavery movement in the northern states even though many scholars argue that the 
moral perspective about slavery was a main reason of “sectional rivalry and hostility.”
Even though sectional cleavage was based partly on economic interests, Key 
(1942:169) found that the different economic interests of sections were still based on 



















sectionalism is weakened by the introduction of industry and other nonagricultural 
pursuits” (Key 1942:169). The economic structure of the United States changed from
“small scale artisanal production” to “large-scale mechanized mass production” between 
the Civil War and the Great Depression (Oestreicher 1988:1258). 
Large-scale manufacturing industry caused the formation of the working class in 
the North. Because large factories concentrated in this region, the size of the working 
class also increased in the northern states. Key (1942:169) explains that “in 1899 the 
northeastern industrial area accounted for 86 per cent of the industrial jobs; in 1935, 82 
per cent.” Therefore, the presence of the working class influences the geographical 
association between class and politics in the northern states. That is, class formation in 
the United States was related to the geographical distribution of manufacturing industries. 
Marx also suggests that class formation is associated with urbanism because large 
factories concentrated in cities in the early stage of capitalist development. Southworth 
and Stepan-Norris (2003:321) further point out that “Karl Marx…suggested that the 
physical concentration of workers in cities and large factories contributed to their ability
to realize their aggregate class…interests.” Thus, capitalist development is unevenly 
distributed and the geographical association between class and politics varies by location. 
After the Second World War, the relocation of manufacturing industry influenced 
the geographical relationship between class and voting. As more factories moved from
the Frostbelt to the Sunbelt, the size of the working class decreased in the northeastern 
region, decreasing political influence of the working class in the Frostbelt. On the other 
hand, industrial employment in the Sunbelt increased. Fan and Casetti (1994:179) suggest


















slower growth, stagnation, and decline of states within the main core and new growth in 
the former periphery which began in the 1960s and early 1970s.” According to Fan and
Casetti (1994:180), “less unionization,” “lower labor and land costs,” and “attractive
climate and amenities” led to the economic development of the Sunbelt. 
Suburbanization also influences class politics because the middle class moved 
into the suburbs while the working class remained in urban areas. McKee and Teigen 
(2009:486) observe that “Americans increasingly move into locations compatible with 
their demographic and political preferences.” McKee and Teigen (2009) also explain that 
suburbanites tend to live in homogenous place while urbanites live in heterogeneous 
environments. However, suburban areas also became heterogeneous places because the 
working class eventually moved to suburbs (Lang et al. 2008). Thus, the relationship
between class and voting also varies geographically. 
Region, Religious Affiliations, and Voting
Religion is associated with geographical characteristics because ethnoreligious 
identity is closely related with region in the United States (Carroll 2012). In the United 
States, ethnoreligious identities have been formed by combinations of religious and 
ethnic origins because religion of European immigrants “has remained strongly identified 
with ethnic origin” (Zelinsky 1961:159). These ethnoreligious groups were associated 
with specific regions and ethnoreligious identity based on regions developed in the early 
19th century. During this time, established denominations, such as Congregationalists, 
Presbyterians, and Episcopalians concentrated in the East, while newer denominations, 
such Methodist and Baptists spread into the West (Zelinsky 1961). Slavery was an 















1942). Many denominations split because of disagreements over slavery. Southern 
denominations began to develop their own identity to differentiate themselves from
northern denominations. In particular, the Southern Baptist church became a regional 
church after the Civil War (Cromartie 1992). For example, the Southern Baptists created 
their own subculture and tried to differentiate it from that of other evangelicals because 
“many Southern Baptists consider evangelicalism to be a ‘Yankee’ phenomenon”, so 
Southern Baptists tried to avoid using the term “evangelicals” because of its association 
with northern denominations (Ingersoll 2003:48). 
Based on the ethnoreligious traditions in the United States, scholars tried to 
identify religious regions. For example, Zelinsky (1961:163-164) developed a 
classification of religious regions: “New England region,” “Midland region,” “Upper 
Middle Western region,” “Southern region,” “Spanish Catholic region,” “Mormon 
region,” and “Western region.” The New England region is dominated by Roman 
Catholics, Congregationalists, Unitarians, and Episcopalians. The Midland region is 
dominated by Methodists. The Upper Middle Western Region is dominated by Lutherans 
and Catholics. The Mormon Region is dominated by Mormons. The Spanish Catholic 
Region is dominated by Catholics. The Western Region is dominated by diverse religious 
traditions of immigrants. Shortridge (1977:150) updated Zelinsky’s classification because 
he thought that the classification of Zelinsky is “highly subjective and based on criteria 
somewhat different not only from the present map, but from each other.” These 
classification schemes of religious regions are the foundation of regionalization studies of 



















After Zelinsky suggested the classification scheme of religious regions, scholars 
continue to debate the topic. While some scholars suggested alternative classification 
schemes, other scholars criticized the concept of regionalization of religion. For example, 
convergence theorists argue that regional differences in religion have decreased because 
of internal migration and the development of mass media (Bauer 2012; Labovitz and 
Purdy 1970; McKinney and Bourque 1971). They argue that “Zelinsky’s regions were 
artifacts of a bygone era, not current entities” (Bauer 2012:523). However, some scholars
show that regionalization of religion still exists in the United States (Bauer 2012; Brunn 
and Barcus 2004; Crawford 2005; Jordan 2007; Warf and Winsberg 2008). Bauer
(2012:537) revisited the topic, reviewing recent regionalization studies of religion, and
concludes that “religious regions continue to exist today.”
Subsectional structure also influences the geographical distribution of religion. 
Zelinsky (1961:150) reports that 97.5 percent of Jews lived in metropolitan areas, while
74.5 percent of Catholics and 72.7 percent of Episcopalians lived in metropolitan areas in 
1952. He reports, too, that more than 60 percent of “the Disciples of Christ, Churches of
God, Brethren, Baptist, and Mennonite bodies” lived in non-metropolitan areas (Zelinsky 
1961:151). 
The development of megachurches is also related with geographical structure. 
Warf and Winsberg (2010:33) found that megachurches concentrate in “suburban, 
metropolitan, and Sunbelt” areas and that “typically, megachurches are defined as having 
a minimum of 2,000 members, and some reach 10,000” (Warf and Winsberg 2010:34). 
The size of megachurches influences the structural change of religion. For example, even 











   
 
 
evangelicalism. Thus, the growth of megachurches is associated with the decline of 
mainline Protestant churches. The number of megachurches has increased since the 
1970s: 50 in 1970, 150 in 1980, over 300 in 1990, and around 1,310 in 2005 (Warf and 
Winsberg 2010). 
The growth of megachurches in the suburban Sunbelt areas is also related to the 
relationship between religion and politics because megachurches tend to support the 
religious right’s positions on school prayer, abortion, and gay rights. According to
Aleksic, “the megachurch can in fact be characterized as an ideal community of the 
American Christian Right: a planned collective environment governed in accordance not 
only with evangelical church doctrine, but also with a conservative social and political 
ethos” (as cited in Warf and Winsberg 2010:38).
As I explain above, region is associated with many factors, including class, 
religion, and politics. These associations result in each region having distinctive political 
preferences. In particular, sectional cleavage significantly influenced political preferences
in the 19th century. With the acceleration of urbanization in the early 20th century, the 
importance of micro-regional cleavage also emerged. Suburbanization also influenced
micro-regional cleavage after World War II. However, we do not know whether micro-
regional cleavage is more important than macro-regional cleavage. Although some 
scholars assume that the importance of regional cleavage erodes because of 
modernization, other scholars argue that place of residence is still an influential factor in 
vote choice regardless of demographic and socioeconomic background (Walks 2004). 













                                                 
  
 
using various measures for region. In the next section, I will review how economic 
factors influence voting behavior.
Economic Factors and Voting 
Socioeconomic Voting
Many scholars agree that economic factors have influenced voting behavior. 
However, the economic voting pattern became important after the industrialization 
process began in the United States in the early 20th century; more studies focus on the 
period after World War II because of data credibility and changed ability of government 
in economic policy (Lynch 1999). Lin (1999) explains that the ethnoreligious or
ethnocultural perspective had been important until the Third Party System (1860-1896)1 
and the period of the “preindustrial democratic system.” In the preindustrial democratic 
system, the community-based long-term stability of political preference and the high 
level of political participation were dominant characteristics (Burnham 1965). Hays 
(1965) argues that the community-based political environment changed into a society-
based, political environment in 1896, and impersonal relationships became more
prevalent than personal relationships. From that time on, socioeconomic voting became 
important gradually (Lin 1999). Socioeconomic voting patterns appeared conspicuously 
in the election of 1928. Working class people in large cities supported Democratic 
1Political scholars who argue realignment thesis classify the political system of the United States 
as follows: “1. 1796-1816, First Party System: Jeffersonian Republicans and Federalists,”“2. 
1840-1856, Second Party System: Democrats and Whigs,”“3. 1860-1896, Third Party System: 
Republicans and Democrats,”“4. 1896-1932, Fourth Party System: Republicans and Democrats,”


















candidate Al Smith in 1928 even though he tried to emphasize ethnocultural issues (Lin 
1999). 
Some scholars argue that economic voting patterns decreased after the period of
“postindustrial politics” began even though there are debates about the timing of 
realignment (Burnham 1965; Lin 1999). Inglehart (1987) also developed a similar term, 
such as the era of “postmaterialist” even though the terms were developed independently. 
Lin (1999) explains that cultural value and meaning are more important than material 
value in postmaterialism. The emphasis on the cultural factors undermined the 
importance of economic factors. However, the influence of cultural factors is different 
based on the types of economic voting. For example, the influence of postmaterialism on 
socioeconomic voting may be different from that of issue-based economic voting because
group-based economic interest is different from individual-based economic interest, 
while economic voting based on an individual’s rational choice is less influenced by 
cultural factors (Lin 1999).     
The Great Depression and the New Deal policy also contributed to the 
development of economic voting patterns. Lynch (1999) explains that the President’s 
power of policy-making ability in the 1930s increased after the election of President 
Roosevelt and his New Deal policy. With this change, government’s ability of controlling 
economic conditions grew dramatically in the 1930s. Thus, voters began to think that 
economic condition depends on a President’s performing ability of economic policy, and 
they tend to reward the incumbent president while they punish the incumbent party 
(Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000; Lewis-Beck, Norpoth, and Jacoby 2009). However, 


















I will explain rational voting behavior by applying retrospective and prospective voting 
theories. 
Retrospective and Prospective Economic Voting Theories
Conover, Feldman, and Knight (1987) propose the retrospective and prospective 
economic voting theories. The retrospective evaluation of the economic condition has
been studied by many scholars (Key 1966; Kramer 1971). They suggest that economic 
performance is one of the major determinants of national Presidential voting for the 
incumbent President’s party (Erikson 1989). The political party of the incumbent 
President tends to win in the election if the economy is improving, while the incumbent 
party lost in the presidential election when the economy was declining (Erikson 1989; 
Welch and Hibbing 1992). For example, Welch and Hibbing (1992) explain that the
increase of consumer prices and the decline of real income caused Jimmy Carter to lose
in the 1980 Presidential election, while the low inflation and low unemployment helped
Ronald Reagan and George Bush to win the 1984 and 1988 Presidential elections
respectively. However, they also explain that the effects of economic condition are
different on congressional elections because election results of the House and the Senate
tend to show inconsistent relationships with economic conditions in the 1980s (Welch 
and Hibbing 1992). The representative scholars in retrospective economic voting theory 
are V.O. Key (1966) and Gerald H. Kramer (1971). They suggest that voters tend to 
punish or reward the incumbent party based on the past economic performance (Nadeau 
and Lewis-Beck 2001). They assume that voters do not have enough information about 














performance of the incumbent party while they do not have information about the 
competing party (Fair 1978)
On the other hand, prospective economic voting theory proposes that voters are 
rational and well-informed (Fair 1978) even though there are some variations in the 
amount of voters’ ability to get information. Stigler (1973) argues that voters are 
concerned with prospective policy rather than retrospective economic evaluation (Stigler 
1973). Downs (1957) explains that retrospective evaluation also needs to be considered 
because future expectations are influenced by the past experience. Prospective voting 
theory seems to be similar to “classical democratic theory” because it assumes that 
rational voters have enough information (Marini 1969; Fair 1978). It assumes that voters
understand policies of both incumbent and non-incumbent parties and expect the results 
of the policies. Based on the information, rational voters seek maximized utility by 
selecting parties for their own economic interests (Fair 1978). However, Downs (1957)
explains that voters do not have enough information about the policies of parties, so 
voters depend on a party’s ideology. Based on the difference of two theories, Nadeau and 
Lewis-Beck (2001) contend that Key’s retrospective voting theory explains incumbent 
elections better than the prospective voting theory while Downs’ prospective voting 
theory explains non-incumbent elections better than the retrospective economic voting 
theory. 
The Michigan School includes both economic voting explanations. This School 
identifies four important factors in voting behavior research: “partisan affiliation,”
“evaluations of national economic conditions,” “the candidates’ stances on salient 





















these factors have been used as important variables in much national-level voting 
research and were regarded as more important factors than social group membership. 
Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000) suggest that subjective economic measure, such as 
retrospective evaluation and prospective economic assessment became more important 
because objective economic measures based on macroeconomic factors, such as 
unemployment rate, inflation, income, and economic growth does not indicate solid 
relationships with voting behaviors.
As I explain above, economic voting became important in the early 20th century 
and economic voting theory began to develop after World War II and became a more
important theory in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Anderson 2007). Regarding objective 
and subjective economic measures, subjective economic measures are more influential 
than are objective measures in vote choice (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). 
Specifically, subjective measures suggested by retrospective and prospective economic 
voting theories seemed to become more influential than social group membership after 
the 1960s (Lewis-Beck et al. 2009; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). Thus, I will
examine the idea that voters’ perceptions about economic performance reduce the 
influence of social cleavage on vote choice. 
Cultural Factors and Voting
Cultural factors are considered in order to explain the decline of social cleavage 
since the 1960s. Inglehart and Abramson (1994) explain that political cleavage based on 
cultural values (i.e., materialism vs. postmaterialism) is a more important mechanism
than political cleavage based on social groups. In industrialized societies, the highly 
















   
 
 
environmentalism and human rights whereas the older generation continues to stick to
traditional values based on their social group membership (Dalton 1996). After the Civil
Rights movement, the general public in the United States showed a more liberal attitude 
toward abortion, gender equality, and LGBT rights (Brooks 2000). Hayes, McAllister, 
and Studlar (2000) also explain that those who support postmaterialism tend to have a 
more favorable attitude toward feminism. These differences in values caused a reactive
movement of religious conservatives in the 1970s (e.g., anti-environmentalism, anti-
abortion, anti-feminism, and anti-gay rights movements). Religious conservatives tried to 
mobilize resources to prevent society from becoming liberalized. These attitudes toward 
civil rights of the general public influenced national elections (Brooks 2000). Because 
these trends are related to the influence of issue voting patterns in the United States, I will
provide some historical background for the cultural movements of abortion, feminism, 
and LGBT rights and explain how these attitudes influenced voting behavior. 
Cultural Conflict and Reactive Movement
Reactive movements against liberalization of cultural issues such as abortion, 
feminism, and LGBT rights were initiated by conservative Christians in the 1970s. 
Because they have a distinctive worldview based on Christian beliefs that differs from the 
liberalized worldview, their reactive movement caused cultural conflict as they began to 
mobilize in order to prevent secularization of their society through political campaigns. 
Cultural conflict within the American electorate has been described as a “culture war”
(Hunter 1991). While many sociologists argue that attitudes toward moral issues are
determined by social factors, such as class and gender, other scholars, arguing the culture 
















and lesbians, is mostly influenced by worldview which is explained as “notions of moral 
authority,” or “understanding of reality” (Evans 1997). Some scholars believe that 
religious conflicts occur because of social factors, such as ethno-religious group 
membership: Protestant, Catholic, and Jew (Liebman et al. 1988). However, other 
scholars argue that religious worldview is a more important factor in religious conflict 
over moral values, regardless of denominational membership (Wuthnow 1989b; Layman 
1997; 2001). According to the culture wars thesis, the religious ideologies of 
conservatism and liberalism are more important classification frames than are 
denominations. 
Two different worldviews have different perspectives on cultural issues. First of 
all, the literalism of the Bible is one of the important issues in the culture war debate. 
Religious conservatives advocate a literal interpretation of the Bible, while liberals 
suggest a flexible interpretation. The disagreement arises because conservatives believe 
in the transcendental authority of the Bible, while liberals do not (Smith 2002; Layman 
2001). However, even though the transcendental authority of the Bible is important in the
culture wars debate, the culture wars thesis has not been used for a political campaign. 
On the other hand, abortion, gays and lesbians, women’s rights, and school prayer are 
frequently issues in political campaigns. In particular, conservative parties have used 
these cultural issues to mobilize conservative Christian voters (Williams 2010). 
Abortion is one of the most important issues in the culture war debate (Evans 
2002). Even though it is known that conservatives tend to support the pro-life position
and liberals support the pro-choice position, conservative Protestants showed ambivalent 





   









   
 
(1999:48) explains “Before the late 1970s, few evangelicals worried about abortion, 
perceiving it primarily as a ‘Catholic issue.’” Williams (2010:115) also explains 
“Southern Baptists were more tolerant of abortion than northern evangelicals were, partly 
because they were suspicious of a Catholic cause and partly because abortion law did not 
become a political issue in the South until several years after it had begun polarizing 
northern state legislatures.” Abortion became a “national political issue” since the 
Supreme Court case of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Williams 2010:129; Phillips 
2006; Kaplan 2004). However, even though Roe v. Wade was “the catalyst” for the pro-
life movement, many conservative Protestants were not actively engaged in a pro-life 
movement in the early 1970s because they thought it “as highly controversial and 
predominantly Catholic” (Ramet 2005:432; Williams 2010:155). Williams (2010:154) 
explains “Francis Schaeffer was largely responsible for mobilizing evangelicals against 
abortion during the Carter presidency.” Schaeffer urged Christians to resist against
secular humanism, such as pro-choice movement, by publishing books and making 
documentary film, How Should We Then Live? (Williams 2010:140). Due to the efforts of 
Schaeffer, the leaders of Religious Right, such as Jerry Falwell, began to “cooperate with 
Catholics and to join the pro-life movement” (Williams 2010:156).
Prohibitions of Bible reading and school prayer in public schools constitute 
another important issue that was used to mobilize conservative Christians during election 
campaigns. For the issues of Bible reading and school prayer, three decisions by the U.S. 
Supreme Court are important. The first decision was in Engel v. Vitale (1962), which 
forbade “recitation of state-composed prayer” in the school. The second decision was in 















   
 
 
about reading 10 Bible verses at the beginning of the school day. The third decision was 
in Murray v. Curlett (1963) which dealt with Bible reading and school prayer in the 
Baltimore schools (Elifson and Hadaway 1985). In these cases, the Supreme Court 
decided that school prayer and Bible reading in the public schools are unconstitutional 
(Elifson and Hadaway 1985). Additionally, the case of Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) is 
regarded as an important decision because the Court made the “Lemon Test” to decide
whether or not religious activities such as school prayer or Bible reading violate the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment (Schwadel 2013). 
Various Christians’ responses to these decisions were based on their 
denominations and religious perspectives. Catholics criticized the decision about school 
prayer. On the other hand, many conservative Protestants show an ambivalent attitude
toward the decision while some conservative Protestant groups supported the decision. 
Even though conservative Christians felt that forbidding recitation of state-composed 
prayer was a threat to their religious tradition, they thought that it would have little 
consequence because it applied only to state-composed prayer. Conservative Protestants
had not used the state-composed prayer because the prayer was composed by an 
ecumenical group of liberal Christians. Additionally, they thought that the Court’s 
decision could be a way to counter the influence of Catholics. Thus, even though some 
conservative Protestant groups, such as the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE), 
tentatively supported the Supreme Court’s decision about school prayer, evangelical 
magazines, such as Christianity Today and Moody Monthly, supported the decision of
Engel. Among fundamentalists, Carl McIntire supported the Supreme Court decision by 




   
 
   
   










However, the reaction of conservative Protestants toward the Court’s decision in
Abington v. Schempp (1963), which prohibited “devotional Bible reading” in public 
school classrooms, was different from the reaction to the Court’s ruling in Engel v. Vitale 
(1962) (Williams 2010). Evangelical Protestants felt that if Bible reading was forbidden 
in public schools, it would accelerate the secularization process of American society 
because reading verses from the King James Version of the Bible had been a symbol of 
the influence of Protestantism in the American public educational system since the early 
19th century (Williams 2010). Thus, evangelical Protestants opposed the Supreme Court’s
decision about Bible reading and changed their attitude toward the Supreme Court’s
decision about school prayer (Williams 2010).
Fundamentalist and evangelical Protestants had similar attitudes toward school 
prayer and Bible reading. McIntire also changed his position began to ask political parties 
to support a constitutional amendment for a return of school prayer and Bible reading. 
Billy James Hargis took the same position on school prayer and Bible reading (Williams 
2010). Hargis’s Christian Crusade and McIntire’s American Council of Christian 
Churches disseminated messages in support of a constitutional amendment through radio 
broadcasting, newspapers, and leaflets. Because public opinion seemed to be favoring a 
constitutional amendment, the Republican Party decided to support a constitutional 
amendment about school prayer and Bible reading in 1964. On the other hand, 
evangelicals did not actively participate in this movement even though they opposed the 
Supreme Court decisions. 
While evangelicals and fundamentalist Protestants oppose the Supreme Court’s



















took a different position. The SBC agreed with the Court’s decision on school prayer and 
Bible reading. One of the reasons was that most leaders of the SBC were moderate
Baptists in the 1960s and 1970s (Ammerman 1990). What is more, because of the 
persecution they suffered in early America, the SBC thought that the separation of church 
and state was a more important principle than support of school prayer and Bible reading. 
Additionally, the SBC still worried about the political influence of Catholics, perceiving
that the constitutional amendment movement would strengthen the political influence of 
Catholics and non-Christians (Williams 2010). The position of the SBC on school prayer 
and Bible reading persisted until the 1970s before more conservative pastors took over 
the leadership of the SBC in the 1980s (Williams 2010). 
Because of the opposition of the SBC to a constitutional amendment and the 
ambivalent attitude of evangelical groups, the constitutional movement was not
successful in the 1960s despite the efforts of fundamentalist Protestants. Other
conservative Protestants also began to follow the position of the SBC on school prayer 
and Bible reading in public schools because school prayer and Bible reading continued in 
schools (McGuire 2009). Thus, there was division on the school prayer and Bible reading 
issues among conservative Christians in the 1960s and 1970s (Williams 2010). 
The attitude of conservative Christians on the school prayer issue changed in the 
1980s. Conservative Christians began to feel that the influence of secular culture became 
stronger and thought that the decision in Engel v. Vitale was a critical moment of 
deterioration of American morality. Therefore, more conservative Christians believed
that a constitutional amendment movement for school prayer would be required. Gallup 







   
  






prayer (Green and Guth 1989; Williams 2010; Woodrum and Hoban 1992). 
Subsequently, many Christian Right movement leaders, such as Pat Robertson, a founder
of the Christian Coalition in 1989, Jerry Falwell of the Moral Majority, Bill Bright of 
Campus Crusade for Christ, and even SBC leaders joined the constitutional amendment 
movement for school prayer in the public schools in the 1980s (Martin 1996; Williams 
2010). 
Gay and lesbian rights are another important culture war issue. Conservative
Protestants strongly oppose the gay rights movement, while liberal Protestants support it, 
believing that a gay and lesbian relationship should be accepted under the love of God
(Brooke 1993; Wald, Button, and Rienzo 1996; Olson, Cadge, and Harrison 2006). For 
example, Presbyterians for Lesbian and Gay Concerns (PLGC) began in 1974 to support
the gay rights movement (Anderson 1997). It was not until the 1960s that laws against
gays and lesbians became an important issue in American society. Before the 1960s, gays 
tended to hide their sexual identity to avoid discrimination and harassment in the schools 
or workplaces. However, gays began to raise their voice to protect their rights after the 
fledgling movement ignited in the triumph in Greenwich Village in 1969. In New York’s 
Greenwich Village, gay community members began to demonstrate for their rights when 
police arrested gay patrons at the Stonewall Inn, known as a gay bar. They claimed that 
the police raid at the Stonewall Inn occurred because of discrimination against gays. 
Then, gays began to participate in gay rights parades. After that event, the National Gay 
Task Force’s lobby for gay protection laws in 1973 resulted in the first introduction of a 
gay rights bill in Congress, even though it failed (Williams 2010). However, some local 














   
 
   
such as the American Psychiatric Association, also began to change their attitude toward 
gays by deciding to delete homosexuality from the mental disorder list in 1973 (Williams 
2010). 
Conservative Protestants responded when the political influence of the gay rights 
movement expanded significantly. Many conservative Protestants signed petitions to
prevent the enactment of gay rights policies in local areas. The SBC decided to pass a 
resolution against the gay rights movement in 1976. Conservative Protestants’ antigay 
efforts influenced conservative Protestants to change their political preference because 
the Democratic Party decided to support gay rights. The opposition of conservative 
Protestants to the Democratic Party made the latter apart from the political opinion of 
President Carter. Even though President Carter, personally, was a born-again Southern 
Baptist Protestant, he followed the Party’s decision about gay rights (Williams 2010). 
The character of the anti-gay rights movement is similar to that of the antifeminist 
movement. The antifeminist movement began after the legal status of women advanced 
dramatically. When Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, American 
companies could not discriminate against women in the employment process. In 1972,
the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) was passed in Congress and was supported by both 
parties (Williams 2010). However, conservative Protestants opposed the ERA because 
they believed that it undermined traditional moral values of family and femininity 
(Jimenez 1999; Williams 2010). Conservative Protestants believe that the family is based 
on traditional values about gender relations and gender roles. They believe that husbands 
should have a leadership position in the family and wives should obey their husbands. 





















children and other domestic responsibilities, such as cooking and cleaning because God 
created men and women differently and gave different roles to men and women within 
the family. Thus, many conservative Protestant women felt that the ERA was an assault
on their religious morality. 
The opposition of conservative Protestant women to the ERA led to the anti-ERA
movement. After the ERA was passed in the U.S. Congress in 1972, it had to be ratified 
by the 50 states, and 22 states ratified the ERA immediately (Soule and King 2006). 
Many conservative Protestant women began to move to defend their conservative values. 
In 1975, Phyllis Schlafly established the Eagle Forum to prevent the progress of the
ratification process and organized the anti-ERA movement, called “STOP ERA” (Martin 
1996). When Schlafly began her efforts, 28 states had already ratified the ERA (Tedin, 
Brady, Buxton, Gorman, and Thompson 1977). Most anti-ERA movements were related 
to Schlafly’s movement until Beverly LaHaye began a new national level anti-ERA
organization in 1979. LaHaye mobilized many conservative women to influence the 
political decision processes and organized Concerned Women for America (CWA)
(Martin 1996). The membership of CWA reached almost 500,000 in less than five years 
of its initiation. Thus, the political influence of the anti-ERA movement grew 
dramatically until later in the 1970s, and the ERA failed because only 35 states had
ratified it by 1979. The required number of states for ratification was 38. Consequently, 
conservative Christian women seemed to be successful in defending their values from the 
influence of feminism. Even though the time limit of ratification was extended three more
years, the ERA failed to be ratified (Williams 2010). As I explained above, conservative 




















liberalization. These movements influence of electoral politics since the 1970s. I will
review how these issues are related to voting behavior in the next section.
Gender and Voting
Cultural conflict occurs based on gender-related issues such as abortion, 
feminism, and LGBT rights, and these issues are used to mobilize conservative
Christians. Many scholars have examined how these gender-related issues influence 
voting behavior. While the Religious Right tried to mobilize conservative Christians to
protect their traditional values, feminists also tried to use the gender gap to persuade
political elites in both parties (Manza and Brooks 1999). 
After the Republican Party failed to receive a majority vote from women in the 
1980 Presidential election, gender cleavage became a distinctive topic in national 
elections (Manza and Brooks 1999). Abramowitz and Saunders (1998) argue that voters’
ideological position is related to partisanship. Killian and Wilcox (2008) argue that voters 
tend to change their political preference according to their position on gender-related 
issues, such as abortion. Studies done in the 1980s argue that the influence of the issue of 
abortion on national elections is minimal; however, many scholars began to find a 
significant association between the abortion issue and elections in the 1990s. This is 
consistent with the findings of Carmines and Woods (2002), who argued that the general
public was polarized on the issue of abortion in the 1990s.
Abortion gradually became an important issue in American politics since the 
1970s. Adams (1997:718) used “the theory of issue evolution” to explain how abortion 
issue influence political preference of partisans among major political parties. Since the 






















since the mid-1980s, there has been a polarization of opinion on the abortion issue among 
party activists (Carmines and Woods 2002). Carmines, Gerrity, and Wagner (2010)
examine the effort of interest groups in connecting political elites and general citizens.
They explain that the first groups which responded to the decision of Roe v. Wade and
made it into a political issue were interest groups. The abortion issue was perceived as a 
personal issue, but interest groups made it a politically relevant issue by exposing the
abortion issue in the media (Carmines, Gerrity, and Wagner 2010). Adams (1997) 
demonstrates that Congress members of both parties began to be polarized on the
abortion issue in the late 1970s and began to have consistent roll-call votes in the 1990s. 
Carmines and Woods (2002) explain that the general public began to be polarized on the 
abortion issue in the 1990s. Thus, the abortion issue has not appeared abruptly in a short 
time as critical realignment theory suggests. Rather, it has evolved for a relatively longer
time, so the “issue evolution” thesis is proposed to explain abortion politics (Key 1955). 
Attitudes toward LGBT rights have received less attention than abortion and 
feminism in electoral studies. Haider-Markel and Meier (1996) argue that political 
scientists paid little attention to the role of LGBT issues on politics until the mid-1990s 
although national media dealt with LGBT rights quite frequently; however, LGBT rights 
became part of the discourse during the 1992 and 1996 Presidential campaigns (Haeberle 
1999). Additionally, many studies argue that the general public’s attitude toward LGBT 
rights became liberalized in the 1990s (Keleher and Smith 2012; Baunach 2011; 2012; 
Hicks and Lee 2006; Brewer 2003).Conservative Christians tend to support the 
Republican Party because they believe Democrats support liberalization. Many scholars














Party in the 1980s (Brooks and Manza 2004; Claassen and Povtak 2010). Wilcox (1994) 
argues that the influence of the Christian Right movement was more influential in the 
1990s. The Christian Right movement was closely related to the mobilization of 
conservative Christians in Presidential elections (Williams 2010). Therefore, voters’ 
attitudes toward various cultural issues, such as abortion, gays and lesbians, and women’s 
rights, might influence the voting behaviors of conservative Christians. Atheists’ 
reactions is another influence of the Christian Rights movement on presidential elections 
(Hout and Fischer 2002). Thus, I will examine the influence of attitudes toward these 
cultural issues on Presidential elections. Furthermore, I will also examine the influence of
attitudes toward cultural issues on voting behaviors in class, religion, and macro- and 
micro-regional cleavage voting models.  
As I explain above, the study will examine the decline of traditional social 
cleavages, such as class, religion, and region, and the influence of attitudes on economic 
and cultural issues between 1980 and 2008. Although many studies have examined the 
decline of social cleavages up to the 1990s, few studies show that social cleavages are 
still significant predictors in Presidential elections in the 2000s. Regarding short-term
factors, many scholars argue that short-term factors are more influential than are long-
term factors. Thus, the study will analyze the association between social cleavage and 
vote choice and the influence of short-term factors on the association between social 
cleavage and vote choice between 1980 and 2008.I will ask: Did social cleavages in 
Presidential elections decline or remain the same between 1980 and 2008? What is the 













                                                 
  
economic and cultural issues? What is the influence of short-term factors on the 
association between long-term factors and presidential elections?
Hypotheses
I will test whether the concept of social cleavage can explain individuals’ voting 
behavior from 1980 to 2008. I focus on class cleavage, religious cleavage, and regional 
cleavages because they are representative of traditional social cleavages. By comparing 
the patterns of these types of cleavages, we can understand the overall pattern of social 
cleavages in U.S. national elections. I also test whether short-term factors, such as 
attitudes toward economic issues, influence the relationship between social cleavages and 
voting behavior in Presidential elections. By adding the short-term factors, such as 
evaluation of government’s performance in economic policies and expectations about a
candidate’s prospective economic policies, we can ascertain the relative importance of
long-term factors, such as social cleavages and short-term factors, such as attitudes 
toward economic issues. In addition, I test whether attitudes toward cultural issues, such 
as abortion, the gay rights movement and feminism2, influence the relationship between 
social cleavage and voting behavior. Lastly, I test the pattern of regional cleavage in U.S. 
Presidential voting since the 1980s and examine its relationship with class and religious 
cleavages.  
Hypothesis 1: trends of social cleavages since the 1980s
H1: Social cleavages have decreased in Presidential elections since the 1980s.






























H1-1: Class cleavage has decreased in Presidential elections since the 1980s.
H1-2: Religious cleavage has decreased in Presidential elections since the 1980s. 
H1-3: Macrogeographical cleavage has decreased among the South, Mountain/Plains, 
Midwest, Pacific Coast, and Northeast regions in Presidential elections since the 
1980s.
H1-4: Microgeographical cleavage has decreased among urban, suburban, and rural 
areas in Presidential elections since the 1980s.
Hypothesis 2: influence of economic factors on the relationship between social 
cleavage and Presidential voting
H2: Individuals’ evaluation of their economic situation is negatively associated with 
the magnitude of social cleavages since the 1980s.
H2-1: Individuals’ evaluation of their economic situation is negatively associated with 
the magnitude of class cleavage since the 1980s.
H2-2: Individuals’ evaluation of their economic situation is negatively associated with 
the magnitude of religious cleavage since the 1980s. 
H2-3: Individuals’ evaluation of their economic situation is negatively associated with 
the magnitude of macrogeographical cleavage since the 1980s. 
H2-4: Individuals’ evaluation of their economic situation is negatively associated with 
the magnitude of microgeographical cleavage since the 1980s. 
Hypothesis 3: influence of cultural factors on the relationship between social 
cleavage and Presidential voting
H3: As individuals’ opinions about abortion, gays and lesbians, and feminism have 
liberalized since the 1980s, the magnitude of social cleavages has increased. 
H3-1: As individuals’ opinions about abortion, gays and lesbians, and feminism have 
liberalized since the 1980s, the magnitude of class cleavage has increased.
H3-2: As individuals’ opinions about abortion, gays and lesbians, and feminism have 
liberalized since the 1980s, the magnitude of religious cleavage has increased.  
H3-3: As individuals’ opinions about abortion, gays and lesbians, and feminism have 




















H3-4: As individuals’ opinions about abortion, gays and lesbians, and feminism have 
liberalized since the 1980s, the magnitude of microgeographical cleavage has 
increased.  
Hypothesis 4: influence of cultural factors on the relationship between social 
cleavage and Presidential voting
H4: The relative strength of cultural issues is stronger than economic issues in the 
social cleavage voting models since the 1980s. 
H4-1: The relative strength of cultural issues is stronger than economic issues in the 
class cleavage voting models since the 1980s.
H4-2: The relative strength of cultural issues is stronger than economic issues in the 
religious cleavage voting models since the 1980s.
H4-3: The relative strength of cultural issues is stronger than economic issues in the 
macro-regional cleavage voting models since the 1980s. 
H4-4: The relative strength of cultural issues is stronger than economic issues in the 















I use the ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File (The American National 
Election Studies 2010) for this analysis. Since the American National Election Studies 
(ANES) data have been available, most electoral research has concentrated on national 
level elections including Presidential and Congressional elections (Oliver and Ha 2007).
From the data file, I selected data on Presidential election years between 1980 and 2008 
because voting trends of Presidential elections and Congressional elections are different. 
In the Presidential elections, voters pay attention to national issues. On the other hand, 
voters tend to pay attention to local issues in the congressional elections (Biggers 2011; 
Burden and Wichowsky 2010). In Congressional elections, party loyalty is the most 
important factor in voting even though individual candidates try to show their
independence from their party leadership (Stokes and Miller 1962; Kramer 1971). Many 
voters have no information about candidates and their policies in Congressional elections 
(Stokes and Miller 1962) or less information than in Presidential elections (Burden and 
Wichowsky 2010). Burden and Wichowsky (2010) also explain that Congressional 
elections are different from Presidential elections because the number of constituencies is





















frequent, less competitive, and less salient than Presidential elections. Thus, I analyzed 
Presidential elections only. 
Statistical Model and Analysis Method
The main goals of this study are to show the pattern of class cleavage, religious 
cleavage, and regional cleavage in Presidential elections; and to analyze the effect of 
economic factors and cultural factors on voting behaviors of social groups in Presidential
elections. First, I use binomial logistic regression models to examine the relationship 
between social group and Presidential voting between 1980 and 2008. Second, I examine 
the effects of economic and cultural variables on Presidential voting. Third, I use the fit
statistics of the logistic regression models to assess the effects of economic factors and 
cultural factors on Presidential voting. I also use standardized logistic regression 
coefficients of the economic and cultural variables to compare the relative size of the 
effects of the variables on Presidential voting. Fourth, I calculate the Kappa Index, 
introduced by Manza and Brooks (1999), to estimate the magnitude of the cleavages of
social groups in Presidential elections. Fifth, I examine the influence of economic and 
cultural factors on social cleavages between 1980 and 2008. 
The Kappa Index is the standard deviation of social groups’ log odds ratios, so it 
measures the degree of cleavage among social groups defined in terms of class, religion, 
and region. It indicates the magnitude of the differences of social groups’ voting patterns 
in elections. While the Kappa Index was created to measure the magnitude of social class
cleavage, it can also measure social cleavage based on religion, gender, and race (Manza 










 Party  Total
 Class
Left  Right
 Manual workers  a  b  a+b
 Non-manual  c  d  c+d
 workers
 Total  a+c  b+d  N
 
 
   
 
The Alford Index is a commonly used measure of the magnitude of class voting 
differences (Alford 1963). It measures the difference between the percentage of voters 
supporting Left wing parties among manual occupations and the percentage of voters 
supporting Left wing parties among non-manual workers (Alford 1963; Hout, Brooks, 
and Manza 1995). Korpi (1972) developed the following table to help researchers
understand how the Alford Index is calculated (Table 1). His formula of the Alford Index 
is “Class Voting = a/(a+b)-c/(c+d).”
Table 3.1 The Alford Index Calculation 
Note: Korpi 1972
The Alford Index is an absolute measure of class voting. Although it has been 
widely used, it has several disadvantages. One is that absolute measurements are unduly
influenced by the size of social groups or political parties (Evans 2000; Lachat 2007). 
The Alford Index is also sensitive to changes in the popularity of political parties during 
election years (Heath et al. 1985; Hout et al. 1993). Thus, the Alford Index cannot 
















   
 
     
  
Relative class voting measurement has been used to overcome the disadvantages 
of absolute class voting measurement. Some scholars use odds ratios or log odds ratios 
(Heath et al. 1985). Nieuwbeerta (1996) notes that the methodology of relative class 
voting measurement is borrowed from the methodology of mobility research. Heath et al. 
(1985) were the first scholars to examine the relative class voting index using log-odds. 
Weakliem and Heath (1999) and Evans, Heath, and Payne (1991) also used log-odds to 
analyze class voting trends in Britain (Nieuwbeerta 1996). Nieuwbeerta (1996:352)
explains that scholars who use “log-odds-ratios” tried to show linear patterns in these 
ratios when they examined the strength of the relationship between class and voting. 
Relative class voting measurement is “margin-free,” so it is unaffected by changes of the 
size of social groups or political parties (Brooks and Manza 1997b:940). Gijsberts and 
Nieuwbeerta (2000:411) suggest that “Scores for this index measure the magnitude of the 
class effects for a given election in deviations from the mean. When the voting behavior 
of classes diverges, the standard deviation of the group-specific coefficients will increase. 
Conversely, when the voting behavior of classes converges, the index score will approach 
zero” when they explain the class Kappa Index. Lachat (2007) emphasizes that relative 
class voting measurement can assess only the behavioral change of voters in elections. 
Brooks and Manza (1997a; b) use relative class voting measurement for more 
than two social groups. They argue that measuring the vote difference among more than 
two social groups is made possible by log-linear models. Thus, they use 7-category class 
variables and 7-category religious denomination variables to measure class cleavage and 
religious cleavage. While some scholars use separate models for each election year to 













     
   
  
 
    
 
analyzing pooled data. For this model, they include a time dummy variable and a variable
for the interaction between social group and election year. By using this method, they 
calculate overall social cleavage over time and group-specific trends for vote choice. 
Following the tradition of social cleavage analysis, I use multivariate logistic 
regressions to examine the relationship between social groups and Presidential voting. 
Second, using the same method, I also analyze the effects of various factors, such as 
economic and cultural factors, on Presidential voting. Third, I examine the relative
strength of economic and cultural variables by using partially standardized coefficients. 
Fourth, I calculate the Kappa Index and demonstrate the influence of economic and 
cultural variables on this index.
To analyze the effect of economic factors (attitudes toward economic issues) and 
cultural factors (attitudes toward cultural issues) on voting, I use fit statistics. Following 
Brooks (2002), I use the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and log-likelihood values
to examine the fit of the statistical models to the data. As Brooks (2002) suggested, an
effect of explanatory factors is revealed by an improvement of the BIC or log-likelihood 
index over the null model, so I examine the fit statistic index to ascertain the effect that 
economic and cultural factors have on voting in Presidential elections. Menard (2002) 
states:
In linear regression, we use the F statistic and R2 to test statistical significance and 
substantive significance, respectively, of the relationship between the dependent 
variable and the independent variables. Both are based on the total and error sums 








   
   
 






well the model fits the data (for example, in the context of theory testing), we use
GM and RL2 , based on -2LL, to test for statistical and substantive significance. (p.41)
The BIC and -2 log-likelihood values are useful to compare the fitness of the 
models. However, the BIC can be used to compare non-nested models, while the -2 log-
likelihood statistics are available only in nested models (Burnham and Anderson 2004). 
The Bayesian approach has been used for model selection in sociology since 1986 and 
avoids some problems inherent in p-value tests (Raftery 1995; 2001). The p-values test is 
limited because it considers only two models: H1 (alternative model) and H0 (null model). 
Many scholars include all the possible variables in their models and remove unnecessary 
variables by using the t-statistic of each parameter or a stepwise method until the adjusted 
R-squared values are maximized. But these methods do not consider unidentified 
relationships among the independent variables and random relationships among 
independent variables. On the contrary, Raftery (1995:156) explains that “Bayesian 
model averaging enables one to take into account model uncertainty and to avoid the 
difficulties with standard model selection procedures.” He argues that BIC is a better 
method to choose the best model. Thus, I used both the BIC and the -2 log-likelihood 
values. 
BIC and log-likelihood can be used to examine whether predictors have statistical 
effects on a dependent variable, while it is hard to know the relative strength of the 
effects of independent variables. To compare the relative size influence of independent 
variables, scholars have developed a way to calculate standardized coefficients in logistic 
regression models (Menard 2011, Kaufman 1996, Long 1997). Kaufman (1996) suggests 














effects of different independent variables and to make judgments about the absolute 
strength of the relationship” (Kaufman 1996:90). Although there is no agreement about 
the best way to calculate standardized logistic coefficients, many scholars use the spost9 
user package of STATA, developed by Long and Freese (Long and Freese 2006; Long 
1997; Kaufman 1996; Menard 2011). Long and Freese (2006) explain how to calculate 
fully-standardized and semi-standardized logistic coefficients. Fully-standardized 
coefficients standardize both independent and dependent variables, while partially 
standardized coefficients standardize either the independent or dependent variable. 
However, Kaufman (1996) suggests that it is hard to interpret the standardized 
coefficients of dummy variables even though these coefficients can be compared to the 
standardized coefficients of other variables. Kaufman (1996:108) also suggests that 
“standardized coefficients cannot be used for a polychotomous nominal predictor because 
changing the reference (or excluded) category changes the coefficients for all the dummy 
variables without changing the nature of their relationship to the outcome variable” 
(Kaufman 1996:108). Thus, I use x-standardized logistic coefficients to compare the
relative size of influence of economic and cultural variables. 
Finally, I coded election years as dummy variables to solve the temporal 
dependence issue in binary time-series-cross-section data (Beck and Katz 1995; Beck, 
Katz, and Tucker 1998). Even though there are some arguments about using dummy 
variables for election years to avoid the temporal dependence issue, using time dummy
variables is a simpler way to solve the temporal dependence issue (Beck 2008; De Boef






   
   
 
 





The binary logistic regression equation for the social cleavages voting models
with Time-Series Cross-Section data are as follows:
(3.1)
where DEMOCRATICVOTE i is “the logit transformation of the expected probability”
that person i (i=1,...N) votes for the Democratic Party; ELECTIONYEARs (1=1984,…N-
1=2008) are the dummy variables for the Presidential election years; SOCIALGROUPs
(1 to N-1: varies according to the number of groups of class, religion, macro-region, and 
micro-region) is the dummy variables for social groups; FEMALE is a gender dummy 
variable; EDUCATIONYEAR is years of education; AGE is the age of respondents;
FAMILYINCOME is the income categories based on percentiles of family income 
distribution; and WHITE, BLACK, and HISPANIC are dummy variables for race. For 
the analysis of the influence of attitudes toward economic and cultural issues, I will add 
the variables of attitudes toward economic issues (RETROEVALUATION and 
PROSEVALUATION) and attitudes toward cultural issues (ABORTION,  








    
 
 
             




I will use this model to test Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4. Hypotheses 2 and 3 are tested 
together in the same models. Hypotheses 4 will also be tested by using the same models. I 
will use x-standardized logistic coefficients to test the relative strength of the variables. 
The formula of x-standardized logistic coefficients is as follows.
X-Standardized Coefficient = Logistic Coefficient of X* Standard Deviation of X (3.3)
Kappa Index can be calculated based on either logistic coefficients or 
probabilities. For this project, I will use binomial logistic regression coefficients. I will
calculate the Kappa index of each election year using the formula of the Kappa Index as 
follows:
∑(𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠−𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠 )2 
Kappa Index = √ (3.4)
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠 
where the Kappa Index is the standard deviation of logistic coefficients of social groups 
in each Presidential election. The Kappa Index will be calculated for both social cleavage 
models, which are social cleavage models without control variables and social cleavage 


















   
Dependent Variables and Independent Variables
The dependent variable is “vote choice” (Republican = 0, Democrat = 1) in the 
national Presidential election for a large part of the analysis. Erikson, Lancaster, and 
Romero (1989) used vote choice in general elections rather than party identification
because vote choice determines the election outcome, not party identification. For 
example, the Republican Party won most of Presidential elections between 1968 and 
1988 even though most voters belonged to the Democratic Party. Vote choice is different 
from party identification, especially among white southerners, between 1968 and 1988.
Party identification has stable characteristics, so it changes slowly. Accordingly, the 
pattern of vote choice changes first and party identification tends to follow. Lastly, vote 
choice is more likely to be influenced by short-term factors than is party identification 
(Erikson, Lancaster, and Romero 1989; Manza and Brooks 1999). For these reasons, vote 
choice is the dependent variable.
Researchers traditionally use the binomial class classification of middle class and
working class in terms of occupation or income (Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995). Even 
though both neo-Marxists and neo-Weberians have developed a class definition, neo-
Marxist class classifications have not been used in voting studies, while neo-Weberian 
class classifications have been used extensively (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992; 
Goldthorpe and Marshall 1992; Goldthorpe 2001; Wright 1985; 1996; 2005). However, 
both schools regard “source of income” as more important than “amount of income”
(Brooks and Brady 1999). Even though some scholars prefer income to occupation for 
the class definition, a measure of income does not differentiate among various 















more similar in terms of social class when they have the same occupation (Brooks and 
Brady 1999; Manza, Hout and Brooks 1995; Brooks and Manza 1997a). Thus, I use the 
occupation-based class classification. 
Manza and Brooks (1999) also explain that the binary classification of white 
collar and blue collar can exclude some people who are middle class or in service 
industry occupations. Additionally, this classification has not reflected the change of the 
class structure of the U.S. since World War II (Manza and Brooks 1999). Therefore, 
Manza and Brooks (1999) used the class classification based on occupational position 
and employment condition. They used relational occupation groups to measure class 
because they think that such groups reflect different life chances and class interests in the 
present society. Specifically, they use the seven-category class classification frame: 
“professionals,” “managers and administrators,” “owners, proprietors, and other non-
professional self-employed persons,” “routine white-collar workers,” “skilled workers
and foremen,” “non-skilled workers,” and “non-full-time labor-force participants” 
(Manza and Brooks 1999). I use the same class classification for my analysis. My 
categories include “professionals,” “managers,” “routine white-collar,” “proprietors,”
“skilled worker,” “unskilled/semi-skilled worker,” and “not-in-the-labor force.” 
Homemakers and all others are classified as not-in-the-labor-force. I use “not-in-the-labor 
force” variable as a reference variable. 
For selection of the reference group, Hardy (1993) provides three guidelines, even 
though arbitrary choice is allowed in many cases. First, the reference group has to be 
defined distinctively. For example, “other” group is not an appropriate reference group 


















1993:10). Second, “when there is an underlying ordinality to the qualitative categories (as 
in this case of occupation), some researchers choose as the reference group a category at 
the upper or lower boundary, whereas others prefer to designate a category that is roughly 
midrange” (Hardy 1993:10). Third, the reference group should have a sufficient number
of cases for reasonable estimation. I follow these guidelines when I selected reference 
categories for the social group variables.
There are various ways to classify religious groups. Some investigators use the
“fundamentalist-liberal continuum” or simple categories like “fundamentalist vs. non-
fundamentalist,” while others use complex categories like “fundamentalists, 
conservatives, moderate, liberal, and excluded” (Smith 1990). However, these 
classifications do not capture the religious diversity of American society today. To 
overcome the weakness of previous religious classification, Steensland, Park, Regnerus, 
Robinson, Wilcox, and Woodberry (2000) developed a seven-category religion 
classification system: Mainline Protestant, Evangelical Protestant, Black Protestant, 
Catholic, Jewish, Other religion, and Nonreligious. This classification was based on the 
General Social Survey (GSS). Steensland et al. (2000) argue that many respondents 
dislike classifying themselves as fundamentalists because the term has a negative 
connotation, so fundamentalists are not classified as a separate category in their 
classification. Their classification is created based on respondents’ religious group 
affiliation rather than religious ideology (Hackett and Lindsay 2008). Thus, it is an 
appropriate measurement of the religious group membership of respondents. Brooks and 
Manza (2004) used this religious classification for their analysis of the National Election 














the GSS-based religious classification of Steensland et al. (2000) into NES-based religion 
classification variables. Thus, I use the seven-category religious classification variables 
developed by Steensland et al. (2000).
With regard to regional variables, I examine several different regional 
classifications. The first classification is a five-category classification for macro-region. 
McKee and Teigen (2009:487) used a “five-region division” rather than a “simple 
North/South dichotomy,” following the example of Black and Black (2007). The five 
sections are: “(1) the South, (2) the Mountains/Plains, (3) the Midwest, (4) the Pacific 
Coast, and (5) the Northeast.” The South includes Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia; 
the Mountains/plains includes Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming; the 
Midwest includes Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Ohio, West Virginia, and Wisconsin; the Pacific Coast includes California, Oregon, and 
Washington; and the Northeast includes Connecticut, Delaware, Washing, D.C., Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, and Vermont. Alaska and Hawaii are omitted (McKee and Teigen 2009: 487). I 
used this classification scheme to make five section dummy variables. 
To operationally define cities, suburbs, and rural areas, the NES provides an
“urbanism” variable (VCF0111: 1-central cities, 2-suburban areas, 3-rural, small towns, 
outlying and adjacent areas). The urbanism variable is available up to 2000, so I will use 










   
 
 






For a detailed analysis of suburban areas, Lang et al. (2008) provide a more
specific suburban classification. They classify suburbs into “core,” “inner suburb,” 
“mature suburb,” “emerging suburb,” and “exurb” based on commuting patterns within
urban areas, land use, and population growth. They explain that Core counties contain “at
least 1,000 housing units per square mile in 2000.” In Core counties, more than half of
workers commute to central cities. Inner Suburbs include more undeveloped land, but 
more than half of the workers of Inner Suburbs commute to the city center, which is
located in the central business district in the city, and to the most densely populated areas
during the day (Glaeser and Kahn 2001; 2003). More than 90% of residents reside in 
urbanized environments. Mature Suburbs are counties in which more than 75% of 
residents live in urbanized environments and have a population growth rate that is less 
than one and a half times that of the national average between 2000 and 2006. Emerging 
Suburbs are counties in which more than 25% of residents reside in urbanized 
environments and more than 5% of residents commute to central cities. Exurban counties 
include less than 25% of residents who reside in urbanized areas and less than 5 percent 
of workers commute to major urban areas (Lang et al. 2008). I transformed the “FIPS 
STATE-COUNTY” variables into various suburban variables by using Lang et al.’s
(2008) classification tables based on counties. However, the ANES Time Series 
Cumulative Data File does not include the “FIPS STATE-COUNTY” variable, so I used 
individual time series data to find “FIPS STATE-COUNTY” variables. These variables 
are available up to 1996. Consequently, I can perform a detailed analysis of residential 














   
 
   
  
  




An alternative classification system for suburbs is based on the “Belt code”
variable. The belt code was developed by the Survey Research Center (SRC) for the
General Social Survey (GSS) to classify the rings of metropolitan areas based on a
place’s size and type. Its definition has changed over time, but assuming it is stable I use 
the classification of GSS cumulative data for the belt code. I recoded the data into 6
dummy variables: Belt 1 (“central city of 12 largest SMSAs”), Belt 2 (“central city of 
remainder of the 100 largest SMSAs”), Belt 3 (“suburbs of the 12 largest SMSAs”), Belt
4 (“suburbs of the remaining 100 largest SMSAs”), Belt 5 (“other urban”), and Belt 6
(“other rural”) (National Opinion Research Center 2009). The belt codes are available in 
the individual time-series data between 1980 and 2000. 
I use income, race, gender, education, and age as control variables. Income 
categories are based on percentiles of the income distribution: 1=0 to 16 percentile, 2=17 
to 33 percentile, 3=34 to 67 percentile, 4=68 to 95 percentile, and 5=96 to 100 percentile. 
I transformed the 6-category race variable (VCF 0106a) into a race dummy variable. The 
original categories are: whites, blacks, Hispanics, Asians, native-Americans, and others. I
coded these categories into four categories: whites, blacks, Hispanics, and others. I 
transformed the gender variable (VCF0104) into a dummy variable. If respondents are
female, I recoded them as 1, if respondents are male I recoded them as 0. I use the 7-
category education variable (VCF 0140a) as an ordinal categorical variable based on
years of education: “8 years or less” equals to 8, “9-12 years with no diploma” equals to 
11.5, “12 years with diploma” equals to 12, “some college with no degree” equals to 13, 
“BA level degree” equals to 16, “Advanced degree” equals to 18. The age variable is 















     
  
   
 
I use subjective economic assessments for economic factors, such as the 
evaluation of the overall economy and expectations about the future economic situation. 
To measure the individual’s economic evaluations, I used the item, “R (respondent)
Opinion: Better or Worse Economy in Past Year” (VCF 0870) as the measure of 
retrospective economic evaluation (better=1, stayed same=3, and worse=5). To measure
the individual’s economic outlook, I used the item, “R Opinion: Better or Worse 
Economy in Next Year” (VCF 0872) as the measure of prospective economic expectation 
(get better=1, stay about the same=3, and get worse=5). 
I also use subjective measures for cultural factors, such as attitudes toward 
abortion, gay rights, and gender equality. The abortion attitude variable is based on the 
item, “R Opinion: By Law, When Should Abortion Be Allowed” (VCF 0838): 1=By law, 
abortion should never be permitted, 2=The law should permit abortion only in the case of
rape, incest, or when the woman’s life is in danger, 3=The law should permit abortion for 
reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman’s life, but only after the need for 
the abortion has been clearly established, and 4= By law, a woman should always be able
to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice. Attitude toward gay rights is 
measured by the thermometer scale, ranging from 0 (least favorable) to 100 (most 
favorable), for gays and lesbians (VCF0232). To measure attitudes toward gender
equality, I used the item, “R Placement: Women Equal Role Scale” (VCF 0834), which
ranges from 1= “Women and men should have an equal role” to 7= “Women’s place is in 
the home.”
Table 3.2 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables. Even though I planned 









        
 
       
       
       
       
      
       
      
      
      
       
       
       
      
      
      
       
       
      
       
 
      
      
      
       
      
       
Variables N Min. Max. Mean SD Years
Dependent Republican voting (reference) 1980-20084,381 0.00 1.00 .47 .50variable
Democratic voting 4,928 0.00 1.00 .53 .50 1980-2008
Subtotal (Presidential voting) 9,309 
Class Professional 2,072 0.00 1.00 .16 .37 1980-2004
Managers 984 0.00 1.00 .08 .26 1980-2004
Routine White-Collar 1,635 0.00 1.00 .13 .33 1980-2004
Proprietors 827 0.00 1.00 .06 .24 1980-2004
Skilled Workers 801 0.00 1.00 .06 .24 1980-2004
Un/Semi-Skilled Workers 898 0.00 1.00 .07 .25 1980-2004
Not in the labor force (reference) 5,801 0.00 1.00 .45 .50 1980-2004
Subtotal (class) 13,018 
Religion Mainline Protestant 3,687 0.00 1.00 .24 .43 1980-2008
Evangelical Protestant 3,656 0.00 1.00 .24 .43 1980-2008
Black Protestant 1,368 0.00 1.00 .09 .29 1980-2008
Other religions 531 0.00 1.00 .03 .18 1980-2008
Catholics (reference) 3,777 0.00 1.00 .25 .43 1980-2008
Jewish group 313 0.00 1.00 .02 .14 1980-2008
No religion 1,939 0.00 1.00 .13 .33 1980-2008
Subtotal 15,271 
5-Category South 5,137 0.00 1.00 .33 .47 1980-2008
Macro- Mountain 1,400 0.00 1.00 .09 .29 1980-2008
Region Midwest 3,734 0.00 1.00 .24 .43 1980-2008
Pacific Coast (reference) 2,212 0.00 1.00 .14 .35 1980-2008
North East 2,963 0.00 1.00 .19 .39 1980-2008
Subtotal (macro-region) 15,446 
 
years. For example, class is not available for 2008. Micro-regional variables for urbanism
and the Beltcode classifications are not available for 2004 and 2008, and Lang et al.’s 
(2008) classification is not available for 2000, 2004, and 2008. The variable for attitudes 
toward gays and lesbians is not available for 1980. 
Additionally, the number of cases varies in the analyses of class, religion, and 
macro/micro regions because of missing values. The number of missing values differs for 
class, religion, and macro/micro regions. However, the same set of independent and 
control variables is used for the analyses. Thus, the analyses of class, religion, and 
macro/micro regions are based on different sample sizes. 





 3-Category Central cities  (reference) 2,845  0.00  1.00  .26  .44  1980-2000
Micro-  Suburbs 4,565  0.00  1.00  .41  .49  1980-2000
 Region  Rural 3,706  0.00  1.00  .33  .47  1980-2000
  Subtotal (3-category micro-region) 11,116      
5-Category Core  (reference) 892  0.00  1.00  .23  .42  1980-1996
Micro-  Inner suburb 952  0.00  1.00  .24  .43  1980-1996
 Region  Mature suburb 1,324  0.00  1.00  .34  .47  1980-1996
 Emerging suburb 452  0.00  1.00  .12  .32  1980-1996
 Exurb 299  0.00  1.00  .08  .27  1980-1996
  Subtotal (5-category micro-region) 3,919      
6- Belt 1 (central city of 12 largest 895  0.00  1.00  0.09  0.29  1980-2000Category  SMSAs, reference)
Micro-  Belt 2 (central city of remainder of 1,605  0.00  1.00  0.16  0.37  1980-2000 Region  the 100 largest SMSAs)
Belt 3 (suburbs of the 12 largest 1,666  0.00  1.00  0.17  0.37  1980-2000 SMSAs)
Belt 4 (suburbs of the remaining 100 2,471  0.00  1.00  0.25  0.43  1980-2000 largest SMSAs)
 Belt 5 (other urban) 2,671  0.00  1.00  0.27  0.44  1980-2000
 Belt 6 (other rural) 682  0.00  1.00  0.07  0.25  1980-2000
  Subtotal (beltcode) 9,990      
 Economic  Retrospective  evaluation 15,141  1.00  5.00  3.56  1.57  1980-2008
 variables  Prospective  expectation 13,439  1.00  5.00  2.85  1.39  1980-2008
 Cultural  Abortion  attitudes 13,635  1.00  4.00  2.85  1.09  1980-2008
 variables  Gender equality  attitudes 12,501  1.00  7.00  5.61  1.75  1980-2008
 Gays and Lesbians attitudes 11,687  0.00  97.00  39.64  27.96  1984-2008
Control  Male (reference) 6,837  0.00  1.00  0.44  0.50  1980-2008
Variables Female 8,614  0.00  1.00  0.56  0.50  1980-2008
 Subtotal (gender) 15,451      
 Education 15,307  8.00  18.00  12.98  2.37  1980-2008
 Age 15,451  0.00  99.00  45.82  17.90  1980-2008
 Family  income 13,845  1.00  5.00  2.84  1.14  1980-2008
 White 11,177  0.00  1.00  0.73  0.44  1980-2008
 Black  2,238  0.00  1.00  0.15  0.35  1980-2008
 Hispanic 1,239  0.00  1.00  0.08  0.27  1980-2008
Others  (reference) 682  0.00  1.00  0.04  0.21  1980-2008
  Subtotal (race) 15,336      





The number of respondents is 9,309 between 1980 and 2008. Among them, 4,381 
(47%) stated they voted for the Republican Presidential candidate, while 4,928 (53%) 
stated they voted for the Democratic candidate. The number of respondents who voted for 
the Democratic Party was larger than those who voted for the Republican Party between 














With regard to the class variables, the total number of respondents is 13,018 
between 1980 and 2004. The number in each occupational class is as follows: 
professional (2,072, 16%), manager (984, 8%), routine white-collar (1,635, 13%), 
proprietor (827, 6%), skilled worker (801, 6%), un-/semi-skilled worker (898, 7%), and
not-in-the-labor force (5,801, 45%). 
Regarding the religious groups, the total number of respondent is 15,271 between 
1980 and 2008. The number in each religious group is as follows: mainline Protestant 
(3,687, 24%), evangelical Protestant (3,656, 24%), black Protestant (1,368, 9%), other 
religion (531, 3%), Catholic (3,777, 25%), Jewish group (313, 2%), and no religion 
(1,939, 13%). 
With regard to the 5-category macro-region variables (South, Mountains/Plains, 
Midwest, Pacific Coast, and Northeast), the total number of respondents is 15,446 
between 1980 and 2008. The number of respondents in the South is 5,137 (33%), the 
number in the Mountain region is 1,400 (9%), the number in the Midwest is 3,734 (24%), 
the number in the Pacific Coast region is 2,212 (14%), and the number in the Northeast is 
2,963 (19%).  
Regarding the 3-category micro-region variable (central cities, suburbs, and rural 
areas), the total number of respondents is 11,116 between 1980 and 2000. The 
information for the micro-region variable was provided until 2000, after which point no 
further data are available due to privacy issues. The number of respondents who reported 
residence in central cities is 2,845 (26%). The number in the suburbs is 4,565 (41%), and 














With regard to the 5-category micro-region variable (Core, Inner suburb, Mature
suburb, Emerging suburb, and Exurb), the total number of respondents is 3,919 between 
1980 and 1996. The number of core area residents is 892 (23%), the number in inner 
suburbs is 952 (24%), the number in mature suburbs is 1,324 (34%), the number in 
emerging suburbs is 452 (12%), and the number in exurbs is 299 (8%). 
With regard to the 6-category micro-region variable (Belt 1: Central city, large
metropolitan area (MA), Belt 2: Central city, other MA, Belt 3: Suburb, large MA, Belt 4: 
Suburb, other MA, Belt 5: Other urban area, and Belt 6: Other rural area), the total
number of respondents is 9,990 between 1980 and 2000. The number of respondents in
belt 1 was 895 (9%), the number in belt 2 is 1,605 (16%), the number in belt 3 is 1,666 
(17%), the number in belt 4 is 2,471 (25%), the number in belt 5 is 2,671 (27%), and the 
number in belt 6 is 682 (7%). 
Regarding the economic variable, the total number who answered the question 
about retrospective evaluation is 15,141. The mean is 3.56 and the standard deviation is 
1.57. The number who answered the question about prospective expectation is 13,439. 
The mean is 2.85 and the standard deviation is 1.39. 
Regarding the cultural variable, the number who answered the question about 
abortion is 13,635. The mean is 2.85 and the standard deviation is 1.09. The number who 
answered the question about gender equality is 12,501. The mean is 5.61 and the standard 
deviation is 1.75. The number who answered the question about gays and lesbians is 
11,687. The mean is 39.64 and standard deviation is 27.96. 
Regarding the control variables, the number of males is 6,837 (44%), and the 





   
 
  
standard deviation is 2.37. The mean age is 45.82 and the standard deviation is 17.90. 
The mean family income variable is 2.84 and the standard deviation is 1.14. The total 
number of respondents who answered the question about race is 15,336. The number of 
whites is 11,177 (73%), the number of blacks is 2,238 (15%), the number of Hispanics is 















Trends of social cleavages since the 1980s (Hypothesis 1)
The magnitude of social cleavages for class, religion, macro-region, and micro-
region were analyzed with the Kappa Index, which is the standard deviation of social 
groups’ log odds ratios. The Kappa Index was calculated from the results of binomial
logistic regression estimation for class, religion, macro-region, and micro-region because 
the Index can be used for multinomial variables. The dependent variable is Presidential 
voting (Democratic voting=1) in all models. Model 2 did not include control variables, 
while Model 3 included control variables for gender, education, age, family income, and 
race. The number of cases differs in the analyses of class, religion, and regions because of
differences in missing values. 
First, the Kappa Index was calculated for each social cleavage by using the 
logistic regression results based on the pooled data. Two Kappa Indexes were calculated 
to examine the influence of the control variables on social cleavages; one was for the 
model without control variables, and the other was for the model which included control 
variables. The influence of control variables on the association between social groups and 
Presidential voting was examined. Second, the Kappa Index of individual year variables 
was calculated to understand the trend of social cleavages of class, religion, and regions. 










       
        
       
       
        
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
    
    
    
    
           
     
by using single measurements. However, for micro-regional cleavage, more than one
measurement is used to examine the variation of political preference across various 
micro-regional classifications, such as the 3-category classification (city, suburb, and 
rural), the 5-category classification (core, inner suburb, mature suburb, emerging suburb, 
and exurb), and the 6-category classification (Belt 1: central city of 12 largest SMSAs, 
Belt 2: central city of remainder of the 100 largest SMSAs, Belt 3: suburbs of the 12
largest SMSAs, Belt 4: suburbs of the remaining 100 largest SMSAs, Belt 5: other urban, 
Belt 6: other rural).
Class Cleavage between 1980 and 2004 (Hypothesis 1-1)
Table 4.1 Logistic Regression Results for Class Groups’ Voting Behavior, 1980-2004  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3












































































Note: ***: p<0.001, **: p< 0.01, *: p< 0.05. The dependent variable is Presidential voting. The reference variable for 











Figure 4.1 Trend of Class Cleavage between 1980 and 2004
Note: Model 3 includes control variables, while Model 2 does not. 
Table 4.1 shows the relationship between class groups and the Presidential voting
pattern. Model 1 includes election year dummy variables to control election-specific 
effects. In Model 2, class variables were added to test the statistical effect of class groups 
on Presidential voting between 1980 and 2004. In Model 2, the log-likelihood value (-
2LL) changed from 7163.02 to 7079.99. The likelihood ratio test (lr test) was performed 
to test that there was statistically significant improvement in model fit (-2LL). The lr test
also showed that class groups had a statistically significant effect on Presidential voting 
by comparing the fit of Model 2 with that of Model 1. The hypothesis that all of the 
logistic coefficients for class groups are concurrently equal to zero was rejected at the 

















Presidential voting is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Additionally, the Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC) also improved in Model 2 (from 7222.99 to 7191.37).
The Kappa Index was calculated to show whether there was class cleavage 
between 1980 and 2004, and to examine the magnitude of this cleavage by analyzing the 
logistic coefficients of class groups. The value of the Kappa Index for Model 2 was 0.33, 
while it was 0.22 in Model 3. It decreased after controlled variables were added, 
indicating that class cleavage between 1980 and 2004 was partially explained by the
control variables for gender, education, age, family income, and race. 
The unstandardized logistic coefficients of each class group also changed when 
control variables were added. The logistic coefficient of the professional group increased 
and became statistically significant (from 0.09 to 0.44) when control variables were
added to Model 2. The logistic coefficient of the manager group was statistically 
significant in Model 2, but not in Model 3. The logistic coefficient of the routine white
collar group did not change after the control variables were added. However, this 
coefficient was not statistically significant in Model 3. The logistic coefficient of the 
proprietors group increased when control variables were added (from -0.68 to -0.30) and 
remained statistically significant. The logistic coefficient of skilled workers increased 
when control variables were added (from -0.16 to 0.14), but was not statistically 
significant in either model. The logistic coefficient of un-/semi-skilled workers decreased 
when controlled variables were added (from 0.29 to 0.24) and was no longer statistically
significant.  
Figure 4.1 shows the trend of class cleavage between 1980 and 2004. Overall, 










       
        
       
       
        
        
       
       
        
         
        
        
        
        
         
        
        
       
       
       
        
       
       
    
    
    
    
   
  
increased gradually up to 2004. Thus, overall class cleavage has increased between 1980 
and 2004. Even though the magnitudes of class cleavage estimated in Model 2 and Model 
3 are different, the general trend of class cleavage revealed by both models is similar,
showing that class cleavage increased gradually between 1980 and 2004. 
Religious Cleavage between 1980 and 2008 (Hypothesis 1-2)
Table 4.2 Logistic Regression Results for Religious Groups’ Voting Behavior, 1980-
2008 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
















































































Note: ***: p<0.001, **: p< 0.01, *: p< 0.05. The dependent variable is Presidential 

















Figure 4.2 Trend of Religious Cleavage between 1980 and 2004
Note: Model 3 includes control variables, while Model 2 does not. The results of 1996 
and 2008 were not included. Because no Jewish respondent supported the Republican 
Party in 1996 and no Black Protestant supported the Republican Party in 2008, the
logistic coefficients of the Jewish group in 1996 and the Black Protestants in 2008 were 
very large. 
Table 4.2 shows the relationship between religious groups and the Presidential 
voting pattern. Even though it seemed that the black dummy variable would be correlated 
with the Black Protestant dummy variable, there was no multicollinearity issue. The 
values of tolerance for all independent variables are greater than 0.2 and the values of
VIF are less than 5. 
Model 1 includes election year dummy variables to control election-specific 
effects. In Model 2, religious group variables were added to test the statistical effect of 
religious groups on Presidential voting between 1980 and 2008. In Model 2, the log-



















   
 
 
religious groups had a statistically significant effect on Presidential voting. The 
hypothesis that all of the logistic coefficients for religious groups are concurrently equal 
to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=640.42, df=6, p <0.01). Thus, the 
effect of religious group variables on Presidential voting is statistically significant at the
0.01 level. Additionally, the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) also improved in 
Model 2 (from 8094.11 to 7505.80).
The Kappa Index was calculated to show whether there was religious cleavage 
between 1980 and 2008, and to examine the magnitude of religious cleavage by 
analyzing the logistic coefficients of religious groups. The value of the Kappa Index for 
Model 2 was 1.06, while it was 0.42 in Model 3. It decreased after the controlled 
variables were added. 
The logistic coefficient of the Evangelical Protestant group decreased slightly 
when control variables were added (from -0.73 to -0.89), while the significance level did 
not change. The logistic coefficient of the Mainline Protestants increased slightly (from -
0.42 to -0.39) and the significance level did not change. The logistic coefficient of the 
Black Protestant group decreased remarkably and ceased to be statistically significant.
The logistic coefficient of the other religions group variables did not significantly 
change when control variables were added. The logistic coefficient of the Jewish group
and the logistic coefficient of the no religion group were statistically significant in both
models. 
Figure 4.2 shows the trend of religious cleavage between 1980 and 2004. Overall, 
religious cleavage increased from 1980 to 2000, and then decreased in 2004. The level of 








         
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
     
     
     
      
   
 
magnitudes of religious cleavage estimated in Model 2 and Model 3 are different, the 
overall trend of religious cleavage for both models is similar.
Macro-Region Cleavage between 1980 and 2008 (Hypothesis 1-3)
Table 4.3 Logistic Regression Results for Voting Behavior across the 5-category 
Macro Regions, 1980-2008  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
b S.E. b S.E. b S.E. b S.E.
South -0.11 0.08 -0.54*** 0.09
Mountain -0.30** 0.11 -0.33** 0.12
Midwest -0.14 0.08 -0.17 0.09
Northeast 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.09
Female 0.30*** 0.06 0.30*** 0.06
Education 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Family income -0.28*** 0.03 -0.26*** 0.03
White -0.32* 0.15 -0.31* 0.15
Black 2.44*** 0.21 2.36*** 0.21
Hispanic 0.63** 0.19 0.57** 0.19
1984 -0.10 0.10 -0.11 0.10 -0.13 0.11 -0.11 0.11
1988 0.13 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.11
1992 0.71 0.10 0.71*** 0.10 0.69*** 0.11 0.69*** 0.11
1996 0.63 0.11 0.65*** 0.11 0.70*** 0.11 0.67*** 0.11
2000 0.55 0.12 0.54*** 0.12 0.51*** 0.13 0.52*** 0.13
2004 0.25 0.11 0.24* 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.12
2008 0.97 0.14 1.00*** 0.14 0.61*** 0.16 0.54*** 0.15
Constant -0.29 0.08 -0.21* 0.10 0.59* 0.27 0.28 0.26
-2LL 8092.66 8077.43 7233.28 7288.79
BIC 8162.21 8181.75 7398.45 7419.19
df 8 12 19 15
The Kappa Index 0.14 0.22
Note: ***: p<0.001, **: p< 0.01, *: p< 0.05. The dependent variable is Presidential 











Figure 4.3 Trend of 5-category Macro-Regional Cleavage between 1980 and 2008
Note: Model 3 includes control variables, while Model 2 does not. 
Table 4.3 shows the relationship between macro-region and the Presidential
voting pattern. Model 1 includes election year dummy variables to control election-
specific effects. In Model 2, macro-region dummy variables were added to test the 
statistical effect of macro-region variables on Presidential voting between 1980 and 2008. 
In Model 2, the log-likelihood value (-2LL) changed from 8092.66 (Model 1) to 8077.43. 
The lr test also showed that macro-region variables had a statistically significant effect on 
Presidential voting. The hypothesis that all of the logistic coefficients for macro-region 
variables are concurrently equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-
square=15.23, df=4, p <0.01). Thus, the effect of religious group variables on Presidential
voting is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. However, the Bayesian Information 














improved in Model 3 when control variables were added (7398.45). But, when control 
variables were added prior to the macro-region variables, the addition of 5-category 
macro-region variables improved the value of the BIC (from 7419.19 to 7398.45). 
The Kappa Index was calculated to show whether there was macro-regional 
cleavage between 1980 and 2008, and to examine the magnitude of macro-regional 
cleavage by analyzing the logistic coefficients of the macro-regions. The value of the 
Kappa Index for Model 2 was 0.14, while it was 0.22 in Model 3. It increased after
controlled variables were added. 
The logistic coefficient for the South decreased when control variables were 
added (from -0.11 to -0.54) and became statistically significant. The logistic coefficient 
for the Mountain region has the same value and is statistically significant in both models. 
The logistic coefficients for the other regions were not statistically significant in either 
model.
Figure 4.3 shows the trend of macro-regional cleavage between 1980 and 2008. 
The macro-regional cleavage decreased in 1980 when control variables were added, 
while it increased between 1984 and 2008 when control variables were added. However, 







       
       
       
       
        
        
        
         
        
        
        
       
       
       
       
       
       
    
    
    
    
   
 
Micro-Region Cleavage between 1980 and 2000 (Hypothesis 1-4)
Table 4.4 Logistic Regression Results for Voting Behavior across the 3-category 
Micro Regions, 1980-2000  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3




























































Note: ***: p<0.001, **: p< 0.01, *: p< 0.05. The dependent variable is Presidential 







   







Figure 4.4 Trend of 3-category Micro-Regional Cleavage between 1980 and 2000
Note: Model 3 includes control variables, while Model 2 does not. 
In Table 4.4, the relationship between the 3-category micro-region and 
Presidential voting is analyzed with pooled data from 1980 to 2000. Table 4.4 shows the
relationship between the 3-category micro-region and the Presidential voting pattern. 
Model 1 includes election year dummy variables to control election-specific effects. In 
Model 2, micro-region dummy variables were added to test the statistical effect of micro-
region variables on Presidential voting between 1980 and 2000. In Model 2, the log-
likelihood value (-2LL) changed from 6743.22 to 6589.90. The lr test also showed that
the micro-region variables had a statistically significant effect on Presidential voting. The 
hypothesis that all of the logistic coefficients for the micro-region variables are 
concurrently equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=153.32, df=2, p














is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) also 
improved in Model 2 (from 6794.27 to 6657.97). 
The value of the Kappa Index for Model 2 was 0.39, while it was 0.25 for Model 
3. The value of the Kappa Index decreased when control variables were added, 
suggesting that micro-regional cleavage is partially explained by the combined influence 
of gender, education, age, family income, and race between 1980 and 2000. 
The logistic coefficient for suburban residence increased when control variables 
were added (from -0.84 to -0.47), and the p-value of the coefficient did not change. The 
logistic coefficient for rural residence increased when control variables were added and is 
statistically significant in both models (from -0.83 to -0.56). 
Figure 4.4 shows the trend of the 3-category micro-regional cleavage from 1980 
to 2000. The cleavage decreased when control variables were added, but the trends are 
similar in both models. The 3-category micro-regional cleavage decreased until 1996, and 








       
       
 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
        
       
       
       
       
        
       
       
       
       
       
    
    
    
     
   
 
Micro-Region Cleavage (belt code) between 1980 and 2000 (Hypothesis 1-4)
Table 4.5 Logistic Regression Results for Voting Behavior across Belt Codes, 1980-
2000 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
b S.E. b S.E. b S.E.
Belt 1: Central city, large Metropolitan 
Area (MA), Reference
Belt 2: Central city, other MA
Belt 3: Suburb, large MA
Belt 4: Suburb, other MA
Belt 5: Other urban area
































































Note: ***: p<0.001, **: p< 0.01, *: p< 0.05. The dependent variable is Presidential 












Figure 4.5 Trend of Micro Regional Cleavage based on the Belt code between 1980 
and 2000
Note: Model 3 includes control variables, while Model 2 does not. 
In Table 4.5, the relationship between the Belt Code and Presidential voting is 
analyzed with pooled data from 1980 to 2000. Model 1 includes election year dummy
variables to control election-specific effects. In Model 2, the 6-category micro-region 
variables were added to test the statistical effect of the micro-regions on Presidential 
voting between 1980 and 2000. In Model 2, the log-likelihood value (-2LL) changed 
from 6080.49 to 5918.96. The lr test also showed that the 6-category micro-region 
variables had a statistically significant effect on Presidential voting. The hypothesis that 
all of the logistic coefficients for 6-category micro-region variables are concurrently 
equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=161.53, df=5, p <0.01). Thus, 














significant at the 0.01 level. Additionally, the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) also 
improved in Model 2 (from 6130.93 to 6011.43). The value of the Kappa Index for 
Model 2 is 0.45 and is 0.32 for Model 3. The Kappa Index decreased when control 
variables were added. 
The logistic coefficient for Belt 2 slightly increased when control variables are
added (from -0.34 to -0.28) and ceased to be statistically significant. The logistic 
coefficient for Belt 3 increased (from -1.03 to -0.58) and remained statistically 
significant. The logistic coefficient for Belt 4 increased (from -1.18 to -0.76) and is 
statistically significant. The logistic coefficient for Belt 5 increased (from -1.11 to -0.78) 
and also remained statistically significant. The logistic coefficient for Belt 6 increased
(from -1.10 to -0.92) but is statistically unchanged. 
Figure 4.5 shows the trend of belt code micro-regional cleavage between 1980 
and 2000. The cleavage decreased when control variables were added, but the trends are
similar in both models. The belt code micro-regional cleavage decreased until 1988, and 








       
       
        
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
    
    
    
    
   
 
Micro-Region Cleavage (5-category) between 1980 and 1996 (Hypothesis 1-4)
Table 4.6 Logistic Regression Results for Voting Behavior across the 5-category 
Micro-Regions, 1980-1996 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3






























































Note: ***: p<0.001, **: p< 0.01, *: p< 0.05. The dependent variable is Presidential 









Figure 4.6 Trend of 5-category Micro Regional Cleavage between 1980 and 1996
Note: Model 3 includes control variables, while Model 2 does not. 
In Table 4.6, the relationship between the 5-category micro-region and 
Presidential voting is analyzed with pooled data from 1980 to 1996. Model 1 includes 
election year dummy variables to control election-specific effects. In Model 2, the 5-
category micro-region variables were added to test the statistical effect of the micro-
regions on Presidential voting between 1980 and 1996. In Model 2, the log-likelihood 
value (-2LL) changed from 2478.57 to 2393.61. The lr test also showed that the 5-
category micro-region variables had a statistically significant effect on Presidential 
voting. The hypothesis that all of the logistic coefficients for the 5-category micro-region 
variables are concurrently equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-
square=84.96, df=4, p <0.01). Thus, the effect of the 5-category micro-region variables 

















Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) also improved in Model 2 (from 2516.14 to 
2461.23). The value of the Kappa Index for Model 2 is 0.47 and is 0.29 for Model 3. The 
Kappa Index thus decreased when control variables were added. 
The logistic coefficient for residence in an inner suburb increased when control
variables were added (from -0.36 to -0.05) and ceased to be statistically significant. The 
logistic coefficient for residence in a mature suburb increased (from -1.03 to -0.57) and 
continued to be statistically significant. The logistic coefficient for residence in an 
emerging suburb increased (from -1.15 to -0.64) and remained statistically significant.
The logistic coefficient for exurban residence increased (from -1.12 to -0.64) and is 
statistically significant in both models. 
Figure 4.5 shows the trend of the 5-category micro-regional cleavage between 
1980 and 1996. The cleavage decreased when control variables were added except in 
1992, but the trends are similar in both models. The 5-category micro-regional cleavage 
decreased until 1984, and it increased in 1988, then it decreased until 1996 in both 
models. 
Summary of the Association between Social Cleavage and Presidential Voting 
Although there were variations, most Kappa Index values showed an association 
between social cleavages and Presidential voting. First, the overall Kappa Index of class 
cleavage between 1980 and 2004 was 0.33. When control variables, such as gender,
education, age, family income, and race were added to the model, the Index declined to 
0.22. The control variables influenced the association between the professional
occupations and Presidential voting, but these variables failed to explain the association 
















Second, the overall Kappa Index of religious cleavage was 1.06 and decreased to 
0.42 when control variables were added to the model. The control variables influenced 
the association between Black Protestant religion and Presidential voting and decreased 
the Kappa Index. 
Third, the overall Kappa Index of the 5-category macro-regional cleavage was 
0.14. However, it increased to 0.22 when control variables were added. The magnitude of 
the association between residence in the South and Presidential voting increased 
significantly when control variables were added to the model, reflecting the increase of
macro-regional cleavage. 
Fourth, the overall Kappa Index of the 3-category micro-regional cleavage was
0.39 and decreased to 0.25 when control variables were added to the model. The 
magnitude of the association between suburban residence and Presidential voting 
increased significantly when control variables were added and reflects the decrease of
micro-regional cleavage. 
Fifth, the overall Kappa Index of the 6-category micro-regional (Belt code) 
cleavage was 0.45 and decreased to 0.32 when control variables were added to the model. 
Although the Kappa Index decreased, there was no change in the influence of the control
variables on the 6-category micro-regional cleavage. 
Sixth, the overall Kappa Index of the 5-category micro-regional cleavage was 
0.47 and decreased to 0.29 when control variables were added to the model. Although the 
Kappa Index decreased, there was no evidence that the control variables changed the 5-















Consequently, the results shows that social cleavages in terms of class, religion, 
macro-region, and micro-region have a statistically significant influence on Presidential 
voting in 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. This influence does not disappear when control 
variables are added although the magnitude decreased except macro-region. Thus, these 
results support the argument that influence of social factors on Presidential voting persists 
between 1980 and 2008.  
Influence of Economic and Cultural Factors on Presidential Voting (Hypothesis 2)
Hypothesis 2 examined the influence of economic and cultural factors on
Presidential voting pattern in social cleavage models (class, religion, 5-category macro-
region, 3-category micro-region) and the Presidential voting pattern. The procedure are as 
follows:
First, a likelihood ratio test was used to examine the statistical significance of two 
economic and three cultural variables both respectively and simultaneously. The 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) was also used to confirm improvement of model fit
when the economic and cultural variables were added. Whereas the lr test can be used 
only for nested models, the BIC can be used to compare non-nested models. The Wald 
statistic was also used to examine the significance of the economic and cultural variables 
in the model. 
Second, I examined the change of the Kappa Index of each social group after the 
economic and cultural variables were added. The Kappa Index is the standard deviation 









   
    
     
     
     
     
     
      
      
      
     
      
      
  
 
Third, the relative effect-size of the economic and cultural variables on 
Presidential voting was tested by using a standardized logistic coefficient. 
Influence of Economic and Cultural Factors on Presidential Voting in the Class 
Cleavage Model (Hypothesis 2-1 and 3-1)
Table 4.7 Model fit of Class Cleavage Models
Models -2LL df BIC
Model 1 (year only) 6307.06 6 6357.72
Model 2 (Model 1 + class) 6219.60 12 6320.88
Model 3 (Model 2 + control variables) 5710.80 19 5871.16
Model 4 (Model 3 + retrospective evaluation) 5582.59 20 5751.40
Model 5 (Model 3 + prospective expectation) 5641.42 20 5810.22
Model 6 (Model 3 + abortion attitudes) 5367.18 20 5535.99
Model 7 (Model 3 + gender equality attitudes) 5489.83 20 5658.64
Model 8 (Model 3 + gay/lesbian attitudes) 5321.80 20 5490.61
Model 9 (Model 3 + 2 economic variables) 5554.97 21 5732.22
Model 10 (Model 3 + 3 cultural variables) 5068.39 22 5254.08
Model 11 (Model 3 + 2 economic var. & 3 cultural var.) 4915.29 24 5117.87





     
            
           
           
            
           
            
            
           
           
           
            
           
           
           
            
            
            
             
            
           
           
           
           
           
           
   
 
  
    
 
  
Table 4.8 Economic and cultural Factors on Class Voting, 1984-2004  
Model 3 Model 11

























0.44*** 0.18 0.10 17.88
-0.13 -0.04 0.13 1.05
0.22* 0.08 0.11 3.99
-0.37** -0.10 0.14 7.00
0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00
0.19 0.04 0.16 1.35
0.22** 0.11 0.07 10.61
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.09
0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.06
-0.27*** -0.29 0.03 63.50
-0.24 -0.09 0.16 2.16
2.27*** 0.69 0.23 95.78
0.47* 0.10 0.21 4.86
0.23* 0.09 0.10 5.15
0.79*** 0.32 0.10 62.83
0.79*** 0.30 0.11 56.39
0.64*** 0.19 0.13 25.49





















0.31** 0.13 0.11 7.24 1.36
-0.19 -0.06 0.14 1.87 0.83
0.13 0.05 0.12 1.21 1.14
-0.47** -0.12 0.16 8.97 0.63
0.01 0.00 0.16 0.00 1.01
0.21 0.04 0.18 1.34 1.23
-0.02 -0.01 0.08 0.06 0.98
-0.07*** -0.16 0.02 13.42 0.93
0.01** 0.13 0.00 9.42 1.01
-0.32*** -0.35 0.04 74.34 0.72
-0.43* -0.17 0.18 5.88 0.65
2.31*** 0.70 0.25 84.37 10.05
0.43 0.09 0.24 3.30 1.53
0.25*** 0.39 0.03 86.89 1.28
0.14*** 0.18 0.03 24.56 1.15
0.42*** 0.44 0.04 129.26 1.52
0.19*** 0.31 0.02 59.63 1.21
0.02*** 0.57 0.00 189.99 1.02
0.07 0.03 0.11 0.41 1.08
0.10 0.04 0.12 0.69 1.11
0.64*** 0.24 0.12 29.85 1.89
0.17 0.05 0.14 1.42 1.18
-0.44** -0.15 0.14 10.68 0.64
-2.63*** 0.37 50.62 0.07
Note: ***: p<0.001, **: p< 0.01, *: p< 0.05. The dependent variable is Presidential 
voting. The reference variable for class is the not-in-labor force group. N=4,630.
Table 4.7 shows model fit statistics, namely the -2LL and BIC, for class cleavage 
models. Table 4.8 shows the binary logistic regression analysis of the relationship 
between class groups and the Presidential voting pattern when economic and cultural
factors were controlled. The dependent variable is Presidential voting (Democratic 















     
  
   
 
 
effects. In Model 2, the main independent variables (class groups) were added to examine 
the total effect of class groups on Presidential voting. In Model 3, several control 
variables were added, and in Model 4, the influence of economic and cultural factors on 
the goodness-of-fit of the class cleavage models was examined. In this analysis, the data 
for the years between 1984 and 2004 are used because the information on attitudes
toward gays and lesbians was not available for 1980. Model 4 tested the influence of 
retrospective economic evaluation on model fit improvement. Model 5 tested the 
influence of prospective economic expectations on model fit improvement of the class 
cleavage model. Model 6 tested the influence of attitudes toward abortion rights on the fit 
of the model for the relationship between class and voting. Model 7 tested the influence 
of attitudes toward gender equality on the goodness-of-fit of the class cleavage model. 
Model 8 tested the influence of attitudes toward gays and lesbians on the model fit
improvement of the class voting model. Model 9 tested the combined influence of the
two economic and three cultural variables on the goodness-of-fit of the class voting 
model.  
Table 4.7 indicates that all five variables improved the fit of each model. Model 4
(-2LL: 5582.59, BIC: 5751.40), Model 5 (-2LL: 5641.42, BIC: 5810.22), Model 6 (-2LL: 
5367.18, BIC: 5535.99), Model 7 (-2LL: 5489.83, BIC: 5658.64), and Model 8 (-2LL: 
5321.80, BIC: 5490.61) showed improvement over Model 3 (-2LL: 5710.80, BIC: 
5871.16). The likelihood ratio (lr) test was performed to test the statistical significance of
the two economic and three cultural variables on model fit improvement. The fit of the 
models that include two economic and three cultural variables (Model 4 to Model 8) was 


















variables (Model 3). Model 9 tested the combined effect of retrospective evaluation and 
prospective expectation on model fit improvement compared to the fit of Model 3. Model 
10 tested the combined effect of attitudes toward abortion, gender equality, and gays and 
lesbians on model fit improvement. Model 11 tested the combined effect of the two 
economic and three cultural variables on model fit improvement, 
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for retrospective evaluation is equal to 
zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=128.21, df = 1, p <0.01). The effect of 
retrospective evaluation on Presidential voting was thus statistically significant at the 
0.01 level. 
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for prospective expectation is equal to 
zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=69.38, df=1, p <0.01). The effect of 
prospective expectation on Presidential voting was thus statistically significant at the 0.01 
level.  
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for attitudes toward abortion is equal
to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=343.62, df=1, p <0.01). The effect
of attitudes toward abortion on Presidential voting was thus statistically significant at the 
0.01 level. 
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for attitudes toward gender equality is 
equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=220.97, df=1, p <0.01). The 
effect of attitudes toward gender equality on Presidential voting was thus statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level. 
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for attitudes toward gays and lesbians


















   
 
The effect of attitudes toward gays and lesbians on Presidential voting was thus 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
The hypothesis that the coefficients of retrospective evaluation and prospective 
expectation are simultaneously equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-
square=155.82, df=1, p <0.01). So, at least one of economic variables was statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level. The BIC also improved in Model 9 (from 5871.16 to 
5732.22)
The hypothesis that the coefficients of attitudes toward abortion, gender equality, 
and gays and lesbians are simultaneously equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR 
Chi-square=642.41, df=1, p <0.01). At least one cultural variable was statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level. The BIC also improved in Model 10 (from 5871.16 to 
5254.08).
The hypothesis that the coefficients of the two economic variables (retrospective 
and prospective evaluation) and the three cultural variables (attitudes toward abortion, 
gender equality, and gays and lesbians) are simultaneously equal to zero was rejected at 
the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=795.50, df=1, p <0.01). At least one of these coefficients 
was statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The BIC also improved in Model 11 (from
5871.16 to 5117.87).
Table 4.8 shows that the Wald statistic was statistically significant for 
retrospective and prospective economic evaluation and attitudes toward abortion, gender
equality, and gays and lesbians in Model 11.  
In Table 4.8, the coefficients for professional, routine white-collar, and proprietor















proprietor were statistically significant in Model 11. The significance level of the 
coefficient for routine white-collar became non-significant when the two economic and 
three cultural variables were added to the model.  
To compare the relative sizes of the coefficients of the two economic and three 
cultural variables, I used standardized coefficients. The standardized coefficients suggest
that attitudes toward gays and lesbians had the strongest relationship (Beta=0.57). The 
next strongest relationship was attitudes toward abortion (Beta=0.44). Retrospective 
evaluation was third (Beta=0.39), attitudes toward gender equality was fourth 
(Beta=0.31), and prospective expectation was last (Beta=0.18) in terms of the strength of 
the relationships to Presidential voting. 
Figure 4.7 Influence of Economic and Cultural Factors on the Kappa Index of Class
Cleavage, 1980-2004 
Note: Attitudes toward gays and lesbians was not included in Model 11 in 1980.  
Figure 4.7 shows the trend of class cleavage and the influence of economic and 










    
     
     
     
     
     
      
      
      
     
      
      
 
  
factors were not influential on class cleavage. However, the direction of the influence of 
these factors in 1980 and 1984 was different from that of 1988, 1992, 2000, and 2004. 
The magnitude of the Kappa Index for both models was higher in 2000 and 2004.  
Influence of Economic and Cultural Factors on Presidential Voting in the Religious 
Cleavage Model (Hypothesis 2-2 and 3-2)
Table 4.9 Model fit of Religious Cleavage Models
-2LL df BIC
Model 1 (year only) 7156.31 7 7216.30
Model 2 (Model 1 + religion) 6562.26 13 6673.67
Model 3 (Model 2 + control variables) 6151.85 20 6323.26
Model 4 (Model 3 + retrospective evaluation) 6016.64 21 6196.61
Model 5 (Model 3 + prospective expectation) 6071.68 21 6251.66
Model 6 (Model 3 + abortion attitudes) 5908.25 21 6088.23
Model 7 (Model 3 + gender equality attitudes) 5994.79 21 6174.77
Model 8 (Model 3 + gay/lesbian attitudes) 5854.17 21 6034.15
Model 9 (Model 3 + 2 economic variables) 5981.04 22 6169.59
Model 10 (Model 3 + 3 cultural variables) 5655.95 23 5853.07
Model 11 (Model 3 + 2 economic var. & 3 cultural var.) 5487.50 25 5701.76





     
            
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
            
             
            
           
           
           
           
           
           
           




Table 4.10 Economic and Cultural Effects on Religious Voting, 1984-2008  
Model 3 Model 11

































































































































































Note: ***: p<0.001, **: p< 0.01, *: p< 0.05. The dependent variable is Presidential 
voting. The reference variable for religion group is Catholic. N=5,273.
Table 4.9 shows model fit statistics (Log-likelihood and BIC) for the religious 
cleavage models. Table 4.10 shows the binary logistic regression analysis of the 
relationship between religious groups and the Presidential voting pattern between 1984 




















that all five variables improved the fit of each model, that is, Model 4 (-2LL: 6016.64, 
BIC: 6196.61), Model 5 (-2LL: 6071.68, BIC: 6251.66), Model 6 (-2LL: 5908.25, BIC: 
6088.23), Model 7 (-2LL: 5994.79, BIC: 6174.77), and Model 8 (-2LL: 5854.17, BIC: 
6034.15) showed improvement over Model 3 (-2LL: 6151.85, BIC: 6323.26).  
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for retrospective evaluation is equal to 
zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=135.22, df=1, p <0.01). The effect of 
retrospective evaluation on Presidential voting was thus statistically significant at the 
0.01 level. 
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for prospective expectation is equal to 
zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=80.17, df=1, p <0.01). The effect of 
prospective expectation on Presidential voting was thus statistically significant at the 0.01 
level.  
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for attitudes toward abortion is equal 
to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=243.60, df=1, p <0.01). The effect
of attitudes toward abortion on Presidential voting was thus statistically significant at the 
0.01 level. 
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for attitudes toward gender equality is 
equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=157.06, df=1, p <0.01). The 
effect of attitudes toward gender equality on Presidential voting was thus statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level. 
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for attitudes toward gays and lesbians


















The effect of attitudes toward gays and lesbians on Presidential voting was thus 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficients for retrospective evaluation and 
prospective expectation are simultaneously equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level 
(LR Chi-square=170.81, df=1, p <0.01). At least one of these coefficients is statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level. The BIC also improved in Model 9 (from 6323.26 to 
6169.59)
The hypothesis that the coefficients of attitudes toward abortion, gender equality, 
and gays and lesbians are simultaneously equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR 
Chi-square=495.90, df=1, p <0.01). Therefore, at least one of these coefficients was 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The BIC also improved in Model 10 (from
6323.26 to 5853.07).
The hypothesis that the coefficients of the two economic variables (retrospective 
and prospective evaluation) and three cultural variables (attitudes toward abortion, gender
equality, and gays and lesbians) are simultaneously equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 
level (LR Chi-square=664.35, df=1, p <0.01). At least one of these coefficients was 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The BIC also improved in Model 11 (from
6323.26 to 5701.76).
Table 4.10 shows that the Wald statistic was statistically significant for
retrospective and prospective economic evaluation and attitudes toward abortion, gender
equality, and gays and lesbians in Model 11.  
In Table 4.10, evangelical Protestant, mainline Protestant, Jewish, and no religion 






    
 
   
 
 
    
  
significant to non-significant when the two economic and three cultural variables were 
added to the model. 
The standardized coefficients show that attitudes toward gays and lesbians had the
strongest effect (Beta=0.51) of the economic and cultural variables. The next strongest 
was attitudes toward abortion and retrospective evaluation (Beta=0.39) followed by 
attitudes toward gender equality (Beta=0.27) and prospective expectation (Beta=0.20). 
Figure 4.8 Influence of Economic and Cultural Factors on the Kappa Index of
Religious Cleavage, 1980-2008
Note: The results of 1996 and 2008 were excluded. In both cases, the values of the 
logistic coefficients were too large because there was no vote for the Republican Party 
among the Jewish group in 1996 and Black Protestants in 2008. 
Figure 4.8 shows the trend of religious cleavage and the influence of the 









    
     
     
     
     
     
      
      
      
      
      
      
economic and cultural factors did not influence the trend of religious cleavage. However, 
unlike the pattern of class cleavage, the trend of the influence of economic and cultural 
factors is consistent throughout the period. The magnitude of the Kappa Index for both 
models is highest in 2000.  
Influence of Economic and Cultural Factors on Presidential Voting in the Macro-
regional Cleavage Model (Hypothesis 2-3 and 3-3)
Table 4.11 Model fit of Macro-regional Cleavage
2LL df BIC
Model 1 (year only) 7211.96 7 7272.01
Model 2 (Model 1 + macro-region) 7198.43 11 7292.80
Model 3 (Model 2 + control variables) 6421.84 18 6576.25
Model 4 (Model 3 + retrospective evaluation) 6277.58 19 6440.57
Model 5 (Model 3 + prospective expectation) 6339.54 19 6502.54
Model 6 (Model 3 + abortion attitudes) 6085.89 19 6248.89
Model 7 (Model 3 + gender equality attitudes) 6216.84 19 6379.84
Model 8 (Model 3 + gay/lesbian attitudes) 6026.80 19 6189.80
Model 9 (Model 3 + 2 economic variables) 6242.07 20 6413.64
Model 10 (Model 3 + 3 cultural variables) 5776.52 21 5956.67
Model 11 (Model 3 + 2 economic var. & 3 cultural var.) 5603.19 23 5800.51





     
            
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
            
            
            
             
            
           
           
           
           
           
           




    
Table 4.12 Economic and Cultural Factors on Macro-region Voting, 1984-2008  
Model 3 Model 11










































-0.27 0.10 39.59 0.55
-0.08 0.13 5.80 0.74
-0.09 0.09 5.06 0.81
0.00 0.10 0.00 0.99
0.14 0.06 22.88 1.33
0.06 0.01 2.85 1.02
-0.06 0.00 4.11 1.00
-0.32 0.03 89.84 0.74
-0.15 0.15 5.84 0.70
0.79 0.22 125.65 11.29
0.14 0.20 9.87 1.85
0.09 0.10 6.19 1.28
0.33 0.10 72.49 2.28
0.31 0.10 66.09 2.32
0.18 0.12 26.55 1.90
0.08 0.11 4.32 1.26
0.18 0.15 25.36 2.10
0.28 4.02 1.75
-0.17 -0.08 0.10 2.55
-0.04 -0.01 0.14 0.09
0.17 0.08 0.10 2.84
0.15 0.06 0.11 1.86
0.03 0.01 0.07 0.19
-0.05***-0.12 0.02 11.26
0.00* 0.07 0.00 4.38
-0.34***-0.37 0.03 95.88
-0.55***-0.23 0.16 11.27
2.42*** 0.79 0.23 109.08
0.58** 0.13 0.21 7.22
0.25*** 0.40 0.03 98.42
0.14*** 0.19 0.03 29.43
0.4*** 0.43 0.03 135.28
0.17*** 0.28 0.02 55.81
0.02*** 0.56 0.00 200.77
0.08 0.03 0.11 0.49
0.16 0.06 0.12 1.79
0.67*** 0.24 0.11 34.76
0.19 0.05 0.14 1.86
-0.44***-0.14 0.13 11.32

























Note: ***: p<0.001, **: p<0.01, *: p<0.05. The dependent variable is Presidential voting. 
The reference variable for macro-region is the Pacific region. N=5,318.
Table 4.11 shows model fit statistics (Log-likelihood and BIC) for the macro-
regional cleavage models. Table 4.12 shows the binary logistic regression analysis of the 
relationship between macro-region and the Presidential voting pattern between 1984 and 




    
 
  
   











that all five variables improved the fit of each model, that is, Model 4 (-2LL: 6277.58,
BIC: 6440.57), Model 5 (-2LL: 6339.54, BIC: 6502.54), Model 6 (-2LL: 6085.89, BIC: 
6248.89), Model 7 (-2LL: 6216.84, BIC: 6379.84), and Model 8 (-2LL: 6026.80, BIC: 
6189.80) all showed improvement over Model 2 (-2LL: 7198.43, BIC: 7292.80). Table 
4.11 further indicates that the five variables improved the fit of each model over Model 3 
(-2LL: 6421.84, BIC: 6576.25). 
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for retrospective evaluation is equal to 
zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=144.26, df = 1, p <0.01). The effect of 
retrospective evaluation on Presidential voting was thus statistically significant at the 
0.01 level. 
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for prospective expectation is equal to 
zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=82.30, df=1, p <0.01). The effect of 
prospective expectation on Presidential voting was thus statistically significant at the 0.01 
level.  
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for attitudes toward abortion is equal 
to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=335.94, df=1, p <0.01). The effect
of attitudes toward abortion on Presidential voting was thus statistically significant at the 
0.01 level. 
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for attitudes toward gender equality is 
equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=205.00, df=1, p <0.01). The 
effect of attitudes toward gender equality on Presidential voting was thus statistically 
















    
  
 
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for attitudes toward gays and lesbians
is equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=395.03, df=1, p <0.01). 
The effect of attitudes toward gays and lesbians on Presidential voting was thus 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
The hypothesis that the coefficients for retrospective evaluation and prospective 
expectation are simultaneously equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-
square=179.77, df=1, p <0.01). At least one of these coefficients was statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level. The BIC also improved in Model 9 (from 6576.25 to 
6413.64)
The hypothesis that the coefficients of attitudes toward abortion, gender equality, 
and gays and lesbians are simultaneously equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR 
Chi-square=645.32, df=1, p <0.01). At least one of these coefficients was statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level. The BIC also improved in Model 10 (from 6576.25 to 
5956.67).
The hypothesis that the coefficients of the two economic variables (retrospective 
and prospective evaluation) and three cultural variables (attitudes toward abortion, gender
equality, and gays and lesbians) are simultaneously equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 
level (LR Chi-square=818.64, df=1, p <0.01). At least one of these coefficients was 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The BIC also improved in Model 11 (from
6576.25 to 5800.51).
Table 4.12 shows that the Wald statistic was statistically significant for
retrospective and prospective economic evaluation and attitude toward abortion, gender












   
 
In Table 4.12, the South, Mountain, and Midwest regions were statistically 
significant in Model 3. On the other hand, no macro-regional variable was statistically 
significant in Model 11. 
The standardized coefficients of the economic and cultural variables show that
attitudes toward gays and lesbians had the strongest effect (Beta=0.56). The next 
strongest influence was attitudes toward abortion (Beta=0.43) followed by retrospective 
evaluation (Beta=0.40), attitudes toward gender equality (Beta=0.28), and prospective 
expectation (Beta=0.19).
Figure 4.9 Influence of Economic and Cultural Factors on the Kappa Index of 5-
category Macro-regional Cleavage, 1980-2008 
Figure 4.9 shows the trend of macro-regional cleavage and the influence of 









    
     
     
     
     
     
      
      
      
     
      
      
 
  
Overall, economic and cultural factors did not influence the trend of macro-regional 
cleavage. The magnitude of the Kappa Index for both models is relatively flat until 1996 
and highest in 2000 and 2008.  
Influence of Economic and Cultural Factors on Presidential Voting in the Micro-
regional Cleavage Model (Hypothesis 2-4 and 3-4)
Table 4.13 Model fit of Micro-regional Cleavage
2LL df BIC
Model 1 (year only) 5862.51 5 5904.36
Model 2 (Model 1 + micro-region) 5738.80 7 5797.39
Model 3 (Model 2 + control variables) 5297.86 14 5415.04
Model 4 (Model 3 + retrospective evaluation) 5241.20 15 5366.75
Model 5 (Model 3 + prospective expectation) 5262.17 15 5387.72
Model 6 (Model 3 + abortion attitudes) 5038.93 15 5164.48
Model 7 (Model 3 + gender equality attitudes) 5108.52 15 5234.07
Model 8 (Model 3 + gay/lesbian attitudes) 4962.50 15 5088.05
Model 9 (Model 3 + 2 economic variables) 5224.49 16 5358.41
Model 10 (Model 3 + 3 cultural variables) 4761.05 17 4903.34
Model 11 (Model 3 + 2 economic var. & 3 cultural var.) 4683.30 19 4842.33




   
     
            
          
           
          
           
           
          
           
          
           
            
            
            
            
            
           
          
          
          





     
     
Table 4.14 Economic and Cultural Factors on Micro-region Voting, 1984- 2000 
Model 3 Model 11


































-0.22 0.09 25.84 0.64
-0.25 0.09 32.64 0.59
0.14 0.07 17.99 1.33
0.00 0.02 0.00 1.00
-0.06 0.00 2.55 1.00
-0.28 0.04 56.71 0.77
-0.15 0.17 4.99 0.69
0.63 0.25 67.78 7.69
0.06 0.23 1.51 1.32
0.10 0.10 5.80 1.27
0.34 0.10 67.71 2.21
0.31 0.10 57.74 2.18



























































Note: ***: p<0.001, **: p<0.01, *: p<0.05. The dependent variable is Presidential voting. 
The reference variable for micro-region is central city. N=4,316.
Table 4.13 shows model fit statistics (Log-likelihood and BIC) for the micro-
regional cleavage models. Table 4.14 shows the binary logistic regression analysis of the 
relationship between micro-region and the Presidential voting pattern between 1984 and 
2000 before and after economic and cultural factors were added. Table 4.13 indicates that




















5366.75), Model 5 (-2LL: 5262.17, BIC: 5387.72), Model 6 (-2LL: 5038.93, BIC: 
5164.48), Model 7 (-2LL: 5108.52, BIC: 5234.07), and Model 8 (-2LL: 4962.50, BIC: 
5088.05) showed improvement over Model 3 (-2LL: 5297.86, BIC: 5415.04).
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for retrospective evaluation is equal to 
zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=56.66, df=1, p <0.01). The effect of 
retrospective evaluation on Presidential voting was thus statistically significant at the 
0.01 level. 
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for prospective expectation is equal to 
zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=35.69, df=1, p <0.01). The effect of 
prospective expectation on Presidential voting was thus statistically significant at the 0.01 
level.  
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for attitudes toward abortion is equal 
to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=258.93, df=1, p <0.01). The effect
of attitudes toward abortion on Presidential voting was thus statistically significant at the 
0.01 level. 
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for attitudes toward gender equality is 
equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=189.34, df=1, p <0.01). The 
effect of attitudes toward gender equality on Presidential voting was thus statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level. 
The hypothesis that the logistic coefficient for attitudes toward gays and lesbians
is equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-square=335.36, df=1, p <0.01). 
The effect of attitudes toward gays and lesbians on Presidential voting was thus 



















The hypothesis that the coefficients of retrospective evaluation and prospective 
expectation are simultaneously equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR Chi-
square=73.37, df=1, p <0.01). At least one of these variables was statistically significant 
at the 0.01 level. The BIC also improved in Model 9 (from 5415.04 to 5358.41)
The hypothesis that the coefficients of attitudes toward abortion, gender equality, 
and gays and lesbians are simultaneously equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 level (LR 
Chi-square=536.81, df=1, p <0.01). At least one of these cultural variables was 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The BIC also improved in Model 10 (from
5415.04 to 4903.34).
The hypothesis that the coefficients of the two economic variables (retrospective 
and prospective evaluation) and three cultural variables (attitudes toward abortion, gender
equality, and gays and lesbians) are simultaneously equal to zero was rejected at the 0.01 
level (LR Chi-square=614.56, df=1, p <0.01). At least one of these variables was 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The BIC also improved in Model 11 (from
5415.04 to 4842.33).
Table 4.14 shows that the Wald statistic was statistically significant for
retrospective and prospective economic evaluation and attitudes toward abortion, gender
equality, and gays and lesbians in Model 11.  
In Table 4.14, the coefficients of suburban and rural residence were statistically 
significant in Model 3. However, the coefficient of rural residence was not statistically 
significant in Model 11. 
The standardized coefficients showed that attitudes toward gays and lesbians had 















attitudes toward abortion (Beta=0.39) followed by attitudes toward gender equality
(Beta=0.31), retrospective evaluation (Beta=0.29), and prospective expectation 
(Beta=0.14).
Figure 4.10 Influence of Economic and Cultural Factors on the Kappa Index of Micro-
regional Cleavage, 1980-2000
Figure 4.10 shows the trend of the 3-category micro-regional cleavage and the 
influence of economic and cultural factors on class cleavage between 1980 and 2000. 
Overall, economic and cultural factors did not influence the trend of micro-regional 














The current study examines the relationship between social cleavage and 
Presidential voting between 1980 and 2008. Social cleavage represents the influence of 
social structure on voting behavior. Even though there are various types of structural 
factors – such as economic structure, social structure, and cultural structure – electoral 
scholars who study cleavage tend to focus on social group membership when examining 
the relationship between social structure and voting behavior. Thus, the current study 
examines the relationship between social cleavage and voting behavior to examine the 
influence of social structure on voting behavior. 
The Decline of Traditional Social Cleavages
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argue that social cleavage has a stable relationship with 
political voting patterns since it was created by two societal revolutions – national and 
industrial revolutions – in industrialized countries. Because Lipset and Rokkan (1967)
argue that the relationship between social cleavage and voting behavior had remained 
stable until the 1960s, which is known as the “freezing hypothesis,” many electoral 
scholars have examined whether this stable relationship has continued to be aligned or 
has dealigned or realigned. Some scholars argue that political voting patterns were

















1960s; however, others suggest that political voting patterns continued to be aligned or
realigned with social group membership and that social cleavage still influences political
cleavage (Inglehart and Abramson 1994; Franklin, Mackie, and Valen 1992; Franklin
2010; Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995; Manza and Brooks 2008). Franklin (2010) argues 
that voting patterns were dealigned with social group membership and that the magnitude 
of class cleavage has declined since the 1960s. Franklin, Mackie, and Valen (1992)
acknowledge the existence of political cleavage, but are skeptical about the relevance of 
Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) classical definition of cleavage. On the other hand, Manza 
and Brooks (1999), using advanced methodology and social cleavage schemas, show that
social cleavage did not decline until the 1990s
There may be various reasons why the magnitude of social cleavage declined. 
One possibility is that the influence of intra-group division became stronger than that of
inter-groups divisions. The traditional concept of cleavage deals with inter-group 
divisions based on class, religion, and region; however, there is also a possibility of intra-
group divisions among social groups. For example, there may be Catholic working-class, 
conservative Protestant working-class, and liberal Protestant working-class members in 
the same working-class group. So, if there is variation based on religious group 
membership, there may be intra-group divisions among groups of the same class. For this 
reason, it is necessary to consider intra-group division of social groups for electoral 
studies.  
However, if the magnitude of intra-group divisions is stronger than that of inter-
groups divisions, it may be because the influence of one social cleavage is stronger than 










   
  






candidates or attitudes toward various election-specific issues, are more influential than 
long-term factors such as social group membership on voting behavior. 
Because the traditional concept of social cleavage applies to inter-group divisions, 
the current study focuses on inter-group divisions. Although the current study deals with
intra-group division by examining the influence of short-term factors on long-term
factors, the main focus of the current study is limited to traditional social cleavages. 
Thus, the influence of intra-group divisions on vote choice will be a subject for future 
research. 
The Influence of Short-Term Factors on Voting
The current study contributes to this debate about social cleavage by analyzing the 
social cleavage pattern of the U.S. Presidential elections since the 1980s. The study 
demonstrates the influence of both long-term factors (social cleavages) and short-term
factors (evaluation of previous performance and expectation of prospective policies) on 
Presidential elections. It also shows the relative importance of short-term factors on 
Presidential voting. 
Social cleavage has been influenced by social structural change and short-term
factors, such as attitudes toward economics and culture. Although many scholars agree
with Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) argument, others argue that the decline of social
cleavage results from the influence of short-term factors (Franklin, Mackie, and Valen 
1992; Dalton 1996; Manza and Brooks 1999). Franklin, Mackie, and Valen (1992) assert 
that since 1960s traditional social cleavage does not reflect the change of social change 
caused by feminist movement, civil rights movement, and post-materialism. Still other 













   
 
     
influential on voting (Key 1966; Kramer 1971; Fair 1978; Inglehart and Flanagan 1987; 
Erikson 1989; Welch and Hibbing 1992; Carmines, Gerrity, and Wagner 2010; Wilcox 
1992; 1994)
The current study tested hypotheses about social cleavages to examine the 
argument that social cleavage has declined. This study also tested hypotheses about the 
influence of economic and cultural factors on Presidential voting in the social cleavage 
models between 1980 and 2008. If the argument about the decline of social cleavage is 
correct, then social cleavage in Presidential elections will show low levels of magnitude. 
If economic and cultural factors strongly influence social cleavage in Presidential voting, 
then the magnitude of social cleavage will decline when economic and cultural variables
are controlled. Additionally, the study examined the relative strength of economic and 
cultural factors on the relationship between social cleavage and Presidential voting. 
Continued Influence of Regional Cleavage on Voting
This study also investigated regional cleavage patterns in national elections. 
Regional cleavage is important in the analysis of Lipset and Rokkan (1967). However, 
there are relatively few studies of regional cleavages, although geopolitical studies often 
focus on regional differences of voting patterns (Gainsborough 2005; McKee and Shaw 
2003; McKee and Teigen 2009). Regional cleavage continues to influence political 
behavior after the nation-building process. Many studies suggest that political preferences
differ across regions, such as the South and non-South and cities, suburbs, and rural
areas. Since the 1930s, regional differences in urbanization and suburbanization have 

















    
     
  
dimensions of social cleavage in U.S. Presidential elections by using more specific 
measurements of macro- and micro-regions. 
Significance of Social Cleavage on Voting between 1980 and 2008
Significance of Class Cleavage
Debate about the decline of class cleavage thesis is one of the main topics in 
political sociology. Some studies indicate that class voting declined because of the 
influence of post-materialism, emergence of racial issues, working class affluence, 
weakening of labor unions, and influence of welfare states (Inglehart and Flanagan 1987;
Inglehart and Abramson 1994; Carmines and Stimson 1984; Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 
1989). Absolute measurement, such as the Alford Index, was used in these studies to 
demonstrate the decline of class voting: however, when other investigations used relative 
measurement to analyze social structural change, they showed that class cleavage was 
still influential in Presidential voting in industrialized countries after the 1960s (Heath et 
al. 1985; Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1995; Weakliem 1995; Goldthorpe 1999). The 
decline of class cleavage thesis also implies that social structural factors, such as social
class, do not substantially influence individuals’ political behavior. The current study 
explores whether social structural factors influenced individuals’ political behavior 
between 1980 and 2004. The study used the class classification of Manza and Brooks 
(1999), which originated from Goldthorpe (1980), to investigated class cleavage between 
1980 and 2004. While Manza and Brooks (1999) investigate class cleavage in the United 
States until the 1990s, this study extended the period to 2004. 
The study finds that class was a significant predictor of voting behavior in 








   
  
 








class cleavage shows “trendless fluctuation” through 1992, and the current study shows 
that class cleavage was constant through 2004. So the current study supports Manza and 
Brooks (1999) and shows that the constant trend of class cleavage did not change until 
recently. Hout and Moodie (2007) also confirm that the trend of class cleavage had 
remained flat through 2004 although class coalitions realigned in the United States 
starting in the 1960s. Many European scholars show that class cleavage is still influential 
in European elections (Rennwald 2014; Goldberg and Sciarini 2014; Vanhoutte and 
Hooghe 2013; Jansen, Evans, and De Graaf 2013). 
Significance of Religious Cleavage
Religious cleavage was also investigated. Religious cleavage in the United States 
was explained by the ethnocultural model of voting theory in the 19th century (Benson 
1961; Kleppner 1970; Jensen 1971; Formisano 1971; McCormick 1974; Feller 1992). In 
the early 20th century, debates about evolutionism affected religious cleavage in the 
United States. Since World War II, the relationship between political preferences and
religious membership has changed due to secularization and a decline of 
denominationalism (Manza and Brooks 1999). Many scholars studied the contribution of
the Christian Right movement on the victory of the Republican Presidential candidates in 
the 1980s (Brooks and Manza 2004; Claassen and Povtak 2010). Other scholars argued 
that the Christian Right movement led by the Christian Coalition was more successful 
than the movement led by the Moral Majority in the 1980s (Williams 2010; Wilcox 
1994). Still other scholars argued that the de-alignment of Catholics and Mainline 
Protestants changed the relationship between political preferences and religious 



















   
  
and Brooks (1999: 38) state that “the magnitude of the religious cleavage remains
substantial” between 1960 and 1992. The current study extended the period to elections 
between 1980 and 2008 and found that religious variables significantly affected
Presidential voting during this period. This study also shows that the magnitude of 
religious cleavage was highest in 2000 although it soon dropped to its previous level.
This study also shows that the magnitude of religious cleavage is biggest of the four 
kinds of social cleavage. Raymond (2011) also shows that religious cleavage still has an 
important influence on vote choice in the United States, and the magnitude of religious 
cleavage is larger than that of other social cleavages. European scholars also show that 
religion is still influential on vote choice in European countries (Emmenegger and 
Manow 2014; Botterman and Hooghe 2012). Thus, religious cleavage should be 
considered in electoral studies. 
Significance of Regional Cleavage
Regional cleavage in the United States has received less attention than class and 
religious cleavages, although sectional cleavage was one of the main factors influencing 
political preferences in the 19th century (Turner 1932; Key 1942; Archer 1988; Layman 
2001). Mendelson (1977) argues that micro-regional cleavage became more influential 
than macro-regional cleavage in elections since the 1930s; however, Archer (1988)
argues that macro-regional cleavage was more influential than micro-regional cleavage in 
elections by analyzing county-level data between 1940 and 1984. Even though the 
current study did not compare the relative influence of macro-regional and micro-
regional cleavage in Presidential elections, it showed that both regional cleavages











A binary logistic regression analysis of a pooled dataset of Presidential elections 
between 1980 and 2008 showed that social groups have significantly affected these 
elections since the 1980s. The effect of class, religion, macro-region (5-category), and 
micro-region (3-category, 5-category, and 6-category) was tested using the Likelihood 
Ratio test (lr test). The fit of the model without social group variables was compared to 
that of the models with social group variables. The results showed that most social group 
variables have statistically significant effects on Presidential voting. Class variables were 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level in the Likelihood Ratio test. Thus, we conclude 
that class groups significantly predicted Presidential voting behavior over the study 
period. The Kappa Index of class cleavage, not including control variables, was 0.33, 
meaning that the standard deviation of log-odds ratios of class groups was 0.33. It 
decreased to 0.22 when control variables were added. The overall trend of the Kappa 
Index showed that class cleavage increased as an influence on Presidential voting 
between 1980 and 2004. The Kappa Index values of 2000 and 2004 were greater than 
those of the 1980s and 1990s. Class group membership, therefore, continues to influence 
Presidential voting, in agreement with the argument of Manza and Brooks (1999) rather 
than that of Franklin, Mackie, and Valen (1992). 
Religious variables were statistically significant at the 0.01 level in the Likelihood 
Ratio test, showing that religious group membership predicts Presidential voting 
behavior. The Kappa Index of religious cleavage without control variables, was 1.06. 
That is, the standard deviation of log-odds ratios of class groups was 1.06. It decreased to 









   





increased until 2000 and decreased in 2004. The overall magnitude of the Index was 
greater for religious cleavage than for class cleavage. Religious group membership thus 
seems to be the more influential factor in voting behavior in Presidential elections. 
Regional cleavage at the macro- and micro-levels were analyzed. A 5-category 
macro-regional variable was used to analyze cleavage across the South, 
Mountains/Plains, Midwest, Pacific Coast, and Northeast regions. The macro-regional 
variables were statistically significant at the 0.01 level in the Likelihood Ratio test, and
the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) value did not improve when these variables 
were added in the model. The Kappa Index of the 5-category macro-regional cleavage
variables without control variables, was 0.14, and it increased to 0.22 when control 
variables were included. Furthermore, the magnitude of the 5-category macro-regional 
cleavage was less than these of the class and religious cleavages. 
Micro-regional cleavage was examined with three different variables: a 3-
category variable (city, suburban, and rural), a 5-category variable (core, inner suburb,
mature suburb, emerging suburb, and exurb), and a 6-category variable (from belt 1
(central city, large Metropolitan Area) to belt 6 (other rural area)) classifications. These 
three different measures were statistically significant at the 0.01 level in the Likelihood 
Ratio test. The BIC value also improved when the three micro-regional variables were 
added to the model. The Kappa Index values of the 3-, 5-, and 6-category micro-regional 
cleavages without control variables were 0.39, 0.47, and 0.45, respectively. These values
decreased to 0.32, 0.29, and 0.32, respectively. The level of micro-regional cleavages was 
similar among the three measures when control variables were added. The magnitudes of 















class cleavage; conversely, micro-regional cleavages were lower in magnitude than 
religious cleavages.  
Consequently, social group membership and geographical residence are judged to 
be significant factors in Presidential elections between 1980 and 2008. That is, voters’ 
political preferences are based on their social group membership and geographical 
residence. Political cleavage based on religious group membership is the greatest. Voters
also have more distinctive political preferences based on micro-regional residence 
compared to macro-regional residence.  
These results are consistent with recent studies on the relationship between social 
group membership and Presidential voting behavior (Evans 1999; Hout and Moodie 
2007; Raymond 2011; Zingher 2014). Social group memberships based on class, religion, 
and region are statistically significant variables between 1980 and 2008. Even though it 
seems as if the Kappa graphs have variations, overall, the graphs show that the trend in
social cleavage is not declining. Thus, the thesis regarding the decline of social cleavage 
in Presidential voting must be reconsidered in electoral studies and the social basis of 
voting should continue to be considered in future studies of Presidential voting.
Influence of Economic and Cultural Issues on Social Cleavage, 1980-2008 
Influence of Economic Issues
The influence about influence of economic and cultural factors on voting behavior 
is a key issue in political sociology. Economic issues became important in politics after 
the United States became industrialized and became more salient with the introduction of 
the New Deal policy. (Lynch 1999; Lin 1999). Although economic factors include both 



















subjective economic assessment is more important than objective economic conditions in 
voting behavior because subject measures are more closely related to voting behavior. 
Key (1966), Kramer (1971), and Fiorina (1981) emphasize the importance of 
retrospective economic voting rather than prospective economic voting, assuming 
individuals tend to vote based on the economic performance of the incumbent party 
because voters do not have enough information about future candidates’ policies. On the 
other hand, Stigler (1973) suggests that voters have an interest in prospective policy 
rather than in retrospective economic evaluation. The current study found that
retrospective economic evaluation had a relatively stronger effect on Presidential voting 
between 1980 and 2008 than did prospective economic evaluation. Both economic factors 
were statistically significant in the analyses. 
Influence of Cultural Issues
Cultural issues became important factors in Presidential voting preference after
World War II, and gender equality, abortion, and gay and lesbian issues became 
particularly important after the early 1970s (Inglehart and Flanagan 1987; Layman and 
Carmines. 1997; Adams 1997; Carmines and Woods 2002; Williams 2010). Many studies
have explored the influence of cultural factors on political behavior. For example, Killian 
and Wilcox (2008) argue that abortion attitudes influence political preferences. Carmines
and Woods (2002) suggest that the general public was polarized on the abortion issue in
the 1990s and that abortion has been an important issue for political elites since the late 
1970s. Campbell and Monson (2008) maintain that the gay marriage initiative was a main 
cause of political cleavage in the Presidential election of 2004. Conover (1988) argues 














Manza and Brooks (1998) assert that attitude toward the feminist movement is related to 
voting behavior. The current study found that three cultural variables significantly affect
Presidential voting. Attitudes toward gays and lesbians had the strongest effect among 
these variables and had a stronger effect than the economic variables. On the other hand, 
attitudes toward gender equality had a weaker effect on Presidential voting than 
retrospective evaluation in all the models except the micro-region voting model. 
Findings
The binary logistic regression analysis showed that economic and cultural factors
are significantly associated with Presidential elections between 1984 and 2008, and that 
the magnitude of social cleavage changed when economic and cultural variables were 
included. The statistical effect of the two economic and three cultural variables on 
Presidential elections was tested by using the likelihood ratio test (lr test) and the BIC. In 
the lr test, the fit of the model, including economic and cultural variables, was compared 
with that of the models that excluded the economic and cultural variables. The results 
showed that economic and cultural variables have statistically significant effects on 
Presidential voting both individually and concurrently in the models for the four social 
cleavages examined (class, religion, macro-region, and 3-category micro-region). 
These results showed that social cleavages are still influential even after 
controlling for voters’ economic evaluations and attitudes toward cultural issues. 
Raymond (2011) also argues that (1) social cleavage has an indirect influence on vote 
choice through short-term factors, such as economic evaluations, Left-Right self-
placement, and party leader preference, and (2) the influence of social cleavage may be 












   
and short-term factors influence Presidential election voting, so it is necessary to examine 
the relative strength of these two variables and to examine how short-term variables 
change the relationship between social cleavage and Presidential election voting in future 
studies.  
The current study shows that voters’ attitudes toward economic and cultural 
issues are statistically significant in social cleavage voting models. When attitudes toward 
economic and cultural issues are added to social cleavage models, the magnitude and 
significance level of the logistic coefficients of social groups also change; however, it is 
hard to interpret the change of magnitude and significance level of logistic coefficients
when attitudes toward economic and cultural issues are added to the social cleavage 
models. This is because the total variance of dependent variables differs between models; 
however, there is a possibility that attitudes toward economic and cultural issues may 
influence social groups’ voting patterns because the significance levels of logistic 
coefficients of social groups change after attitudes toward economic and cultural issues 
are added to social cleavage models. For example, the significance level of the coefficient 
for routine white-collar became non-significant when short-term factors, such as attitudes 
toward economic and cultural issues, were added to the class voting model. In the 
religious voting model, the coefficient of no religion changed from significant to non-
significant when the attitudes toward economic and cultural issues were added to the
religious voting model. In the macro-region voting model, the significance level changed 
to insignificant for three macro-region group variables – namely, the South, Mountain, 
and Midwest. In the micro-region voting model, the significance level of the logistic 














These results show that short-term factors may explain some of the voting
patterns of social groups. Thus, it is necessary to measure how attitudes toward economic 
and cultural issues influence social groups’ voting patterns in the binary logistic 
regression models. The relative size of effect of the variable that measured attitudes 
toward gays and lesbians is the strongest among the economic and cultural variables in
the four social cleavage models. The variable that measured abortion attitudes has the
second strongest effect in these models. The variable for retrospective economic 
evaluation has the third strongest effect in these models while the variable that measured 
attitudes toward gender equality has the third strongest effect in the 3-category micro-
region model. The measure of attitudes toward gender equality has the fourth strongest 
effect in the class, religion, and macro-region cleavage models. The variable that 
measured prospective economic expectation has the weakest effect in all four social 
cleavage models.  
These results show that attitudes towards gays and lesbians were more influential 
than attitudes toward economic issues on social groups’ voting patterns between 1980 
and 2008; however, it is necessary to examine how the relative size of the effect of 
attitudes toward economic and cultural issues changes over time because the trajectories
of attitudes toward cultural and economic issues vary over time. For example, attitudes 
toward gays and lesbians began to be liberalized dramatically in the 1990s (Keleher and 
Smith 2012; Baunach 2011; 2012; Hicks and Lee 2006; Brewer 2003). The general 
public’s attitudes toward abortion became polarized in the 1990s, although it became 
polarized among political elites in the late 1970s (Carmines and Woods 2002; Carmines, 












between 1974 and 1994, but this trend stagnated after 1994 (Cotter, Hermsen, and 
Vanneman 2011). Attitudes toward abortion and feminism changed over time as well 
(Jelen and Wilcox 2003; Adamczyk 2013). Although these three issues became 
politically important in the 1970s, the trajectories of attitudes toward cultural issues vary 
over time. For this reason, the stagnation of the liberalization of gender equality may be 
one reason why attitude toward gender equality shows a relatively weaker effect on 
Presidential voting than attitudes toward gays and lesbians or abortion. Thus, the relative 
strength of attitudes toward cultural issues on voting behavior needs to be examined over 
time.
Attitudes toward economic issues show a relatively weaker effect on voting 
behavior than attitudes toward cultural issues; however, the current study does not show 
whether attitudes toward economic issues have a stronger effect on Presidential voting
than social group membership. The relative strength of voters’ economic perception and 
social group membership may differ over time. Thus, it is necessary to examine which 
factor has a stronger effect on voting behavior between long-term factors, such as social 
group membership, and short-term factors, such as attitudes toward economic issues. 
Furthermore, future studies should examine the trajectories of both factors in terms of 
relative strength. 
Limitations and Future Research
The limitations of this study need to be considered. First, the primary purpose was 
to examine the existence of social cleavages between 1980 and 2008, so the study did not 
investigate change over time in the relationship between class and Presidential voting. All 










remains relatively constant between 1980 and 2008. Although the trend of social 
cleavage was demonstrated by calculating the magnitude of social cleavage by election 
year, this procedure did not provide statistical evidence for change of social cleavage 
over time. Thus, the statistical significance of temporal change in social cleavage in 
Presidential elections needs to be examined, which may be accomplished in future 
research by using interaction variables between election years and social groups. 
Second, this study does not take into account for change across time in the 
influence of economic and cultural factors on Presidential voting. The study examined 
the influence of economic and cultural variables on Presidential voting between 1984 and 
2008; however, it did not explore temporal change in the influence of economic and 
cultural factors on Presidential voting. It is necessary, therefore, to include variables for 
the interaction between time and the economic and cultural variables to investigate the 
possibility of temporal change in the effect of economic and cultural variables in future 
studies.  
Third, this study did not examine the magnitude of the influence of economic and 
cultural variables on social cleavages. In linear regression, it is possible to calculate the 
magnitude of the influence of third variables (Z) on the independent variable (X) by 
comparing the coefficient of the independent variable (X) with and without the third 
variables. The difference of the coefficients of the independent variable show the 
magnitude of the influence of the controlled variables in linear regression (Mood 2010; 
Karlson, Holm, and Breen 2012). Williams (2011) explains that, in OLS regression, the 
total variance of dependent variable (Y) is fixed and it consists of two variances: variance 












variance of Y is fixed, it is possible to examine the degree of change of the variance 
explained by the independent variables (X) and residual variance (Ԑ) when the control 
variables (Z) are added. 
However, in the logistic regression model, the total variance of Y is not fixed. 
Instead, the residual variance is fixed, so changes were observed in both total variance 
and explained variance when control variables are added. For this reason, the change of 
the coefficients of the independent variables can be explained by influences of both 
control variables and by a rescaling of the model. The increase of explained variance may 
therefore cause the increase of total variance. Because the total variance of the dependent 
variable changes when control variables are added, it is hard compare the coefficients of
two nested models. Williams argues that “comparisons of coefficients between nested 
models and across groups do not work the same way in logistic regression as they do in 
OLS” (Williams 2011). Thus, it is hard to estimate how much the control variables, such 
as the economic and cultural variables, mediate, confound, or explain the association 
between social groups and Presidential voting. Fortunately, several scholars have 
suggested alternatives to address this problem (Allison 1999; Williams 2009; Karlson, 
Holm, and Breen 2012; Breen, Karlson, and Holm 2013). Thus, in a future study, these 
methods will be applied to examine the influence of economic and cultural factors on the 
association between social groups and Presidential voting. 
Fourth, this study did not consider group size and voter turnout because the 
primary purpose was to focus on the structural relationship between social groups and 
Presidential voting. That is, the study examined the political preference of a specific 
















turnout. Even though the size of a specific group may change, the structural association 
between the group and the voting pattern is relatively constant, if the proportion of the 
group’s vote for the specific party does not change. Without considering group size and 
voter turnout, it is hard to examine the actual contribution of a social group to the election 
result. Accordingly, future research should take group size and voter turnout into account 
more accurately to ascertain the magnitude of the influence of social groups on the 
political alignment of specific parties in Presidential elections.
Fifth, this study does not consider social cleavages along the lines of gender and 
race. Rather, the study considers traditional types of cleavage, such as class, religion, and 
region, using gender and race as control variables. However, gender and race became 
important sources of social cleavage beginning in the 1960s (Manza and Brooks 1998;
1999; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000; Ogorzalek 2011). Although some scholars argue that 
the importance of race declined in American politics after President Obama was elected 
in 2008, Ogorzalek (2011) argues that race remained an important factor and influenced 
the Presidential election in 2008. He argues that “the election of Obama itself was not
actually a triumph of post-racial politics” because racial cleavage is still influential in 
American politics (Ogorzalek 2011:27). Thus, future research will need to examine the 
influence of gender cleavage and race cleavage on Presidential voting.  
Sixth, the NES pooled data were collected by telephone-interview methods as 
well as face-to-face interview methods in 1992, 1994, 2000. Respondents of telephone-
interview methods may differ from respondents of face-to-face interview methods
(Malhotra and Krosnick 2007). Although it would be desirable to consider the mode of













                                                 
  
avoid sample size reduction. However, it is recommended that the mode of data
collection be taken into account in future studies. 
Seventh, some information is not available in the NES dataset. For example, the 
NES does not provide county-level information after 2000. For this reason, micro-
regional cleavage could be analyzed only until 2000. However, researchers may obtain 
county-level data through the Restricted Data Access (RDA) process. It may be necessary 
then to use the county-level data for the election years of 2004, 2008, and 2012 in future 
research. Additionally, the NES has not published occupational information for 2008 
because of cross-year consistency issues. The NES staff explained that “the pre-existing 
coding system was abandoned in 2008. The 2012 data have not yet been coded at all.”3 
Thus, class variables could be created only until 2004. In future research, it will be 
possible to use the class variables of 2008 and 2012 based on occupation once the NES 
publishes the necessary occupational coding information. 
Eighth, the current study only deals with inter-group divisions even though there
is a possibility of intra-group divisions among social groups. To examine the effect of 
intra-group divisions on vote choice, it is necessary to use a more advanced statistical 
methodology. One possible way is to test statistical effects of interaction variables
between class and religion, between class and region, and between religion and region in 
the social cleavage voting models in future studies. Another way to test intra-group 
divisions would be to measure social cleavages separately based on other types of social 
division. For example, class cleavage may be different when it is measured separately for 










different religious groups, such as Protestants, Catholics, and Jewish groups; however,
another methodology may be used to test the intra-group division effect on Presidential
elections and the relationship between intra-group and inter-groups divisions. Thus, it is 
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